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Abstract
The main research focus of this thesis lies on the role of preferences in international trade
theory, with a particular emphasis on how preferences determine the production structure,
shape the trade pattern and influence the welfare effects of trade in open economies. The
articles in this thesis contain three modeling approaches, which discuss the central topic
of preferences in trade theory from different perspectives: (i) a specific form of parametric
“price-independent generalized-linear” (PIGL) preferences with price distortion on the
labor market, (ii) more general parametric PIGL preferences with a perfectly competitive
labor market and (iii) a specific form of parametric PIGL preferences with search frictions
and a labor market imperfection. This allows a broad discussion on how preferences
affect the equilibrium outcomes in closed and open economies depending on the modeling
approach.
After a short introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 relies on a subclass of parametric
PIGL preferences and includes rent sharing to capture feedback effects of trade on income.
This generates a two-way linkage between income and trade. We set up a home-market
model with two sectors, producing differentiated goods and a homogeneous outside good,
and labor as the only factor input. Assuming that households differ in their effective
labor supply, this leads to differences in their level of labor income. We show that the
country featuring a higher ex ante level and/or dispersion of per-capita income has a larger
home market and becomes net-exporter of differentiated goods in the open economy. Due
to a price distortion on the labor market, the trade pattern is an important factor of
welfare in the open economy. The country that increases its market share and net-exports
differentiated goods benefits from trade, whereas the other country can lose.
Chapter 3 displays a generalization of Chapter 2 with regard to the choice of prefer-
ences, as it relies on a more general form of parametric PIGL preferences, giving rise to
an integrability problem. Introducing differentiated intermediate goods that are costlessly
assembled to a nontradable, homogeneous luxury good in the model variant of Chapter 2
with perfectly competitive labor markets, allows us to solve the integrability problem for
two homogeneous final goods. In the open economy, all other things equal, this makes the
country with the relatively higher demand for the luxury good and thus the larger domes-
tic market for differentiated intermediates a net-exporter of intermediate goods. However,
with the same market clearing wage paid in the two sectors, the welfare effects of trade
are always positive for both trading partners, irrespective of the trade structure.
Chapter 4 contains a two-country model featuring the same parametric PIGL prefer-
ences as in Chapter 2. Adding search frictions and firm-level wage bargaining, Chapter
4 elaborates on the role of preferences for employment and welfare effects of trade. We
introduce a home-market model with a homogeneous goods sector, producing under per-
fect competition, and a differentiated goods sector, distorted on the labor market. In the
open economy, the larger country specializes on the production of differentiated goods and
net-exports these goods, at the cost of a higher economy-wide rate of unemployment. The
welfare effects of trade depend on the preference structure, such that the large country is
likely to benefit from trade if preferences are homothetic, whereas losses from trade are
possible if preferences are quasilinear. The opposite is true in the smaller country.
The thesis concludes with a summary in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Ever since the publication of the Linder (1961) hypothesis, the research field of interna-
tional trade has substantially raised attention for demand-side factors as explanations of
patterns of trade. In a first informal account, Linder (1961) has established that countries
which are similar in their per-capita income purchase similar bundles of products causing
large (intra-industry) trade flows in these products. The similarity in market size as a key
determinant of international trade is the focus of the new trade theory, founded by Krug-
man (1979, 1980), who motivates intra-industry trade due to love-of-variety preferences.
Krugman’s (1979; 1980) seminal contributions mark the first formal models highlighting
the role of preferences in international trade theory, thereby explaining mutual exchange
of goods within industries between similar countries. Markusen (1986) has developed a
first theoretical model to explain the impact of per-capita income on the structure of in-
ternational trade in a setting with intra- and inter-industry trade. Thereafter, departing
from the standard assumption of homothetic taste in theoretical and empirical models of
trade, which makes these models analytically challenging, became more prevalent.1 The
three articles in this thesis capture demand-side factors for explaining trade by using non-
homothetic preferences. The discussion of “price-independent generalized-linear” (PIGL)
preferences (cf. Muellbauer, 1975, 1976) in a trade context marks an important contri-
bution, since thereby not only the level of per-capita income but also the dispersion of
per-capita income can be taken into account in one model framework.2 In the remainder of
the introduction, the contents of Chapters 2-4 are briefly summarized, whereas a detailed
overview of the respective literature and a thorough discussion about the contributions of
the different models are postponed to the respective chapter.3
Chapter 2 is entitled “Nonhomothetic Preferences and Rent Sharing in an Open Econ-
omy”.4 We develop a framework for studying how differences in the level and/or dispersion
1Recent contributions relying on nonhomothetic preferences are for instance Fajgelbaum et al. (2011),
Fieler (2011), Bertoletti and Etro (2017) and Foellmi et al. (2018).
2Evidence in favor of income dispersion as an important factor for explaining international trade flows
has been reported, for instance, by Flam and Helpman (1987), Francois and Kaplan (1996), Dalgin et al.
(2008), Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) and Bernasconi (2013).
3This cumulative dissertation contains three separate chapters, whose contents originate from au-
tonomous manuscripts. Therefore, notations are adopted from the respective manuscripts and might
differ between the chapters. Chapters 2 and 4 build on joint work with Hartmut Egger, whereas Chapter
3 is based on a single-authored work.
4This chapter is based on Egger and Habermeyer (2019). When working on this article, we have ben-
efited from comments by Timo Boppart, Carsten Eckel, Sergey Kichko, John Morrow, Peter Neary, Marc
1
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of per-capita income affect trade structure and welfare in a two-country model. Thereby,
we embed nonhomothetic preferences into a home-market model with two sectors of pro-
duction and one input factor. Relying on a subclass of parametric PIGL preferences for
which a closed form representation of direct utility exists, we avoid an integrability prob-
lem. We associate the homogeneous outside good with a necessity and differentiated goods
with luxuries, and we assume that heterogeneity of income arises due to heterogeneity of
households in their effective labor supply. We then show that, in line with other models
featuring home-market effects, countries have a trade surplus in the good for which they
have relatively higher domestic demand, making the country with a higher level and/or
dispersion of per-capita income a net-exporter of luxuries. The structure of trade is ir-
relevant for welfare in the open economy if both sectors pay the same wage. If, however,
the sector producing luxuries pays a wage premium due to rent sharing at the firm level,
there are feedback effects of trade on the level and dispersion of per-capita income, which
can lead to losses from trade in the country net-exporting necessities.5 In an extension of
our model, we show that our results remain intact when we allow for positive assortative
matching of workers featuring high effective labor supply with jobs offering high wages in
the sector of luxuries. In a second extension, we show that the assumption of nonhomo-
thetic preferences seems less important when supply-side differences are the main motive
for inter-industry trade.
In Chapter 3 – “PIGL Preferences, Income Differences and International Trade” –
we rely on a more general class of parametric PIGL preferences as compared to Chapter
2, for which an explicit solution for the direct utility function does in general not exist.
This gives rise to an integrability problem, since it is a priori not clear that the demand
functions derived from indirect utility are in fact the solution to a well-defined utility max-
imization problem. So far, this integrability problem has not been solved for a continuum
of differentiated goods. We modify the problem by introducing differentiated intermediate
goods along the lines of Ethier (1982b), which are assembled to a homogeneous luxury
good. This allows us to solve the integrability problem for two final homogeneous goods
by following insights from Boppart (2014). In order to highlight the impact of the form of
preferences on trade pattern and welfare, Chapter 3 abstracts from a price distortion on
the labor market und thus from feedback effects of trade. We employ the more general
form of parametric PIGL preferences in a two-country home-market model of interna-
tional trade. The economy is populated by heterogeneous households, who differ in their
efficiency units of labor which leads to income differences. Labor is the only input fac-
tor for the production of homogeneous necessities and differentiated intermediate goods,
which are used for the production of a costlessly assembled, homogeneous luxury good.
Associating trade with the exchange of necessities and intermediates, we show that the
Muendler and Federico Trionfetti. We are grateful to participants of the TRISTAN Workshop at the Uni-
versity of Bayreuth, the Göttingen Workshop on International Economics, the Research Workshop of the
Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics, the European Trade Study Group, the Midwest International
Trade Meeting, the European Economic Association, and Research Seminars at Aix Marseille University,
the Universities of Bayreuth, Hagen, Munich, and Nuremberg for helpful comments and suggestions.
5Recent examples dealing with firm-level wage setting in models of international trade are, for instance,
Davidson et al. (2008), Egger and Kreickemeier (2009, 2012), Helpman et al. (2010) and Helpman and
Itskhoki (2010).
3country with the higher level and/or dispersion of per-capita income exhibits a larger
domestic demand for the luxury good and net-exports differentiated intermediate goods,
which is in line with the well-established model of the home-market effect. In the absence
of feedback effects of trade, both countries gain from trade, whereas the magnitude of the
welfare gains may differ. Thus, we can show that the fundamental insights of Chapter 2
extend to a generalization of parametric PIGL preferences.
The main purpose of Chapter 4 is to investigate “How Preferences Shape the Wel-
fare and Employment Effects of Trade”, when allowing for involuntary unemployment.
In economic research, it is well-established that the form of labor market imperfection
influences the welfare and employment effects of trade.6 Chapter 4 goes one step further
and studies the relevance of consumer preferences for the effects of trade on unemploy-
ment and welfare in the presence of a labor market distortion. We set up a trade model
with two countries, two sectors, and one production factor, which features a home-market
effect due to the existence of trade costs. We consider search frictions and firm-level wage
bargaining in the sector producing differentiated goods and a perfectly competitive labor
market in the sector producing a homogeneous good. Consumers have “price-independent
generalized-linear” preferences over the two types of goods, covering homothetic and quasi-
linear preferences as two limiting cases. We show that trade between two countries that
differ in their population size leads to an expansion of the differentiated goods sector and
a contraction of the homogeneous good sector in the larger economy. This induces the
larger country to net-export differentiated goods at the cost of a higher economy-wide rate
of unemployment in the open economy (with the effects reversed for the smaller country).
The welfare effects of trade depend on the preference structure. Looking at the two lim-
iting cases, we show that the large country is likely to benefit from trade if preferences
are homothetic, whereas losses from trade are possible if preferences are quasilinear. The
opposite is true in the smaller country. This reveals an important role of preferences
for the welfare effects of trade in the presence of labor market imperfection, a result we
further elaborate on in two extensions, in which we consider more general preferences and
differences of countries in their per-capita income levels.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the most important results and presents concluding
remarks.
6Notable examples are Brecher (1974), Davis (1998a), Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), Helpman et al.
(2010) and Helpman and Itskhoki (2010).
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Chapter 2
Nonhomothetic Preferences and
Rent Sharing in an Open Economy
“Trade operates with [... a] fundamental bias in favor of richer and
progressive regions against the other regions [... so] that even the
handicrafts and industries existing earlier in the other regions are
thwarted.”
— Myrdal (1957, p. 28)
2.1 Introduction
Comparative advantage has been widely acknowledged as the engine of international trade
and an important source of welfare gain since David Ricardo’s book “On the Principles of
Political Economy and Taxation” more than two centuries ago. It took almost one and a
half centuries before the dominance of this supply-side view has been broken by Linder’s
(1961) hypothesis that demand-side factors are also important for explaining international
trade patterns. Providing a first, informal account of a new trade theory that emphasizes
mutual exchange of goods within industries between similar countries, the first fully-fledged
model of intra-industry trade is due to Krugman (1979, 1980). Krugman’s new trade
theory highlights similarity in market size as a key determinant of international trade,
whereas Markusen (1986) and Flam and Helpman (1987) show that the level and dispersion
of income constitute further demand-side factors when deviating from the assumption of
homothetic preferences. This makes two variables, whose changes to international trade
have been the target of economic research for a long time, determinants of the existence of
trade. The last two decades have seen a revived interest in models featuring nonhomothetic
preferences, as they promise a better description of real world trade flows (cf. Fajgelbaum
et al., 2011; Markusen, 2013). We use them here to study under which conditions Myrdal’s
widely shared concern that trade widens the gap between rich and poor countries is justified
and show that it is not only the difference in the initial level but also in the dispersion of
per-capita income that matters for the welfare effects of trade.
For this purpose, we introduce a class of nonhomothetic preferences that are simple
enough to warrant analytical tractability of a model featuring trade between two countries,
which differ in the level and/or dispersion of per-capita income, and allow to dissect the
5
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welfare effects of this asymmetry into an exogenous component, determining the trade
pattern in the open economy, and an endogenous component, capturing the feedback
effects of trade. We consider a two-sector economy that adopts important features of the
home-market model proposed by Helpman and Krugman (1985). There is one sector with
monopolistic competition producing differentiated varieties and another sector producing
a homogeneous good under perfect competition, with both sectors using labor as the only
input of production. Due to the assumption of nonhomothetic preferences, we can give the
output produced by the two sectors an intuitive interpretation from consumer theory. The
differentiated goods are luxuries and the homogeneous good is a necessity, as suggested by
Francois and Kaplan (1996).1 Since the expenditure share for luxuries increases in income,
the assumption of nonhomothetic preferences makes the level and dispersion of per-capita
income important determinants of the size of the home market for luxuries and hence also
crucial factors of the trade pattern in the open economy. To distinguish ex ante differences
in the level and/or dispersion of per-capita income from ex post differences materializing
from trade liberalization, we impose two additional assumptions. On the one hand, we
assume that households differ in their effective labor supply (as in Fajgelbaum et al., 2011)
and, on the other hand, we consider firm-level rent sharing through individual bargaining
(as in Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010) to generate sector-specific wages and allow for feedback
effects of trade on nominal wage income.
To model nonhomothetic utility, we rely on “price-independent generalized-linear”
(PIGL) preferences proposed by Muellbauer (1975, 1976). These preferences are more
general than the Gorman class, but still admit a representative consumer, who is charac-
terized by an expenditure level for which the value (expenditure) shares of consumption
equal the value shares of the aggregate economy.2 The existence of a representative con-
sumer makes these preferences particularly suited for aggregating consumer demand over
households with heterogeneous income. However, PIGL preferences have the disadvantage
that an explicit solution for the direct utility function usually does not exist. This gives
rise to an integrability problem as outlined by early contributions of Antonelli (1886) and
Samuelson (1950), because it is a priori not clear that the underlying demand system
results from a constrained utiliy maximization problem. To overcome this issue, we use a
subclass of PIGL preferences, for which a closed form representation of the direct utility
function can be determined (see Boppart, 2014). This subclass is still general enough
to cover two prominent preference specifications as limiting cases. The first one are ho-
mothetic Cobb-Douglas preferences and the second one are nonhomothetic quasilinear
preferences. In both cases, preferences have Gorman form with linear Engel curves so
that, by assumption, changes in the dispersion of income do not affect market demand.
Except for these limiting cases Engel curves are, however, not linear. They are convex
for luxuries and concave for necessities. With non-linear Engel curves, the representative
1For instance, Rauch (1999) classifies electronic products, automobiles, and motorcycles as differentiated
goods and thus luxuries in our context, whereas cotton fabrics, food, and tobacco products are not classified
as differentiated and can therefore be associated with necessities in our model.
2As put forward by Muellbauer (1975), PIGL preferences are the most general class of preferences that
avoid an aggregation problem with heterogeneous households by admitting a well-defined representative
consumer. If the thus defined expenditure level corresponds to the mean of expenditures, PIGL preferences
have Gorman form.
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consumer used for aggregation does not have a normative interpretation. To discuss wel-
fare implications of trade, we therefore must take a stance on distributional justice and
we do so by choosing a utilitarian perspective that gives each household the same weight
in the social welfare function.3
Due to the non-linearity of Engel curves, demand for luxuries is larger in the country
that features a higher level and/or higher dispersion of per-capita income, which, follow-
ing the reasoning from the literature on home-market effects, is the country that has a
trade surplus in luxuries in the open economy. Larger differences of countries in their
expenditure structure lead to a stronger specialization in production, raising inter- and
reducing intra-industry trade. Therefore, the model considered here is consistent with Lin-
der’s (1961) hypothesis that more equal per-capita income levels of two economies provide
larger scope for (intra-industry) trade in those goods, for which local demand is an im-
portant determinant of production.4 As put forward by Davis (1998b), the home-market
effect is more pronounced at lower trade costs, making intra-industry trade less important
if the two economies become more integrated. If both sectors pay the same wage, there are
gains from trade in our model, which are independent of the trade structure in the open
economy and thus the same for the two economies. This changes when employment in the
sector of luxuries promises a wage premium, so that the allocation of workers influences
the level and dispersion of per-capita income. In this case, the trade pattern becomes a
determinant of welfare with two important consequences for our analysis.
First, there are nominal income losses for workers losing their jobs in the production of
luxuries, which captures the widespread concern that not all workers equally benefit from
globalization. Whereas this insight is not new and has received a lot of media attention
through recent publications by Autor et al. (2013) and Dauth et al. (2014), our analysis
points to the role of demand-side factors and shows that losers are more likely to be found
in countries with a lower initial per-capita income level. However, things can be even
worse for the poorer economy. Losing market share in the sector of luxuries can lead to an
increase in the consumer price index and hurt all households. Hence the specialization of
production, while usually understood as an important channel for generating gains from
3One may prefer a prioritarian view on distributional justice that gives higher weight to poorer house-
holds (cf. Parfit, 1997). However, since our welfare function features social inequality aversion even when
weighting poor and rich households equally, a prioritarian view would not have a large impact on our qual-
itative results. Furthermore, one may be more interested in changes in real GDP per-capita than changes
in welfare. However, determining real GDP per-capita requires the construction of an exact consumer
price index. Whereas Feenstra and Reinsdorf (2000) and Hamilton (2001) have made significant progress
in determining such an exact price index for a class of nonhomothetic preferences introduced by Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980), which deliver an almost ideal demand system (AIDS), their insights are of limited
help for our analysis. On the one hand, except for the limiting case of Cobb-Douglas, the preferences
considered here do not belong to this class (see Pollak and Wales, 1992, for a discussion). On the other
hand, Almås et al. (2018) point out that computing a single consumer price index has the inherent problem
of disregarding the fact that households with different income levels differ in their expenditure shares if
preferences are nonhomothetic. Hence, choosing a single consumer price index fails the purpose of mea-
suring the cost-of-living of heterogeneous households. To avoid the problems associated with constructing
a proper consumer price index, we therefore focus on the effects on welfare instead of real GDP in our
analysis.
4Empirical evidence in favor of the Linder (1961) hypothesis has been reported, for instance, by Thursby
and Thursby (1987), Bergstrand (1989, 1990), and Hallak (2010). Francois and Kaplan (1996), Dalgin et al.
(2008), Bernasconi (2013), and Vollmer and Martínez-Zarzoso (2016) show that bilateral trade is not only
affected by differences in the level of per-capita income but also by differences of the two trading partners
in their distributions of income.
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trade, can be a source of welfare loss. Losses from trade can exist in our model only for
the country that loses market share in the sector featuring increasing economies to scale.
However, in contrast to insights from Graham (1923), Markusen and Melvin (1981), and
Ethier (1982a), it is not the existence of economies to scale per se that gives scope for
welfare loss. Rather losses from trade are the result of a price distortion in the labor
market, which makes our results akin to findings by Brecher (1974) and Davis (1998b)
and builds on the fundamental insight from the theory of second best that welfare losses
from trade are possible if the market equilibrium in the closed economy has not been
socially optimal (cf. Markusen, 1981; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984). Our analysis shows
that welfare losses can result from differences in demand-side factors and exist although
the price distortions in the labor market are the same in the two economies.
Second, with non-linear Engel curves the concentration of disposable income becomes
a further determinant of the home market for luxuries. A lower dispersion of disposable
income can make a country net-importer of luxuries and therefore worse off with trade than
under autarky. This insight challenges policy measures put forward by the literature to
distribute the gains from trade more equally. On the one hand, it cannot be ruled out that
all households lose from trade, leaving no scope for a redistributive policy intervention. On
the other hand, a policy intervention that targets ex ante sources or ex post realizations
of an unjust distribution, while maintaining gains from trade in the aggregate, may not
be feasible. Lowering the dispersion of per-capita income decreases the home market for
luxuries with potentially detrimental welfare consequences. Therefore, the analysis in this
paper raises doubts that so far discussed policy measures remain promising instruments
to increase support for trade liberalization (cf. Davidson and Matusz, 2006; Egger and
Fischer, 2018), when accounting for demand-side determinants of trade in a setting with
nonhomothetic preferences.
We complement our analysis on the link between trade patterns and welfare by two
extensions of our model. In the first extension, we give up the simplifying assumption that
workers are assigned to the production of luxuries by a lottery that does not discriminate
between different levels of effective labor supply. This is, because in the benchmark model
firms producing luxuries have to pay the same job installment costs for each unit of labor
input and are therefore indifferent between employing workers with low or high effective
labor supply. Assuming instead that firms have to pay the same job installment costs per
worker, gives them an incentive for selecting applicants with higher effective labor supply
to reduce their employment costs. If screening the pool of applicants is not costless and
gives an imprecise signal about the effective labor supply (as in Helpman et al., 2010),
the thus modified framework features endogenous fixed and variable production costs in
the sector of luxuries and thus an additional margin for adjustments to trade. Despite
these complications the results from our analysis are largely unaffected. In a second ex-
tension, we analyze whether the choice of preferences is also important for understanding
the consequences of supply-side differences for trade structure and welfare, pointing to a
determinant of the international exchange of goods that has been put forward by tradi-
tional models of trade theory. We consider differences in the price distortion at the labor
market as the supply-side asymmetry of the two economies and, to keep things simple,
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assume that rent sharing only exists in the foreign economy. This gives home a compar-
ative advantage in the production of luxuries, making it a net-exporter of these goods in
the open economy. As a consequence, home gains from trade, whereas the welfare effects
in foreign are less clear. We show that irrespective of the specific nature of preferences,
foreign loses from a small reduction of initially high trade costs if the price distortion
in the labor market is high, while it benefits from the decline in trade costs if the price
distortion is small. This result is in line with the more general observation that welfare
losses from forfeiting market share in the sector exhibiting increasing economies to scale
are more likely if trading partners are more dissimilar (cf. Francois and Nelson, 2002).
Emphasizing the role of demand-side factors for explaining trade patterns in a set-
ting with nonhomothetic preferences, we build on work by Markusen (1986, 2013) and
Bergstrand (1990) who employ Stone-Geary preferences to explain how differences in per-
capita income affect the trade structure in open economies.5 Simonovska (2015) uses
Stone-Geary preferences to explain the positive relationship between (relative) prices of
tradable goods and per-capita income. Relying on preferences that produce linear En-
gel curves, market demand in these settings is independent of the distribution of income
and an aggregation problem over heterogeneous households therefore does not exist. The
aggregation problem is also avoided by a number of studies using non-Gorman form prefer-
ences with symmetric households. An early prominent example in this respect is Stockey
(1991), who considers nonhomothetic preferences in a setting with vertically differenti-
ated products to shed light on the trade structure between rich and poor countries and
to explain empirical evidence that new, high quality products are first consumed in rich
countries and are only at later stages also consumed in poor countries. Fieler (2011)
introduces preferences that do not have Gorman form to explain the role of per-capita
income for trade structure in a multi-country Ricardian model along the lines of Eaton
and Kortum (2002), and she uses this model to show that a technology shock in China
has different effects on countries with differing per-capita income levels. Caron et al.
(2014) employ nonhomothetic preferences to improve the predictions of the Heckscher-
Ohlin Vanek model regarding the factor content of trade and show that their correction is
quantitatively important. Matsuyama (2015) introduces nonhomothetic preferences into a
home-market model to study the effects of per-capita income differences on trade structure
and to analyze how the benefits of technological progress are distributed between the rich
and the poor country. Matsuyama (2018) uses the same class of preferences to show how
trade liberalization and economic growth affect the patterns of structural change, inno-
vation, and trade in the presence of Engel’s Law.6 Whereas these models do not provide
5Bergstrand (1989) shows how the gravity equation has to be adjusted in order to account for differences
in per-capita income along with differences in factor endowments as key determinants of bilateral trade.
Hunter (1991) provides early empirical evidence that accounting for per-capita income differences may
explain missing trade in empirical work based on Heckscher-Ohlin models.
6Both Fieler (2011) and Caron et al. (2014) build on a generalized CES preference structure, in which
the demand elasticities of income and prices are constant and proportional (as suggested by Pigou’s Law).
Matsuyama (2015, 2018) considers an even more general class of isoelastically nonhomothetic CES prefer-
ences, which allow to decouple the effects generated by income elasticity differences and those generated
by price elasticity differences. As put forward by Bertoletti and Etro (2018) and Fally (2018), the CES
preferences used by Matsuyama (2015, 2018) lead, similar to the Gorman-Pollak form preferences con-
sidered by Bertoletti and Etro (2017), to a “generalized separable” demand system, which has the nice
property that other prices enter the demand functions through a common price index (see Pollak, 1972).
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new insights for the aggregation of consumer demand over heterogeneous households, the
preferences are useful for aggregating consumer demand over heterogeneous goods, and
hence for solving a problem that is relevant for quantitative studies.
A final group of studies avoids problems from aggregating consumer demand over
households with heterogeneous income levels by making the consumption decision a bi-
nary choice. For instance, Matsuyama (2000) imposes nonhomothetic ‘0-1’ preferences
into a Ricardian model of North-South trade with a continuum of goods and shows that
acknowledging the nonhomotheticity of preferences changes the insights from an otherwise
identical Dornbusch et al. (1977) model regarding the role of technological advancement,
population growth, and income redistribution in the South on the terms-of-trade and wel-
fare in the two economies.7 Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) build on the preference structure
proposed by Flam and Helpman (1987) and assume that households purchase one unit
of a vertically differentiated good and allocate the rest of their expenditures on the con-
sumption of a homogeneous outside good. Assuming that quality of the differentiated
good and quantity of the homogeneous good are complements makes their preferences
nonhomothetic, because the impact of income on indirect utility depends on the chosen
quality of the differentiated good. To allow for monopolistic competition between firms
producing horizontally differentiated varieties of the same quality level, Fajgelbaum et al.
(2011) augment their discrete choice mechanism with a stochastic utility term (similar
to McFadden, 1978), and they use this framework to provide a reasoning for the empir-
ical observation that richer countries export goods of higher quality (see Hallak, 2010).
Using PIGL preferences, we aggregate demand of heterogeneous households relying on a
representative consumer and complement previous work on how differences in the level
and/or dispersion of per-capita income shape trade in an open economy, by emphasizing
the intensive margin through differences in the consumption level of luxuries.
Employing a mechanism of rent sharing, our model also contributes to a sizable litera-
ture dealing with firm-level wage setting in models of international trade. Recent examples
to this literature include Davidson et al. (2008), Egger and Kreickemeier (2009, 2012),
Helpman et al. (2010), Felbermayr et al. (2011), and Amiti and Davis (2012). Relying on
individual bargaining between firms and a continuum of workers in a home-market model
with two sectors of production makes the analysis in this paper akin to Helpman and
Itskhoki (2010). In contrast to them, we consider homogeneous producers, because firm
heterogeneity of the Melitz (2003)-type would complicate the analysis but not affect our
results. Furthermore, we assume that rent sharing only exists in one sector, acknowledging
the rich evidence on (persistent) inter-industry pay gaps (see Krueger and Summers, 1988;
Blanchflower et al., 1996; Katz and Autor, 1999). Associating the sector featuring rent
sharing with the sector producing luxuries captures the widespread view that employer
characteristics are important determinants of these pay gaps (see Dickens and Katz, 1987;
Neary et al. (2017) introduce a demand system for which the elasticity of marginal revenue with respect
to total revenue is constant. While having no direct link to other demand systems, it has the interesting
property to be dual to the demand system derived from PIGL preferences in Neary and Mrázová (2017).
7Foellmi et al. (2018) consider a model with hierarchical ‘0-1’ preferences and consumption indivisibilities
to shed light on the role of per-capita income differences for explaining ‘export zeros’ observed in the world
trade matrix. Wheras similar to Matsuyama (2000), their preferences allow for aggregation of consumer
demand over heterogeneous households, they do not elaborate on income dispersion within countries.
2.2. THE CLOSED ECONOMY 11
Abowd et al., 2012). Finally, we abstract from search frictions and assume that workers
who do not find a job in firms producing luxuries are employed in the production of ne-
cessities at the market clearing wage (see Bastos and Kreickemeier, 2009). We make this
assumption, because we are not interested in employment effects per se, but want to shed
light on how the reallocation of labor between sectors offering different wages alters the
welfare effects of trade in a setting with nonhomothetic preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we set up the
basic structure of our model and discuss the closed economy equilibrium. In Section
2.3, we study trade between two countries that are symmetric in all respects, except for
the level and/or dispersion of per-capita income. There, we also discuss how differences
in the level and/or dispersion of per-capita income affect trade structure and welfare in
the open economy. In Section 2.4, we consider two extensions, in which we allow for
positive assortative matching of workers featuring high effective labor supply with firms in
the sector of luxuries and shed light on the differences between demand- and supply-side
asymmetries. Section 2.5 concludes with a summary of our results.
2.2 The closed economy
We consider a static economy that is populated by a continuous set H of single-person
households with Lebesgue measure H. In their role as workers, households inelastically
supply labor input for the production of goods. Effective labor supply is household-specific
and distributed over interval [λ, λ] according to a continuously differentiable cumulative
distribution function L(λ). Ex ante differences in λ are an important factor of ex post
differences in household income and consumption expenditures. Assuming that preferences
do not have Gorman form, both the level and dispersion of income are decisive for the
aggregate demand for two types of goods: necessities, n, which are homogeneous, and
luxuries, ℓ, which are differentiated. However, the link between effective labor supply and
household income is exacerbated by a price distortion in the labor market that makes
wages sector-specific.
2.2.1 Preferences and household consumption
To establish a link between the distribution of household expenditures and aggregate
demand, we consider price-independent generalized-linear (so-called ”PIGL”) preferences
introduced by Muellbauer (1975, 1976), which can be represented by an indirect utility
function of the following form
v
(
P, ei
)
= 1
ε
[
ei
a(P)
]ε
+ b(P), (2.1)
where P is a price vector, ei is expenditure of household i and ε is a constant. The
preferences specified in Eq. (2.1) do not entail an aggregation problem, because they allow
to define a representative expenditure level such that a household with this expenditure
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level has the same value (expenditure) shares of consumption as the aggregate economy.8
We consider a subclass of PIGL preferences and assume that households have preferences
over two goods, which are represented by an indirect utility function of the following form:
v(Pn, Pℓ, ei) =
1
ε
(
ei
Pℓ
)ε
− β
ε
(
Pn
Pℓ
)ε
− 1− β
ε
, (2.2)
where Pn, Pℓ are prices for goods n and ℓ, respectively, and ε, β ∈ (0, 1) is assumed. As
explained by Boppart (2014) and formally shown in the Appendix, in contrast to more
general forms of PIGL preferences, Eq. (2.2) has a closed form representation of the direct
utility function, which proves to be useful for the computation of a proper price index if one
of the goods is a composite of differentiated varieties that are sold under imperfect compe-
tition (see below). In the limiting cases of ε, the preferences in Eq. (2.2) correspond to two
specifications widely used in the literature. If ε → 0 preferences are Cobb-Douglas and
therefore homothetic, delivering an indirect utility function of v(Pn, Pℓ, ei) = ln
[
ei
PβnP
1−β
ℓ
].
If ε → 1, preferences are quasilinear and therefore nonhomothetic, delivering an indirect
utility function of v(Pn, Pℓ, ei) = e
i
Pℓ
− β PnPℓ − 1 + β.
Applying Roy’s identity to the indirect utility in Eq. (2.2), we can derive Marshallian
demand functions for Xin and Xiℓ according to
Xin = β
(
ei
Pn
)1−ε
and Xiℓ =
ei
Pℓ
1− β ( ei
Pn
)−ε , (2.3)
respectively. The Engel curve of good n is concave, making this good a necessity with
its value share of consumption decreasing in the expenditure level. In contrast, the Engel
curve for good ℓ is convex, making this good a luxury with its value share of consumption
increasing in the expenditure level. In the limiting cases of ε → 0 and ε → 1 preferences
have Gorman form and Engel curves are therefore linear in the expenditure level. To
ensure that both goods are purchased by household i, it must be true that ei/Pn > β1/ε
and we impose a parameter constraint below that establishes this result.
That Engel curves for necessities and luxuries are differently shaped is the result of
assuming that the respective goods enter the utility function asymmetrically. This asym-
metry is justified in our model, because we assume that necessities are homogeneous,
whereas luxuries are differentiated and can be aggregated to the composite discussed
above according to
Xiℓ =
[∫
ω∈Ω
xiℓ(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
, (2.4)
where σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between the differentiated varieties
8The term of generalized linearity has been introduced by Muellbauer (1975) to emphasize that the
preferences are more general than the Gorman class which features consumption levels that are linear in
expenditures, thereby making the value shares of consumption independent of the overall expenditure level.
This property does not extend to other preference classes. However, generalized linear preferences accord
with the weaker condition that the ratio of marginal value shares of any two goods are independent of the
overall expenditure level. The notion of price independency is used by Muellbauer (1975) to express that
the representative expenditure level, for which an individual household chooses the same value shares of
consumption as the aggregate economy, is the same for all permissible prices.
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xiℓ(ω) from set Ω. The price corresponding to the composite Xiℓ is an index of the prices
of differentiated varieties, pℓ(ω), and it is defined by the condition that PℓXiℓ is equal to
the household’s overall expenditures for luxuries, ∫ω∈Ω pℓ(ω)xiℓ(ω)dω. As formally shown
in the Appendix, the respective price index features constant elasticity and is given by
Pℓ ≡
[∫
ω∈Ω pℓ(ω)1−σdω
] 1
1−σ . Using Roy’s identity, we can then derive household demand
for a single variety of the luxury good, ω, according to
xiℓ(ω) =
ei
Pℓ
(
pℓ(ω)
Pℓ
)−σ 1− β ( ei
Pn
)−ε . (2.5)
Aggregating over all households, gives market demand functions
Xn =
∫
i∈H
Xindi = β
He¯
Pn
(
e¯
Pn
)−ε
ψ, (2.6)
xℓ(ω) =
∫
i∈H
xiℓ(ω)di =
He¯
Pℓ
(
pℓ(ω)
Pℓ
)−σ [
1− β
(
e¯
Pn
)−ε
ψ
]
, (2.7)
where e¯ ≡ H−1 ∫i∈H eidi is the average expenditure level of households and
ψ ≡ H−1 ∫i∈H (ei/e¯)1−ε di is a dispersion index that is defined on the unit interval and
captures how the distribution of household expenditures affects the value shares of con-
sumption. Since the Engel curve for necessities is concave, a more egalitarian distribution
of expenditures, captured by a higher value of ψ, increases aggregate demand for necessi-
ties. The opposite is true for luxuries, which feature convex Engel curves. The dispersion
index reaches a maximum level of one if the distribution of expenditures is egalitarian.
An outcome with ψ = 1 is also reached if the distribution of household expenditure is
irrelevant for aggregate demand because Engel curves are linear, as in the limiting cases
of ε→ 0 and ε→ 1.
2.2.2 Technology and the firms’ problem
The technology to produce necessities is linear in labor input and we assume that one unit
of labor produces one unit of output. Firms producing necessities enter the market at
zero cost, hire labor input at a common wage rate w, and sell their output under perfect
competition. This establishes w = Pn. Production of luxuries requires the creation of
workplaces at the costs of one unit of necessities for each labor input employed. One unit
of labor input used in a workplace produces one unit of output. To start production firms
must develop a blueprint, which comes at the cost of f units of necessities and gives them
access to a unique variety, which they can sell under monopolistic competition.
Workers are free to move between sectors up to the point where all workplaces in the
sector of luxuries are filled. Then, in each workplace workers and firms form a bilateral
monopoly and they distribute the production surplus under Stole and Zwiebel (1996)
bargaining.9 Hiring and wage setting in the sector of luxuries can be understood as a
9It has been recently pointed out by Bruegemann et al. (2018) that the microeconomic foundation of
the Stole and Zwiebel (1996) bargaining protocol does not give wage and profit profiles that coincide with
the Shapley values. However, relying on a Rolodex Game instead of the non-cooperative game put forward
by Stole and Zwiebel, one can restore equivalence of the bargaining outcome with the Shapley values.
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two-stage process and solved through backward induction. Looking first at the bargaining
problem, we can note that its solution is characterized by two conditions: a splitting rule,
determining how the production surplus achieved by an agreement is distributed between
the bargaining parties; and an aggregation rule, describing how infra-marginal production
surpluses add up to the firm’s overall surplus from multilateral bargaining with all of its
workers. The bargaining problem considered here is exacerbated by the heterogeneity of
workers in their effective labor supply. To facilitate the analysis we assume for now that
the number of different worker types employed by the firm is discrete and given by J ,
where firm index ω is suppressed because the hiring and bargaining problem is the same
for all producers.
The mass of employees of type j is Nj and the firm’s overall surplus from multilateral
bargaining with a mass of N ≡∑Jj=1Nj workers is given by
pi =
∫ N
0
µ(ν|N)rˆ(νs)dν, (2.8)
where sj is calculated as a product of the type-specific effective labor supply λj and the
pre-determined fraction of employed workers of type j, Nj/N , while s is the set of resulting
sj-values: s ≡ {s1, ..., sJ}. Furthermore, rˆ(νs) = D 1σQ(νs)1− 1σ are revenues achieved for
employment level ν, D ≡ He(1−β(e/Pn)−εψ)/P 1−σℓ is a common demand shifter, Q(·) is
a function determining how the different types of labor are aggregated in the production
process,10 and
µ(ν|N) ≡ η
ν
(
ν
N
)η
(2.9)
is a probability measure that depends on the firm’s relative bargaining power η > 0 and
determines the fraction of infra-marginal production surplus the firm can acquire in its
wage negotiations with workers. Solving the integral in Eq. (2.8) gives
pi = ησ
ησ + σ − 1D
1
σ
 J∑
j=1
λjNj
1− 1σ = ησ
ησ + σ − 1 rˆ(Ns), (2.10)
where the first equality sign uses the assumption that the labor input of different worker
types is perfectly substitutable, so that Q(νs) = ν∑Jj=1 λjNj/N .
Since workers forfeit their chance to move to the other sector when accepting the job
offer of a firm producing luxuries, they give up their outside income opportunities from
employment elsewhere. Therefore, the splitting rule determining how to distribute the
production surplus between the firm and its workers can be expressed as
∂pi
∂Nj
= ηwˆjℓ (2.11)
where wˆjℓ is labor income of a worker with effective labor supply λj . Eqs. (2.10) and (2.11)
establish the intuitive result that the wage per unit of labor input, wˆjℓ/λj , is the same for
10Under non-increasing returns to scale at the firm level, we have Q′(·) > 0, Q′′(·) ≤ 0 and thus∫ N
0 rˆ(νs)− rˆ(Ns)dν ≥ 0.
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all workers, irrespective of their effective labor supply: wˆjℓ/λj ≡ wℓ. Taking stock, we can
summarize the solution to the firm’s bargaining problem by the two equations
pi = κr, ∂pi
∂qℓ
= σ − 1
σ
κr
qℓ
= ηwℓ, (2.12)
where qℓ ≡
∑J
j=1 λjNj denotes total labor input of the firm, r ≡ D
1
σ q
1− 1
σ
ℓ gives revenues
as a function of labor input, qℓ (instead of the number of employed workers N), and
κ ≡ ησ/(ησ + σ − 1) < 1 is the constant fraction of revenues accrued by the firm in the
wage bargaining with workers, which is increasing in the firm’s relative bargaining power
η.11
Equipped with Eq. (2.12), we can now determine the solution to the firm’s hiring
problem. Recollecting from above that firms have to invest f units of necessities to start
production and one unit of necessities to install workplace capacity for each labor input,
this solution is found by maximizing Π ≡ pi − Pnqℓ − Pnf with respect to qℓ. Since firms
face the same cost for each unit of labor input, they are indifferent between all applicants
and hire a workforce whose composition mirrors the economy-wide distribution of effective
labor supply.12 The first-order condition for the firm’s profit-maximizing qℓ choice is given
by
dΠ
dqℓ
= σ − 1
σ
κr
qℓ
− Pn = 0. (2.13)
Substituting Eq. (2.12) and accounting for the definition of profits, then gives the outcome
of hiring and wage-setting for firms producing luxuries:
wℓ = αPn, Π =
κr
σ
− Pnf, (2.14)
where α ≡ η−1 gives the relative bargaining power of workers in the wage negotiation
with the firm. Eq. (2.14) has been derived under the assumption that firms producing
luxuries can attract the intended mass of applicants at a wage rate αPn. This requires
that employment at these firms promises a wage at least as high as w in order to convince
workers to accept the job offer. Hence, the wage paid in the sector of necessities establishes
a participation constraint for workers seeking employment in the sector of luxuries, so that
α ≥ 1 is needed to ensure that at least some of the workplaces installed by firms producing
luxuries are filled. If α > 1, jobs in the sector of luxuries promise a wage premium, and
hence every household prefers working there. This outcome, which we consider in the
subsequent analysis, can only be consistent with diversified production in both sectors, if
11To determine the solution of wage bargaining for a continuous set of labor types, we can first consider a
symmetric J-division of the support of effective labor supply [λ, λ] and denote the density of effective labor
supplies on the respective subdivisions by ℓ(λj). This establishes the Riemann sum:
∑J
1 λjℓ(λj)∆λj ,
with ∆λj ≡ λj − λj−1. Taking the limit, then gives limJ→∞
∑J
j=1 λjℓ(λj)∆λj =
∫ λ
λ
λdL(λ), where
ℓ(λ) = L′(λ) = dL(λ)/dλ has been considered.
12The assumption that firms have to pay the same workplace installment costs for each unit of labor input
facilitates our analysis. Under the alternative assumption that firms install the same workplace capacity
for each employee, irrespective of her effective labor supply, our model would generate an incentive for
screening the applicants in order to improve the average composition of production workers (see Helpman
et al., 2010). We discuss this case in an extension of our model.
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some of the workers are not hired by luxury producers and therefore are forced to move
to the production of necessities. Of course, these workers want to underbid wℓ. However,
underbidding cannot be successful if wage offers at stage one are not contractible. Without
a binding contract, successful applicants will rationally deviate from their initial offer to
accept a wage discount and opt for the highest wage they can achieve in the bargaining
with the firm, exploiting the protection from the bilateral monopoly that is established
after the workplaces have been filled. Hence, our model generates wage differences due to
a market imperfection that is rooted in information asymmetry and the irreversibility of
the firm’s hiring decision. Since firms can freely enter the sector of luxuries, they must
make zero profits in equilibrium, which establishes the zero-profit condition κr = σPnf ,
according to Eq. (2.14).
2.2.3 The general equilibrium
Household consumption expenditures are equal to labor income and heterogeneous for
two reasons: due to ex ante (and thus exogenous) differences in effective labor supply;
and due to differences in the wages paid by the sectors producing necessities and luxuries.
The worker achieving the lowest income has an ability level of λ and is employed in the
sector producing necessities, yielding an expenditure level of λw. Since the sector of
necessities pays a wage of w = Pn, the minimum permissible expenditure level necessary
for consuming necessities as well as luxuries then establishes a threshold level for effective
labor supply, β1/ε, that must be passed in order to ensure that even the poorest households
attribute some of their expenditures to the consumption of luxuries. To exclude corner
solutions and to focus on changes along the intensive margin of consumption, we assume
throughout our analysis that λ > β1/ε.
Nominal per-capita (labor) income is equal to average household expenditures and
given by
e = w(1− hℓ)
∫ λ
λ
λdL(λ) + wℓhℓ
∫ λ
λ
λdL(λ) = wΛ [1 + hℓ(α− 1)] , (2.15)
where Λ ≡ ∫ λλ λdL(λ) is the average effective labor supply of households and hℓ is the
fraction of workers employed in the production of luxuries, receiving wage premium α.
The dispersion index, measuring how the distribution of household expenditures affects
aggregate consumer demand, can be computed according to
ψ =
(
w
e
)1−ε [
1 + hℓ
(
α1−ε − 1
)] ∫ λ
λ
λ1−εdL(λ) = 1 + hℓ
(
α1−ε − 1)
[1 + hℓ(α− 1)]1−ε
ψλ, (2.16)
where ψλ ≡
∫ λ
λ (λ/Λ)
1−ε dL(λ) is a measure of the dispersion of effective labor supply.
In the limiting case of α = 1, producers of luxuries pay the market clearing wage wℓ =
w, implying that the dispersion of labor income in Eq. (2.16) is pinned down and fully
determined by the exogenous dispersion of effective labor supply, ψλ. If α > 1, firms
producing luxuries pay a wage premium, which amplifies the dispersion of labor income:
ψ < ψλ. The value of the dispersion index depends in a nonmonotonic way on the share
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of workers employed for producing luxuries, hℓ.13
To determine the fraction of workers receiving a wage premium, hℓ, we can combine two
preliminary results from our analysis. First, as a consequence of constant markup pricing
the wage bill paid by firms is a constant fraction σ−1σ κ = σ−1σ+α(σ−1) of their revenues. This
generates a positive link between the share of workers and the mass of firms producing
luxuries:
hℓHΛw =
σ − 1
σ
κMr. (2.17)
Since we have assumed that workers who do not find employment in the production of
luxuries can move to the sector of necessities at zero cost, there is no involuntary un-
employment in our model, and the fraction of workers employed in the production of
necessities is therefore given by 1−hℓ. The second preliminary result is the goods market
clearing condition for luxuries, which can be derived from Eq. (2.7) according to
HΛw
[
1− βΛ−εψλ
]
+ hℓHΛw
σ
σ − 1
B
κ
=Mr, (2.18)
where B ≡ σ−1σ κ
[
(α− 1)− (α1−ε − 1)βΛ−εψλ
], with limα→1B = 0, dB/dα > 0, and
limα→∞B = 1, captures how the existence of a wage premium in the sector of luxuries
augments economy-wide expenditures for luxuries. In the limiting case of α = 1 labor
income does not depend on the allocation of workers and the market size for luxuries is
therefore pinned down by the level and dispersion of effective labor supply. This makes
M in Eq. (2.18) independent of hℓ. For α > 1, employment in the sector of luxuries
promises a wage premium, so that a higher fraction of workers allocated to the production
of luxuries provides a positive effect on the market size and thus a stimulus for firm entry
in this sector. In this case, the goods market clearing condition in Eq. (2.18) establishes
a positive link between hℓ and M . Substituting zero-profit condition σPnf = κr, Eqs.
(2.17) and (2.18) can be combined to get explicit solutions for the mass of firms and the
fraction of workers producing luxuries:
M = κ1−B
HΛ [1− βΛ−εψλ]
σf
, hℓ =
σ − 1
σ
κ
1−B [1− βΛ
−εψλ]. (2.19)
Both a higher average level of effective labor supply, (a higher Λ), and a higher disper-
sion of this supply, (a lower ψλ), cause an increase in M and hℓ, because wealthier house-
holds attribute a higher fraction of their expenditures to luxuries if preferences do not have
Gorman form. Furthermore, noting κ1−B = {1 + σ−1σ [1 + (α1−ε − 1)βΛ−εψλ]}−1 < 1, it
follows from Eq. (2.19) that a higher wage premium α reduces both the mass of firms and
the fraction of workers producing luxuries. This is intuitive, because a higher α reflects a
13In the limiting case hℓ = 0, there is no one employed in the sector of luxuries making wage premium
α irrelevant and establishing ψ = ψλ. In the limiting case of hℓ = 1 all workers are employed in the
production of luxuries and receive the wage premium, again resulting in ψ = ψλ. Dispersion index ψ is
u-shaped and reaches a minimum at
hminℓ ≡ (1− ε)(α− 1)− (α
1−ε − 1)
ε(α− 1)(α1−ε − 1) ∈ (0, 1).
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stronger bargaining power of workers and is therefore associated with a lower fraction of
revenues accrued by firms in their wage negotiations, making production of luxuries less
attractive for them. However, the finding that a lower fraction of workers is employed in
the sector producing luxuries does not imply that less labor income is generated there.
The increase in wage premium α that is responsible for the fall in hℓ implies a wage stim-
ulus for those workers who continue to produce luxuries. Differentiating hℓ(α− 1) reveals
that a higher wage premium α leads to higher per-capita income e and therefore increases
economy-wide expenditures for luxuries, HΛw[1 − βΛ−εψλ]/(1 − B). The positive mar-
ket size effect from higher labor income is counteracted and dominated by a labor cost
increase for firms producing luxuries, so that higher economy-wide expenditures are con-
sistent with lower levels of M and hℓ. Using Eq. (2.19) and the constant markup-pricing
rule pℓ = σσ−1 wκ in the definition of the price index of luxuries, we can compute
Pℓ =
σ
σ − 1
w
κ
[
κ
1−B
HΛ (1− βΛ−εψλ)
σf
] 1
1−σ
. (2.20)
A higher wage premium α exerts two reinforcing effects on price index Pℓ. It increases
labor costs and therefore the price charged by firms producing luxuries, pℓ, and it induces
firm exit and thus reduces the mass of available varieties, M , thereby further increasing
Pℓ.
2.2.4 Welfare in the closed economy
We postulate a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function that is equal to the average
indirect utility of households. Accounting for Eq. (2.2), social welfare is then given by14
V (Pn, Pℓ, e, ψˆ) ≡ 1
ε
(
Pn
Pℓ
)ε [( e
Pn
)ε
ψˆ − β
]
− 1− β
ε
, (2.21)
where ψˆ ≡ H−1 ∫i∈H (ei/e¯)ε di is an inverse measure of income dispersion that is de-
fined on the unit interval and linked to the dispersion of effective labor supply, ψˆλ ≡∫ λ
λ (λ/Λ)εdL(λ), according to ψˆ = ψˆλ[1 + hℓ(αε − 1)]/[1 + hℓ(α− 1)]ε. The two dispersion
indices ψ and ψˆ are closely related but nonetheless different, except for the limiting case
of ε = 1/2. For a welfare analysis, it is useful to distinguish direct effects through changes
in the average level and dispersion of nominal income from indirect effects through adjust-
ments in the price index of luxuries caused by these changes. Furthermore, to facilitate our
analysis and to distinguish the different effects that price distortions in the product and
labor market have in our setting, we first look at the limiting case of α = 1, which yields
e = Λw, ψ = ψλ, and ψˆ = ψˆλ. For this limiting case, a higher nominal level of per-capita
14Giving equal weight to all households, we take a utilitarian perspective. Social welfare under this
perspective differs from the indirect utility of the household with a representative expenditure level. The
(price-invariant) representative level of expenditure is defined by Muellbauer (1975) to ensure that a
household with this expenditure level has the same value shares of consumption as the aggregate economy
and it is given by er ≡ e¯ψ−1/ε, according to Eqs. (2.3) and (2.6). Substituting into Eq. (2.2) establishes
v(Pn, Pℓ, er) = 1ε
(
Pn
Pℓ
)ε[( e
Pn
)ε
ψ−1−β
]
− 1−β
ε
and, due to ψ, ψˆ < 1, a utility level that is larger than social
welfare in Eq. (2.21). Since the representative consumer from Muellbauer (1975, 1976) lacks a normative
interpretation, it cannot be used for welfare analysis.
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income is rooted in a higher average level of effective labor supply and has unambiguously
positive welfare effects, because it allows for additional purchases of necessities and luxu-
ries at given prices and, at the same time, lowers the price index of luxuries through firm
entry.
In contrast, the welfare effect of a higher nominal income dispersion, which is due to
a higher dispersion of effective labor supply, is a priori not clear. On the one hand, the
welfare function in Eq (2.21) features a social aversion to income inequality, and a transfer
from a wealthier household to a poorer one that does not change their income ranking
reduces inequality and therefore increases social welfare (cf. Dalton, 1920).15 On the other
hand, the incentive to harmonize income is counteracted by a distortion of the resource
allocation that exists because households devote part of their expenditures to necessities,
which makes, all other things equal, the mass of firms entering inefficiently small from
a social planner’s point of view. As pointed out by Dhingra and Morrow (2016) this
allocational inefficiency exists because the markups charged in the two industries differ.
Introducing a transfer from poor to rich people would increase demand for luxuries and
therefore provide a (partial) remedy for the misallocation of resources, leading to a fall in
the price index of luxuries.
To gain further insights into the relative strength of the two counteracting effects,
we can evaluate the social welfare function V (·) at ε = 1/2, which establishes ψ = ψˆ.
Noting further that α = 1 yields e = ΛPn and ψ = ψλ, the welfare effects of lower income
dispersion (a higher ψλ) are then given by
dV (Pn, Pℓ,ΛPn, ψλ)
dψλ
≡
√
Pn
Pℓ
Λ
(σ − 1)2
2σ − 1− 1−
(
β/
√
Λ
)2
1− (β/√Λ)ψλ
 . (2.22)
From Eq. (2.22), positive welfare effects of lower income dispersion are more likely ceteris
paribus if σ is large.16 This is intuitive, because higher levels of σ reduce the price
markup charged by monopolistically competitive firms producing luxuries, which lowers
the problem of resource misallocation due to distorted market entry. Also, lower income
dispersion increases welfare if β is sufficiently small. In the limiting case of β → 0 the
model degenerates to a one-sector economy, in which only luxuries are produced, making
aggregate demand independent of the distribution of income.
If α > 1 the two counteracting effects described above are augmented by rent shar-
ing between firms and workers in the sector producing luxuries. As outlined above, the
existence of a wage premium makes entry less attractive and increases the price index of
luxuries, with a negative indirect effect on social welfare. This indirect effect is counter-
acted by a direct effect on social welfare, which exists, because rent sharing leads to an
15Dispersion index ψˆ is a negative monotonic transformation of the well-known Atkinson (1970) index.
In our setting, the evaluation of income inequality is, however, not the result of giving worse-off households
higher weights in the welfare function, as suggested by a prioritarian view on distributional justice (cf.
Parfit, 1997). Rather, social inequality aversion is the result of non-Gorman form preferences under a
utilitarian perspective.
16In the limiting case of σ → 1, Eq. (2.22) yields dV (·)/dψλ >,=, < 0 if β >,=, < Λ1/2
∫ λ
λ
(λ/Λ)1/2dL(λ).
For ε = 1/2, condition λ > β1/ε gives β <
∫ λ
λ
λ1/2dL(λ) and thus dV (·)/dψλ < 0 if σ → 1. In contrast,
dV (·)/dψλ > 0 holds for sufficiently high levels of σ.
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increase in the average level and dispersion of nominal income. In the limiting case of
Cobb-Douglas preferences, it is the first effect that dominates. Since the mass of firms
choosing to produce luxuries is already below the social optimum without rent sharing
(cf. Benassy, 1996), a further decrease in the mass of firms producing luxuries due to an
increase in α is detrimental for social welfare. In the limiting case of quasilinear pref-
erences, firm entry is socially optimal without rent sharing. Since the increase in labor
income triggered by rent sharing leads to an equally strong increase in the expenditures for
luxuries, the direct and indirect effect cancel, leaving social welfare unaffected. Finally, if
preferences do not have Gorman form and Engel curves are therefore nonlinear, we cannot
rule out that social welfare is higher with than without rent sharing (see the Appendix).
We complete the discussion of the closed economy by elaborating on a crucial dif-
ference between direct and indirect effects regarding the consequences that changes in
nominal income have on individual households. Whereas the direct effect of such changes
is household-specific, the indirect effect due to adjustments of the price index of luxuries
is the same for all households, provided that λ > β1/ε induces even the consumer with
the lowest income to purchase luxuries. This is a result of indirect utility in Eq. (2.2)
being an isoelastic function of price index Pℓ and it has important consequences for the
welfare effects of trade in our setting. Households can only be differently affected by trade
if moving to the open economy exerts asymmetric effects on nominal income, which is only
possible in turn if rent sharing leads to a wage premium in the sector of luxuries.
2.3 The open economy
In the open economy, we consider trade between two countries that are symmetric in
all respects, except for the average level and/or dispersion of effective labor supply.17
Trade in necessities is free of costs, and hence wage w is the same in the two economies,
provided that production remains diversified in both locations. We discuss the parameter
domain supporting diversification below. Trade in luxuries is subject to iceberg trade
costs, implying that t 1σ−1 > 1 units of the good must be shipped in order for one unit to
arrive in the foreign country.
Total domestic plus export revenues of firms in the two countries are linked by the zero-
profit conditions, κr = σPnf , κr∗ = σPnf , where an asterisk is used to indicate variables
of the foreign economy. Since production costs are the same in the two countries, the
zero-profit conditions link the differences in the price indices for luxuries to differences in
the expenditures for these goods according to
ρζ =
(
Pℓ
P ∗ℓ
)σ−1
, (2.23)
17We set HΛ = H∗Λ∗, because the effects of differences in total labor endowments are well understood
from Helpman and Krugman (1985) and because they are similar for homothetic and nonhomothetic
preferences.
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with
ρ ≡ 1− β (Λ
∗)−ε ψ∗λ
1− β (Λ)−ε ψλ
and ζ ≡ 1 +
σ
σ−1
1
κh
∗
ℓB
∗/[1− β(Λ∗)−εψ∗λ]
1 + σσ−1
1
κhℓB/[1− βΛ−εψλ]
. (2.24)
B∗ and P ∗ℓ are defined in analogy to the respective variables at home. Parameter ρ ̸= 1
reflects relative differences of the two countries in their expenditures for luxuries that are
due to ex ante differences in the average level and/or dispersion of effective labor supply,
whereas ζ captures a magnification (ζ > 1) or diminution (ζ < 1) of these differences due
to endogenous reallocations of labor and thus changes in the nominal income of households
if α > 1. The combined term ρζ captures foreign’s relative market size for luxuries and, as
explained in detail below, it is larger (smaller) than one if Λ∗ > (<)Λ and/or ψλ > (<)ψ∗λ.
To determine factor allocation and production structure in a diversification equilib-
rium, we can rely on the insight from the closed economy, that the constant markup
pricing rule establishes a positive link between the fraction of workers and the mass of lo-
cal firms producing luxuries. For home, the respective link is given by Eq. (2.17), whereas
for foreign an analogous link can be derived according to
h∗ℓHΛw =
σ − 1
σ
κM∗r∗, (2.25)
whereHΛ = H∗Λ∗ has been considered. A second link between the fraction of workers and
the mass of local firms producing luxuries is obtained from the market clearing conditions
of luxuries, which for home and foreign are given by
HΛw
[
1− βΛ−εψλ
]
+ hℓHΛw
σ
σ − 1
1
κ
B =Mr t1 + t +M
∗r∗
1
1 + t , (2.26)
HΛw
[
1− β(Λ∗)−εψ∗λ
]
+ h∗ℓHΛw
σ
σ − 1
1
κ
B∗ =M∗r∗ t1 + t +Mr
1
1 + t , (2.27)
respectively, where t/(1 + t) is the share of revenues that is due to domestic sales and
1/(1 + t) is the share of revenues that is due to exports.
Combining Eqs. (2.17), (2.25)-(2.27) and acknowledging r = r∗, we can solve for three
functional relationships between the three endogenous variables hℓ, h∗ℓ , and µ ≡M∗/M in
general equilibrium. The first relationship is obtained from substituting hℓ and h∗ℓ from
Eqs. (2.17) and (2.25) into Eqs. (2.26) and (2.27), respectively, dividing the two resulting
expressions, and solving for µ:
µ = ρ[t−B(1 + t)]− 1
t−B∗(1 + t)− ρ =
1
ρ(t)
ρ− ρ(t)
ρ(t)− ρ ≡ µ˜(ρ), (2.28)
with ρ(t) = [t−B(1+ t)]−1 and ρ(t) = t−B∗(1+ t). The link between ρ and µ established
by Eq. (2.28) is positive, dµ/dρ > 0, and depicted by the upper left panel of Figure
2.1. The equilibrium value of µ in Eq. (2.28) is independent of the realizations of hℓ, h∗ℓ ,
provided that these realizations support diversified production in the two economies. The
permissible range of ρ supporting production of luxuries in both countries is given by
interval (ρ(t), ρ(t)). Noting that limt→∞ ρ(t) = 0 and limt→∞ ρ(t) = ∞, we can conclude
that an interval of permissible levels of ρ exists if transport costs are sufficiently high. The
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parameter range supporting production of necessities in both countries is discussed below.
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium in the open economy for ρ > 1
Furthermore, substituting Mr from Eq. (2.17) into Eq. (2.26) and substituting M∗r∗
from Eq. (2.25) into Eq. (2.27), we can solve for
hℓ =
σ − 1
σ
κ
1− βΛ−εψλ
[µ+ t]/[1 + t]−B ≡ h˜ℓ(µ), (2.29)
h∗ℓ =
σ − 1
σ
κ
1− β(Λ∗)−εψ∗λ
[1 + µt]/[µ(1 + t)]−B∗ ≡ h˜
∗
ℓ (µ), (2.30)
respectively. Eq. (2.29) establishes a negative link between the fraction of workers pro-
ducing luxuries in home, hℓ, and firm ratio µ: dhℓ/dµ < 0. This is intuitive, because a
higher fraction of firms located abroad implies that fewer workers are employed for the
production of luxuries at home. Eq. (2.30) establishes a positive link between the frac-
tion of workers producing luxuries abroad, h∗ℓ , and firm ratio µ: dh∗ℓ/dµ > 0. A higher
fraction of firms located abroad implies that more workers are hired for the production
of luxuries, there. The functional relationships between firm ratio µ and the fraction of
local employment in the sector of luxuries are depicted in the upper right panel of Figure
2.1. In the lower right panel of Figure 2.1, we add an additional locus that shows how
changes in labor allocation reflected by changes in hℓ and h∗ℓ are related to changes in the
mass of firms producing luxuries in the two economies, M and M∗. The locus is obtained
from substituting zero-profit condition κr = σPnf and w = Pn into Eq. (2.17), and the
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functional relationship between M and hℓ established by this equation is the same as the
functional relationship between M∗ and h∗ℓ established by Eq. (2.25), provided that total
labor endowments do not differ in the two economies.
The open economy equilibrium is characterized by the intersection of the negatively
sloped locus h˜ℓ(µ) and the positively sloped locus h˜∗ℓ (µ) with the horizontal µ-line in the
upper right panel of Figure 2.1. In the case of symmetric countries with ρ = 1, h˜ℓ(µ)
and h˜∗ℓ (µ) intersect at µ = 1, implying that the fraction of workers and the number of
firms producing luxuries is the same in the two economies. An increase in the average
level or dispersion of effective labor supply abroad (Λ∗ > Λ or ψ∗λ < ψλ) leads to a higher
level of ρ, because foreign expenditures for luxuries increase relative to domestic ones. At
the same time, the h˜∗ℓ (µ)-locus rotates clockwise, because a higher demand for luxuries
requires for a given firm ratio µ higher labor input in order to produce the quantity of
luxuries necessary for market clearing. Because a larger fraction of firms chooses to enter
the now bigger foreign market after the increase in ρ, there is a second-round effect on
the fraction of workers producing luxuries, which causes a further expansion in the foreign
labor input and a decline in the domestic labor input used for the production of luxuries.
This second-round adjustment is captured by movements along the h˜ℓ(µ)-locus and the
rotated h˜∗ℓ (µ)-locus in the upper right panel of Figure 2.1. From the lower right panel,
we furthermore see that the decrease in the fraction of workers induces a decrease in the
mass of firms producing luxuries at home, whereas the increase in the fraction of workers
leads to an increase in the mass of firms producing luxuries abroad.
From Figure 2.1, we also see that considering a permissible value of ρ is not sufficient
to guarantee diversification of production. A positive production level of necessities in
both economies requires in addition that labor allocation respects hℓ, h∗ℓ < 1. The formal
conditions that guarantee positive production levels of necessities at home and abroad for
permissible values of ρ can be derived from substituting Eq. (2.28) into Eqs. (2.29) and
(2.30), and they are given by
κ
σ − 1
σ
[
1− βΛ−εψλ
]
< 1−B + ρ(1−B)− (1−B
∗)
ρ(t)− ρ , (2.31)
κ
σ − 1
σ
[
1− β(Λ∗)−εψ∗λ
]
< 1−B∗ + (1−B
∗)− ρ(1−B)
ρ/ρ(t)− 1 , (2.32)
respectively (see the Appendix). From the analysis of the closed economy, we know that
these two conditions are fulfilled under autarky, which corresponds to the limiting case
of t → ∞. Noting further that ρ′(t) < 0 and ρ′(t) > 0, we can safely conclude that a
diversification equilibrium exists if trade costs are not too small. The impact of higher
trade costs on the open economy equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Differentiating firm ratio µ with respect to trade cost parameter t gives
dµ
dt
= −(1 + ρ) [ρ (1−B)− (1−B
∗)]
[ρ− ρ(t)]2 (2.33)
and thus dµ/dt >,=, < 0 if 1 >=, < µ or, equivalently, 1 >,=, < ρ. This accords with the
important insight that the home-market effect is stronger at lower trade costs (see Davis,
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Figure 2.2: Comparative-static effects of an increase in trade cost parameter t
1998b). In the upper left panel of Figure 2.2, we see that the change in firm allocation
caused by an increase in the trade cost parameter t leads to a counter-clockwise rotation
of µ˜(ρ) and to an expansion of the permissible range of expenditure ratio ρ. For the given
level of ρ > 1, firm ratio µ decreases if trade cost parameter t increases.
Regarding the impact of higher trade costs on the fraction of workers employed in
the production of luxuries, we can first determine the direct effect for a given level of µ.
From Eqs. (2.29) and (2.30), we can compute ∂hℓ/∂t >,=, < 0 and 0 >,=, < ∂h∗ℓ/∂t
if µ >,=, < 1, with the signs of the derivatives explained by the home-market effect in
our model. The direct effect of an increase in t on hℓ and h∗ℓ – captured by a rotation of
loci h˜ℓ(µ) and h˜∗ℓ (µ) in the upper right panel of Figure 2.2 – is reinforced by an indirect
effect through adjustments in firm allocation – captured by a movement along the now
rotated loci. For the considered case of ρ > 1, higher trade costs unambiguously lead to
an increase in the share of workers used for producing luxuries at home and to a decrease
in the respective share abroad. The observation that employment for the production of
luxuries is reduced in the country that uses a larger fraction of its workforce to produce
these goods and the observation that the range of permissible levels of ρ has increased lend
support to our previous insight that higher trade costs make an outcome with diversified
production more likely in the open economy. In the lower right panel of Figure 2.2, we
see that for ρ > 1 an increase in the fraction of workers producing luxuries in home
stimulates firm entry, there. In the foreign country, the decline in the fraction of workers
causes a decline in the mass of firms producing luxuries. Firm allocation and production
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structure have been derived under the assumption that household preferences do not have
Gorman form. In the limiting case of Cobb-Douglas preferences, we have ρ = 1 and thus
hℓ = h∗ℓ , M = M∗, irrespective of existing differences between the two countries in their
average level and/or dispersion of effective labor supply. In the limiting case of quasilinear
preferences ρ ̸= 1 and thus hℓ ̸= h∗ℓ , M ̸= M∗ require differences of the two countries in
their average effective labor supply, whereas differences in the dispersion of effective labor
supply do not generate asymmetries in the local markets for luxuries, leading to ρ = 1.
The foreign to domestic firm ratio µ is instrumental for the trade pattern in the open
economy. Employing the zero-profit condition, we can determine home’s total exports and
imports of luxuries. Accounting for r∗ = r, we have
EXℓ =M
1
1 + t
σPnf
κ
, (2.34)
IMℓ = µM
1
1 + t
σPnf
κ
, (2.35)
respectively, which shows that home is a net-importer (net-exporter) of luxuries if
µ > (<)1. Acknowledging the link between µ and ρ from above, we can therefore con-
clude that differences in the average level and/or dispersion of effective labor supply are
important determinants of the trade structure between two economies if preferences do
not have Gorman form. Further insights on the trade structure in the open economy can
be obtained by looking at the Grubel-Lloyd index, which is a measure for the share of
intra-industry trade and is defined as
GLI = 1−
∑
k
|EXk − IMk|∑
k(EXk + IMk)
,
where k ∈ {n, ℓ} is an industry index. To pin down the extent of trade in necessities, we
assume that households in the case of indifference purchase the domestic product. Then,
ρ > 1 establishes IMn = 0 and EXn = IMℓ − EXℓ, where the latter follows form the
balance of payments condition. As a consequence, we have ∑k(EXk + IMk) = 2IMℓ. In
contrast, ρ < 1 establishes EXn = 0 and IMn = EXℓ−IMℓ, leading to
∑
k(EXk+IMk) =
2EXℓ. Substituting into the Grubel-Lloyd index, we obtain
GLI =

EXℓ
IMℓ
= 1µ if ρ > 1
1 if ρ = 1
IMℓ
EXℓ
= µ if ρ < 1
. (2.36)
The main insights regarding the role of ρ and t for the trade structure in our model are
summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that trade costs are sufficiently high to support a diversification
equilibrium. Then, the country with the higher average level and/or dispersion of effective
labor supply has a larger home market for luxuries and is a net-exporter of these goods in
the open economy. The share of intra-industry trade, measured by the Grubel-Lloyd index,
increases in the similarity of countries in terms of their expenditure shares. If the home
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market for luxuries differs between the two economies, the share of intra-industry trade
increases monotonically in trade cost t.
Proof. Proposition 1 follows from substituting Eq. (2.28) into Eqs. (2.34)-(2.36) and
accounting for the impact of changes in t and ρ on µ displayed in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
The results in Proposition 1 are closely related to the key finding of Helpman and Krug-
man (1985) that in a model similar to ours the country with a larger endowment of labor
has a larger market for differentiated goods and is therefore a net-exporter of these goods
in the open economy. Flam and Helpman (1987) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) point out
that if preferences do not have Gorman form, a larger home market may be the result
of a higher average level and/or dispersion of effective labor supply. From our model we
can conclude that the link between exogenous differences in the average level and/or dis-
persion of effective labor supply and the endogenous differences in expenditure shares are
more involved if rent sharing between firms and workers makes wages sector-specific. The
reason is that a reallocation of workers to the production of luxuries increases per-capita
income in the country net-exporting luxuries. This magnifies pre-existing differences in
market size from the closed economy. Since the dispersion of labor income is nonmono-
tonic in the fraction of workers producing luxuries, the reallocation of labor thus described
can, however, reduce income dispersion in the open economy, working against the market
size stimulus from higher per-capita labor income. Yet, the possible decline in income dis-
persion cannot dominate, because it is triggered by an increase in the fraction of workers
producing luxuries and thus associated with a higher relative mass of local producers (see
Figure 2.1), which further increases the pre-existing trade surplus in luxuries.
The trade structure effects in Proposition 1 are well in line with the Linder (1961) hy-
pothesis, which postulates that manufacturing trade is higher between countries featuring
more similar per-capita income levels. Whereas the Linder (1961) hypothesis is some-
times used as a rationale for explaining higher levels of overall trade between countries
that are more similar in terms of per-capita income (Foellmi et al., 2018), this conclusion
is not immediate in a two-sector model. It is well understood from previous work that a
higher similarity in per-capita income increases intra-industry trade (see Markusen, 1986;
Bergstrand, 1990), but the positive trade stimulus is counteracted by a decline in inter-
industry trade (cf. Hunter, 1991). To assess, which of these two effects dominates, we can
note from above that total intra- plus inter-industry trade is given by 2EXℓ if ρ ≤ 1 and
by 2IM ℓ if ρ > 1. Noting from Figure 2.1 that hℓ,M decrease while h∗ℓ ,M∗ increase in Λ∗,
it follows from Eqs. (2.34) and (2.35) that total intra- plus inter-industry trade is lower
for Λ∗ = Λ (and thus ρ = 1) than for Λ∗ < Λ (and thus ρ < 1), contradicting the idea that
countries with more similar levels of per-capita income trade more in an open economy
(see the Appendix for further details). Of course, as well understood from other studies,
higher trade costs also reduce total intra- plus inter-industry trade.
To complete the discussion in this section, we finally determine the effects of trade on
welfare. For this purpose, we first look at the price index of luxuries. For home, the price
index is given by Pℓ = pℓ[M(1 + µ/t)]
1
1−σ , where M(1 + µ/t) gives the mass of available
luxuries discounted for the price premium paid on imported varieties due to the existence
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of iceberg trade costs. Using Eqs. (2.17), (2.19), (2.20), and (2.29), we can express the
price index as follows
Pℓ = P aℓ
(1 + t
t
) 1
1−σ
[ 1−B
1−B(1 + t)/(µ+ t)
] 1
1−σ
, (2.37)
where superscript a is used to indicate an autarky variable. If α = 1, firms producing
luxuries do not pay a wage premium. This yields B = 0 and thus Pℓ = P aℓ (1 + 1/t)
1
1−σ .
In this case, higher trade costs lower the mass of available consumer goods and increase
price index Pℓ, which is to the detriment of social welfare. Lacking feedback effects of
trade on the level and dispersion of nominal per-capita income, a model variant featuring
equal wages in the sector of necessities and luxuries therefore leads to the intuitive result
of gains from trade in both economies, irrespective of whether preferences have Gorman
form or not. More specifically, for the limiting case of α = 1 social welfare is given by
V (Pn, Pℓ,ΛPn, ψλ) =
[
Va(P an , P aℓ ,ΛP an , ψλ) +
1− β
ε
](1 + t
t
) ϵ
σ−1 − 1− β
ε
, (2.38)
and thus the same for the two countries and independent of the trade structure in the
open economy.
If α > 1, a reallocation of workers between the two sectors produces an endogenous
adjustment in market size captured by ζ which adds to the home-market effect due to
exogenous differences in the average level and/or dispersion of effective labor supply. The
now larger home-market effect leads to additional firm entry in the country net-exporting
luxuries and to firm exit in the other economy. Since locally produced varieties are not
subject to trade costs and since the convexity of the Engel curve implies that the total
mass of domestic plus foreign producers of luxuries increases, price index Pℓ falls with
trade in the country net-exporting this good. This can be seen from Eq. (2.37), where
µ < 1 implies 1 − B(1 + t)/(µ + t) < 1 − B and thus Pℓ < P aℓ in home. The country
net-exporting luxuries is unambiguously better off in the open economy, according to Eq.
(2.21), because the fall in the price index of luxuries is accompanied by an increase in
nominal income, as more workers are used for the production of luxuries. This nominal
income effect is captured by an increase in composite term (e/Pn)εψˆ = Λεψˆλ[1+hℓ(αε−1)].
The effect of a wage premium α > 1 on the price index in the country net-importing
luxuries is a priori not clear. For a given total mass of producers, firm exit at home and
firm entry abroad lead to an increase in the price index of luxuries, because imports are
subject to trade costs. This effect is counteracted by an increase in the total mass of
domestic plus foreign producers, which, all other things equal, lowers the price index of
luxuries. In the Appendix, we show that the first effect can dominate for high trade costs
if market size differences are sufficiently pronounced. In this case, all domestic workers are
worse off in the open economy due to an increase in the price index of luxuries, whereas
those workers losing their job in the sector of luxuries and finding a new job in the sector
of necessities moreover experience a fall in nominal income. This additional source of
welfare loss is captured by a decline in the composite term (e/Pn)εψˆ in Eq. (2.21). We
summarize the impact of trade on welfare in the following proposition.
28 CHAPTER 2. NONHOMOTHETIC PREFERENCES AND RENT SHARING
Proposition 2 Suppose that trade costs are sufficiently high to support a diversification
equilibrium. Then, if a wage premium does not exist (α = 1), there are gains from trade
of equal size in both countries and these gains decrease monotonically in trade cost t. If
α > 1 causes a wage premium in the sector of luxuries, gains from trade are guaranteed for
the country net-exporting luxuries, whereas losses from trade are possible for the country
net-importing luxuries.
Proof. Analysis in the text and formal proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 points to the notable result that in the case of α = 1 welfare effects of
trade are independent of the trade structure in the open economy and thus the same for
both countries. Thereby, gains from trade are a priori not clear in our setting, because the
market outcome in the closed economy is not socially optimal and because we know from
the literature of second best that in this case lifting a constraint may aggravate the dis-
tortion and lead to welfare loss (see, for instance, Markusen, 1981; Newbery and Stiglitz,
1984, for two prominent contributions in the context of trade). More specifically, our
model features increasing economies to scale in only one sector, and it is well known from
studies by Graham (1923), Markusen and Melvin (1981), Ethier (1982a), and Francois
and Nelson (2002) that in such environments there is a chance that one country loses from
trade (even though Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2010, call such outcomes “pathologi-
cal”). The analysis above reveals that concerns about losses from trade are not justified
in our setting if employment in the two sectors promises the same labor return. Since the
engine for gains from trade is a decline in the price index of luxuries and since lower trade
costs lead to a fall in the price index, gains from trade exist for α = 1, irrespective of the
specific nature of preferences.
For α > 1, our model features a second source of inefficiency originating from a price
distortion in the labor market, which makes wages sector-specific. Adding this distortion,
trade can generate losers in the country forfeiting market share in the sector of luxuries,
because some workers previously employed in this sector will experience a wage decline.
This provides a demand-side explanation for anti-globalization attitudes of workers ob-
served in many industrialized economies over the last decades. However, the insight that
the price index of luxuries can increase in response to trade liberalization is even more
disconcerting, because it implies that all workers in the country losing market share in
the production of luxuries may be worse off with than without trade. If all workers lose,
the normative results from our analysis do not depend on the specific choice of a utilitar-
ian welfare function. However, this does not mean that preferences are irrelevant. Since
preferences determine how the average level and/or dispersion of effective labor supply
influence household expenditures, they affect the trade structure in the open economy
and are crucial for the existence of gains and losses from trade. Since the demand-side
differences considered here are only relevant for expenditures in a setting with nonho-
mothetic preferences, the home markets for luxuries do not differ in the limiting case
of Cobb-Douglas preferences, making the production structure symmetric and all trade
intra-industry. This prevents losses from trade due to an unfavorable reallocation of labor
in the open economy.
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Giving up the assumption of homothetic preferences may therefore change the rather
optimistic view shared by many economists that trade, while not necessarily benefitting all
households equally, at least increases economy-wide welfare. Proposition 2 points out that
losses from trade are a threat for the poorer country, augmenting pre-existing differences
in the well-being of the two economies. This provides a rationale for the view shared
by many opponents of globalization that the international distribution of trade surplus is
unjust. However, our analysis also reveals that losses from trade are not confined to poorer
countries but can extend to countries with a more egalitarian distribution of endowments.
This suggests that trade can be a peril for countries in Northern and Central Europe,
where the idea of offering equal opportunities plays a particularly important role (cf.
Dunnzlaff et al., 2011). Also, the results from our analysis provide a challenge to the
idea that redistribution – be it ex ante, through equalization of endowments, or ex post,
through equalization of outcome – can be a successful instrument to increase support for
trade liberalization (cf. Davidson and Matusz, 2006; Egger and Fischer, 2018). Even if the
trade reform generates aggregate gains, policy intervention that aims at distributing theses
gains more equally will influence the trade structure with unintended welfare consequences.
However, such insights should not be misunderstood as an argument against free trade.
Losses from trade are the result of pre-existing price distortions in the product and labor
market and not per se a consequence of falling trade costs. Our analysis points out that
abolishing such distortions may be a more important measure to achieve support for a
trade reform than the compensation of losers.
2.4 Extensions
In this section, we consider two extensions of our benchmark model. In the first one,
we allow for positive assortative matching, implying that workers with higher effective
labor supply end up in the sector of luxuries. Assuming that firms must invest into a
screening technology to gather (imperfect) information upon the type of applicants, the
thus modified setting produces endogenous fixed and variable production costs, thereby
opening an additional adjustment margin to a fall in trade costs. In the second extension,
we consider differences of the two economies in the wage premium paid by luxury producers
and analyze to what extent the predictions of our model change if we consider supply-side
reasons for comparative advantage instead of demand-side reasons for the home-market
effect as a motive for inter-industry trade.
2.4.1 Screening and assortative matching
In the analysis above, firms in the luxury sector are indifferent between hiring workers with
high or low effective labor supply, because the same workplace capacity is needed for each
employed unit of labor input. Whereas this assumption facilitates the analysis, it differs
from the usual approach which associates employment with installment of a workplace
at a cost that is independent of the worker’s effective labor supply. With this alternative
specification, firms producing luxuries prefer employing workers with higher effective labor
supply. However, following Helpman et al. (2010, 2017) we assume that firms cannot freely
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observe the effective labor supply of workers prior to their employment and therefore have
to screen the pool of applicants to gather information upon their λ-level. Screening is
costly and provides an imperfect signal about the effective labor supply of applicants.
More specifically, firms detect whether applicants are above or below a threshold, λu, and
the costs of screening, PnF (λu), increase in this threshold with constant elasticity φ > 0:
F (λu) = λφu . Installing a workplace has costs Pn and if the average worker provides labor
input Λu ≡ [1 − L(λu)]−1
∫ λ
λu
λdL(λ), qℓ/Λu workplaces are needed to employ qℓ units of
labor input. Profits of the firm then correspond to Π = pi − PnqℓΛ−1u − PnF (λu)− Pnf .
Adopting from Helpman et al. (2010) the assumption that effective labor supply is
Pareto distributed, with λ > 0, λ → ∞, and L(λ) = 1 − (λ/λ)−g, g > 1, we have
Λu = gg−1λu, and the first-order conditions for the optimal choice of qℓ and λu are given
by
∂Π
∂qℓ
= σ − 1
σ
κr
qℓ
− PnΛu = 0,
∂Π
∂λu
= PnqℓΛu
1
λu
− φPnF (λu)
λu
= 0. (2.13′)
As formally shown in the Appendix, under the sufficient condition of φ > σ − 1, the
Hesse matrix of the maximization problem (evaluated at the solutions for the first-order
conditions) is negative semi-definite. This implies that if an interior solution exists, it
must be a maximum. Furthermore, combining the first-order conditions in (2.13′) with
the zero-profit condition Π = 0, we can solve for
λu =
(
f(σ − 1)
φ− σ + 1
) 1
φ ≡ λˆu, Λu = g
g − 1
(
f(σ − 1)
φ− σ + 1
) 1
φ ≡ Λˆu.
A solution with a positive level of screening, λˆu > λ, requires f(σ − 1)/(φ− σ + 1) > λφ.
Accounting for the bargaining solution in Eq. (2.12), we can summarize the outcome of
the firm’s maximization problem as follows
wℓ =
α
Λˆu
Pn, Π =
κr
Φ − Pnf, (2.14
′)
with Φ ≡ σφ/(φ − σ + 1) > σ. Thereby, αˆ ≡ α/Λˆu > 1 is needed to ensure that firms
producing luxuries pay a wage premium and therefore make a job application attractive
for workers.
To solve for the general equilibrium outcome, we can proceed as in the benchmark
model and determine the mass of firms and the fraction of workers producing luxuries,
M and hℓ, respectively. Acknowledging that qℓ/Λˆu gives the number of workers per firm,
we can derive a first relationship between hℓ and M from the first-order condition in Eq.
(2.13′) as follows (see the Appendix):
hℓHw =
σ − 1
σ
κMr. (2.17′)
Eq. (2.17′) reflects constant markup pricing and shows once again that firms pay a constant
fraction of their revenues as a wage bill to their workforce. Because in the modified setting
considered here firms pay the same workplace installment costs for each worker and because
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in total these installment costs are equal to their wage payments, the wage bill received
in the sector of luxuries is independent of the now higher effective labor supply of the
workforce. Of course, the share of workers employed in the sector of luxuries, hℓ, cannot
be larger than the share of workers with an effective labor supply above the threshold λˆu,
(λˆu/λ)−g. To avoid a corner solution, we discuss below a necessary parameter constraint
and assume for now excess supply of workers with effective labor endowment λ > λˆu.
This implies that the share of workers with effective labor supply above the threshold λˆu
finding employment in the sector of luxuries is smaller than one: γh ≡ hℓ(λˆu/λ)g < 1.
To determine a second relationship between hℓ and M , we employ goods market clear-
ing in the sector of luxuries, PℓXℓ = Mr, which is derived in the Appendix and given
by
HΛw
[
1− βΛ−εψλ
]
+ hℓHw
σ
σ − 1
1
κ
Bˆ =Mr, (2.18′)
with Bˆ ≡ σ−1σ κΛˆu
[
(αˆ− 1)− (αˆ1−ε − 1)βΛˆ−εu ψλ
]
and Λ = gg−1λ, ψλ =
(
g
g−1
)ε g−1
g+ε−1 due
to our assumption that the distribution of effective labor supply is Pareto. Combining
Eqs. (2.17′) and (2.18′) and making use of zero-profit condition κr = ΦPnf , we can derive
explicit solutions for M and hℓ:
M = κ
1− Bˆ
HΛ [1− βΛ−εψλ]
Φf , hℓ =
σ − 1
σ
κ
1− BˆΛ[1− βΛ
−εψλ]. (2.19′)
A higher average effective labor supply increases demand for luxuries through two channels.
On the one hand, there is a common income effect that increases expenditures for both
goods. On the other hand, there is a further demand stimulus for luxuries, which is
specific to nonhomothetic preferences, because the now richer households devote a larger
fraction of expenditures to the consumption of luxuries. Both of these effects also exist
in the benchmark model. However, there, the common income effect was neutralized by
an increase in the costs of employing the additional amount of labor needed to fulfill the
increased demand for luxuries. This is different in the model variant considered here.
Because workplace installment costs per worker are not affected by a common increase in
effective labor supply, the common income effect is not neutralized. From Eq. (2.19′), we
can moreover infer that an interior solution with γh = hℓ(λˆu/λ)g < 1 requires
κ
σ − 1
σ
Λ[1− βΛ−εψλ] < (1− Bˆ)
( f(σ − 1)
φ− σ + 1
) 1
φ 1
λ
−g .
Despite the complications arising from endogenous fixed costs and despite the additional
parameter constraint needed to achieve an interior equilibrium, the main insights from the
benchmark model remain intact. Since the results for the open economy can be derived
for the more sophisticated model variant considered here by following the derivation steps
from the main text, we do not repeat the analysis and leave the formal details to the
interested reader.
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2.4.2 Supply-side differences due to country-specific wage premia
We now consider the role of supply-side differences of the two countries and assume that
a wage premium is paid by luxury producers only in the foreign economy. Accordingly,
we set α∗ > α = 1, while we make countries symmetric in all other respects, including the
average level and dispersion of effective labor supply. Similar to the benchmark model, we
can apply the zero-profit conditions for home and foreign to link differences in the price
indices for luxuries to market size differences. As formally shown in the Appendix, this
gives
ρζ = tξ
σ − 1
t− ξσ
(
Pℓ
P ∗ℓ
)σ−1
, (2.23′)
where ρ, ζ are defined as above, and ρ = 1 holds, because the two countries do not differ
in the average level and dispersion of effective labor supply, while ζ > 1 follows, because
only the foreign market offers a wage premium for workers employed in the production of
luxuries. On the one hand, this indicates that the local market for luxuries is larger in the
country featuring a price distortion in the labor market, which is foreign in our case. On
the other hand, this country has a comparative disadvantage in producing luxuries, which
is reflected by ξ ≡ p∗ℓpℓ = κκ∗ =
σ+(σ−1)α∗
2σ−1 > 1. From Eq. (2.23′) we see that t > ξσ is a
necessary (not sufficient) condition for some production of luxuries to remain in the foreign
economy. With this result at hand, we can determine the share of revenues achieved in
the domestic market (d) and the export market (x). This gives for home and foreign
rd
r
= t t− ξ
σ
t2 − 1 ,
rx
r
= tξ
σ − 1
t2 − 1 and
r∗d
r∗
= t t− ξ
−σ
t2 − 1 ,
r∗x
r∗
= tξ
−σ − 1
t2 − 1 ,
respectively. An increase in the wage premium in the foreign country increases ξ and
thus the comparative advantage of home in the production of luxuries. However, it also
increases the market for luxuries in foreign and induces firms from both countries to
increase their revenues there. As a consequence, a higher ξ lowers rd/r and increases rx/r,
with the effect mirrored in the foreign country by a decrease in r∗x/r∗ and an increase in
r∗d/r
∗.
The assumption of asymmetric production costs does not affect constant markup pric-
ing and the induced result that the wage bill paid by luxury producers is a constant fraction
of their revenues. This establishes a positive link between the fraction of workers and the
number of firms producing luxuries that is well understood from Eqs. (2.17) and (2.25).
However, asymmetric production costs change the market clearing conditions for luxuries
in the open economy to
HΛw
[
1− βΛ−εψλ
]
=Mrtt− ξ
σ
t2 − 1 +M
∗r∗
tξ−σ − 1
t2 − 1 , (2.26
′)
HΛw
[
1− βΛ−εψλ
]
+ h∗ℓHΛw
σ
σ − 1
1
κ∗
B∗ =M∗r∗t t− ξ
−σ
t2 − 1 +Mr
tξσ − 1
t2 − 1 . (2.27
′)
Combining markup pricing with the two market clearing conditions, we can solve for firm
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ratio µ =M∗/M , according to
µ = 1
ξ
t2 − 2tξσ + 1
t2 − 2tξ−σ + 1− (t2 − 1)B∗ , (2.28
′)
with
dµ
dt
= 2 [t(1−B
∗)− ξ−σ]
t2 − 2tξ−σ + 1− (t2 − 1)B∗
[1
ξ
t− ξσ
t(1−B∗)− ξ−σ − µ
]
. (2.33′)
In the Appendix, we show that dµ/dt > 0, while limt→∞ µ = 2σ−12σ−1+(σ−1)[(α∗)1−ε−1]βΛ−εψλ <
1. This implies that µ < 1 extends to all possible trade costs and that the country
with a comparative disadvantage in the production of luxuries hosts fewer luxury goods
producers in the open economy. Furthermore, from Eq. (2.28′), we see that a positive
production level of luxuries in foreign is given by t > ξσ+
√
ξ2σ − 1, whereas the parameter
domain supporting a positive production level of necessities in home can be determined
by combining Eq. (2.28′) with Eqs. (2.17), (2.26′), and zero-profit condition κr = σPnf ,
and it is given by
κ
σ − 1
σ
[1− βΛ−εψλ] < t+ µξ
1−σ
t+ 1
t− ξσ
t− 1 .
Similar to the benchmark model the foreign to domestic firm ratio µ is decisive for
the trade structure in the open economy. Making use of the zero-profit condition, we can
compute home’s total value of exports and imports of luxuries according to
EXℓ =Mrx =M
tξσ − 1
t2 − 1
σPnf
κ
, (2.34′)
IMℓ =M∗r∗x =Mµ
tξ−σ − 1
t2 − 1
σPnf
κ∗
, (2.35′)
respectively. Combining Eqs. (2.34′) and (2.35′) then implies IMℓ = µξ1−σ t−ξ
σ
tξσ−1EXℓ,
and, acknowledging GLI = µξ1−σ t−ξσtξσ−1 < 1, we can therefore safely conclude that home
exports luxuries, because it has a comparative advantage in producing these goods, which
dominates the home-market effect in our setting. The share of intra-industry-trade in-
creases in trade cost parameter t and it decreases in foreign’s wage premium α∗, whereas
total (intra- plus inter-industry) trade increases in α∗ and decreases in t. These effects are
well understood from the benchmark model.
We complete the discussion in this section with a brief look at the welfare effects of
trade. In home, luxury producers do not pay a wage premium, and hence changes in the
allocation of workers do not affect the level and dispersion of nominal income. This implies
that all welfare effects of trade are due to changes in the price index of luxuries, which
can be expressed as Pℓ = pℓ
[
M t+µξ
1−σ
t
] 1
1−σ . Making use of market clearing condition
(2.26′), zero-profit condition κr = σPnf , and the solution for firm ratio µ in Eq. (2.28′),
we can compute dPℓ/dt > 0. This implies that home benefits from trade, because it
specializes according to the law of comparative advantage in those goods, whose production
features increasing economies to scale and whose exchange is subject to trade costs. In
foreign, things are less clear, because there are two potentially counteracting effects. There
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are adjustments in the share of workers producing luxuries, which affect welfare through
changes in nominal income due to the wage premium paid in the sector of luxuries. At
already high trade costs, a further increase in t increases the fraction of workers producing
luxuries in foreign, with positive effects on nominal income and welfare. This effect is
supplemented by a change in the price index of luxuries, which in the foreign economy
is given by P ∗ℓ = p∗ℓ
[
M∗ 1+tµξ
1−σ
tµξ1−σ
] 1
1−σ . Whereas general effects of trade on price index
P ∗ℓ are difficult to determine, we show in the Appendix that at an initially high level of
t, the price index increases in trade costs if the price distortion in the labor market is
small (ξ close to one), whereas the opposite is true if the price distortion is large (ξ close
to infinity). This indicates that the country losing market share of those goods, whose
production features increasing economies to scale, can be worse off in the open than in
the closed economy if supply-side differences are sufficiently pronounced, whereas gains
from trade are guaranteed for both trading partners if supply-side differences are small.
This conclusion holds for arbitrary levels of ε, and hence does not depend on the specific
nature of preferences.
2.5 Conclusion
We have developed a two-country model, in which ex ante differences in the average level
and dispersion of effective labor supply are important exogenous sources of demand-side
asymmetries, because households have nonhomothetic preferences. The assumption of
nonhomothetic preferences produces non-linear Engel curves and makes in a textbook
model of the home-market effect, with two output sectors and labor as the only factor
input, the differentiated good a luxury and the outside good a necessity. Assuming that
production of luxuries promises a wage premium due to firm-level rent sharing and as-
suming that the export of luxuries is subject to trade costs, we show that the country
featuring a higher average level and/or dispersion of effective labor supply has a larger
home market and therefore becomes net-exporter of luxuries in the open economy. Due to
a price distortion in the labor market, the trade pattern is an important factor of welfare in
the open economy. The country that increases its market share and net-exports luxuries
benefits, whereas the country that lowers its market share and net-imports luxuries can
lose from trade. This implies that trade can increase pre-existing welfare differences and
hurt countries with a lower average level and/or lower dispersion of effective labor supply.
In an extension of our model, we consider screening and assortative matching of work-
ers featuring high effective labor supply with firms producing luxuries. This modified
framework generates endogenous fixed and variable costs of production and therefore ac-
counts for an additional adjustment margin through which trade can affect welfare in an
open economy. Whereas the additional adjustment margin makes the analysis more com-
plicated, the main insights from the benchmark model regarding the link of trade pattern
and welfare remain intact. In a second extension, we consider asymmetries of countries in
the wage premia paid by luxury goods producers. This modification generates a supply-
side asymmetry and sheds light on the role of comparative advantage for trade structure
and welfare in the open economy. Accordingly, the country featuring the stronger price
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distortion in the labor market becomes net-importer of luxuries and, depending on the
strength of the distortion, can win or lose from trade, irrespective of the specific nature
of preferences. This suggests that the choice of preferences is particularly relevant when
demand-side differences are key for the trade pattern in the open economy, whereas the
choice of preferences seems less important if supply-side asymmetries are decisive.
This paper provides a first step to introduce PIGL preferences into models of inter-
national trade. Relying on these preferences, we have shown that problems associated
with the aggregation of heterogeneous households can be avoided and new insights on how
demand-side factors affect trade and welfare can be gained even if one chooses to leave the
Gorman class. In the specific application considered here, we have shed light on the inter-
action between supply-side distortions and demand-side asymmetries for the relationship
of trade and welfare in open economies. Thereby, we have left other interesting topics
aside. For instance, we have not considered unemployment and thus have excluded one
important variable, whose adjustment to trade has been subject to a controversial debate
over the last few decades. Furthermore, while briefly discussing limitations to redistribut-
ing the gains from trade under nonhomothetic preferences, we have not addressed in detail
the costs and benefits of tax-transfer systems in open economies. Whereas extending our
model in both directions is a worthwhile task for future research, doing so is clearly beyond
the scope of this paper.
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2.6 Appendix
A closed form representation of the direct utility function
Applying Roy’s identity to Eq. (2.2) gives the Marshallian demand functions in Eq. (2.3).
These demand functions can be used to solve for
Pn
Pℓ
= X
i
ℓ(
Xin
β
) 1
1−ε −Xin
and e
i
Pℓ
= Pn
Pℓ
(
Xin
β
) 1
1−ε
. (2.39)
Substitution into Eq. (2.2), then gives the direct utility function
u(Xin, Xiℓ) =
1
ε
(
Xiℓ
)ε (Xinβ ) ε1−ε − β[(
Xin
β
) 1
1−ε −Xin
]ε − 1− βε , (2.40)
which is well defined only if the consumption level of luxuries is strictly positive and it
has a value of −(1− β)/ε for all levels of purchased necessities if Xiℓ = 0. This completes
the proof.
Derivation of price index Pℓ
Acknowledging Eq. (2.4), households choose Xin, xiℓ(ω) to maximize utility Eq. (2.40),
subject to their budget constraint PnXin+
∫
ω∈Ω pℓ(ω)xiℓ(ω) ≤ ei. The first-order conditions
for the respective Lagrangian problem yield
xiℓ(ω)−
1
σ(
Xiℓ
)σ−1
σ
(Xin
β
) 1
1−ε
−Xin
 = pℓ(ω)
Pn
. (2.41)
This establishes for any two varieties of luxuries ω and ωˆ a link of their consumption
expenditures according to pℓ(ω)xiℓ(ω) = xiℓ(ωˆ)pℓ(ωˆ)
[pℓ(ω)
pℓ(ωˆ)
]1−σ. Integrating over ω, then
gives ∫
ω∈Ω
pℓ(ω)xiℓ(ω)dω = xiℓ(ωˆ)pℓ(ωˆ)σ
∫
ω∈Ω
pℓ(ω)1−σdω. (2.42)
Using the latter together with Xin = β
(
ei
Pn
)1−ε from Eq. (2.3) in the binding budget
constraint, we obtain
ei
1− β ( ei
Pn
)−ε = xiℓ(ωˆ)pℓ(ωˆ)σ ∫
ω∈Ω
pℓ(ω)1−σdω. (2.43)
Evaluating (2.41) at ωˆ and substituting for xiℓ(ωˆ)pℓ(ωˆ)σ, Eq. (2.43) can be solved for
ei
1− β ( ei
Pn
)−ε = Xiℓ [∫
ω∈Ω
pℓ(ω)1−σdω
] 1
1−σ
, (2.44)
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making Pℓ ≡
[∫
ω∈Ω pℓ(ω)1−σdω
] 1
1−σ a valid price index for the composite Xiℓ, because total
expenditures of household i devoted to luxuries are given by PℓXiℓ. This completes the
proof.
Rent sharing and social welfare
Starting point is the welfare function in Eq. (2.21). Accounting for ( ePn )εψˆ = Λε[1+hℓ(αε−
1)
]
ψˆλ, substituting the share of production workers hℓ from Eq. (2.19), the price index of
luxuries from Eq. (2.20), and acknowledging κ = σσ+α(σ−1) as well as κ1−B = F (α)−1, with
F (α) ≡ 1 + σ−1σ
[
1 + (α1−ε − 1)βΛ−εψλ
], we can express welfare in the closed economy as
a function of wage premium α: V (Pn, Pℓ, e, ψˆ) =
(
HΛ(1−βΛ−εψλ)
σf
) ε
σ−1
Vˆ (α)− 1−βε , with
Vˆ (α) ≡ 1
ε
(
α+ σ
σ − 1
)−ε
F (α)−
ε
σ−1
{
Λεψˆλ
[
1 + σ − 1
σ
(
1− βΛ−εψλ
) αε − 1
F (α)
]
− β
}
.
(2.45)
Differentiation with respect to α gives
Vˆ ′(α) = εVˆ (α)
α+ σσ−1
−1− 1− εσ
(
α+ σσ−1
)
α−εβΛ−εψλ
F (α)
+
(
α+ σσ−1
)
Λεψˆλ σ−1σ (1− βΛ−εψλ)
Λεψˆλ
[
1 + σ−1σ (1− βΛ−εψλ) α
ε−1
F (α)
]
− β
[
αε−1
F (α) −
1− ε
ε
αε − 1
F (α)
σ−1
σ α
−εβΛ−εψλ
F (α)
] .
Accounting for limε→0 F (α) = 2σ−1σ + σ−1σ (α − 1)β, limε→0 1−εε (αε − 1) = lnα, and
limε→0 εVˆ (α) = 1− β, we compute
lim
ε→0 Vˆ
′(α) = 1− β
α+ σσ−1
{
−1− β
σ
α+ σσ−1
2σ−1
σ +
σ−1
σ (α− 1)β
+
σ−1
σ +
1
α
2σ−1
σ +
σ−1
σ (α− 1)β
−σ − 1
σ
β lnα
(
σ−1
σ α+ 1
)
[
2σ−1
σ +
σ−1
σ (α− 1)β
]2
 ,
(2.46)
where σ−1σ + 1α < 2σ−1σ + σ−1σ (α− 1)β proves that limε→0 Vˆ ′(α) < 0. This confirms that a
higher wage premium in the sector producing luxuries lowers welfare in the Cobb-Douglas
case. Furthermore, accounting for limε→1 F (α) = 2σ−1σ , we can compute limε→1 Vˆ (α) =
(Λ− β)σ−1σ
(
σ
2σ−1
) σ
σ−1 and thus limε→1 Vˆ ′(α) = 0. Finally, setting α = 1 establishes
Vˆ ′(1) = εVˆ (1)(σ − 1)β2σ − 1
[
1− βΛ−εψλ
Λεψˆλ − β
− σ − ε
σ − 1Λ
−εψλ
]
,
which can be positive for sufficiently high levels of σ and negative for sufficiently low ones.
This completes the proof.
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Derivation and discussion of constraints (2.31) and (2.32)
From Eq. (2.29), the constraint for a positive production level of necessities at home,
hℓ < 1, can be rewritten as
κ
σ − 1
σ
[
1− βΛ−εψλ
]
<
µ+ t
1 + t −B. (2.47)
Acknowledging Eq. (2.28), we can compute
µ+ t
1 + t = 1 +
ρ(1−B)− (1−B∗)
[t−B∗(1 + t)]− ρ = 1 +
ρ(1−B)− (1−B∗)
ρ(t)− ρ , (2.48)
where the second equality sign follows from the definition of ρ(t). Substituting Eq. (2.48)
into (2.47) then gives
κ
σ − 1
σ
[
1− βΛ−εψλ
]
< 1−B + ρ(1−B)− (1−B
∗)
ρ(t)− ρ ≡ gˆ0(t), (2.49)
which is fulfilled if ρ ≥ 1. To see this, note that with HΛ = H∗Λ∗, ρ > 1 implies
ρ(1 − B) > 1 − B∗, so that gˆ0(t) > 1 − B. Noting that 1 − B > κσ−1σ [1 − βΛ−εψλ], this
is sufficient for a positive production level of necessities at home. In contrast, ρ < 1 and
thus ρ(1−B) < 1−B∗ imply gˆ0(t) < 1−B. However, since gˆ′0(t) > 0 and limt→∞ gˆ0(t) =
1−B hold in this case, we can safely conclude that the condition in (2.49) is fulfilled for
sufficiently high t.
In a next step, we combine Eq. (2.30) with the constraint for a positive production
level of necessities abroad, h∗ℓ < 1, and obtain
κ
σ − 1
σ
[
1− β(Λ∗)−εψ∗λ
]
<
1 + µt
µ(1 + t) −B
∗. (2.50)
Acknowledging Eq. (2.28), we can compute
1 + µt
µ(1 + t) = 1 +
(1−B∗)− ρ(1−B)]
ρ[t−B(1 + t)]− 1 = 1 +
[(1−B∗)− ρ(1−B)]
ρ/ρ(t)− 1 , (2.51)
where the second equality sign follows from the definition of ρ(t). Substituting Eq. (2.51)
into (2.50), we get
κ
σ − 1
σ
[
1− β(Λ∗)−εψ∗λ
]
< 1−B∗ + (1−B
∗)− ρ(1−B)
ρ/ρ(t)− 1 ≡ gˆ1(t). (2.52)
For ρ ≤ 1 and thus 1 − B∗ ≥ ρ(1 − B), we have gˆ1(t) ≥ 1 − B∗, which noting that
1−B∗ > κσ−1σ [1− β(Λ∗)−εψ∗λ] is sufficient for (2.52). In contrast, we have gˆ1(t) < 1−B∗
if ρ > 1 and thus 1 − B∗ < ρ(1 − B), and in this case it is a priori not clear that (2.52)
holds. However, acknowledging that ρ > 1 gives gˆ′1(t) > 0 while limt→∞ gˆ1(t) = 1 − B∗
holds for any ρ, it follows that (2.52) must be fulfilled for a sufficiently high level of t.
This completes the proof.
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Relative market size differences and overall trade
Consider first ρ ≤ 1, which implies that home is a net-exporter of luxuries, according to
Proposition 1. As shown in the main text, total exports plus imports of home are then
given by 2EXℓ, which equals exports plus imports of the foreign economy due to balanced
trade. Accounting for EXℓ =Mr/(1 + t), Eqs. (2.17) and (2.29) establish
EXℓ =
HΛw[1− βΛ−εψλ]
(µ+ t)−B(1 + t) = HΛw[1− βΛ
−εψλ]
ρ(t) [ρ(t)− ρ]
ρ(t)− ρ(t) , (2.53)
where the second equality sign follows from substituting Eq. (2.28) for µ and acknowledg-
ing the definitions of ρ(t), ρ(t). In a similar vein, we can note that ρ > 1 makes home a
net-importer of luxuries, with total exports and imports given by 2IMℓ. Accounting for
IMℓ =Mµr/(1 + t), Eqs. (2.17) and (2.29) establish
IMℓ =
HΛw[1− βΛ−εψλ]µ
(µ+ t)−B(1 + t) = HΛw[1− βΛ
−εψλ]
ρ− ρ(t)
ρ(t)− ρ(t) , (2.54)
where the second equality sign follows from substituting Eq. (2.28) for µ and acknowledg-
ing the definitions of ρ(t), ρ(t). Noting that dEXℓ/dρ < 0 while dIMℓ/dρ > 0 completes
the proof.
Properties of price index (2.37) and proof of Proposition 2
Substituting Eq. (2.28) for µ into Eq. (2.37), gives Pℓ = P aℓ F (t)
1
1−σ , with
F (t) ≡ 1 + t
t
1−B
1−B 1+tµ+t
= (1−B)1 + t
t
ρ(t)− ρB − (1−B∗)
ρ(t)(1−B)− (1−B∗) . (2.55)
Differentiation with respect to t gives F ′(t) = −Fˆ (t)(1−B)/t2, with
Fˆ (t) ≡ 1 +B ρ(t)− ρ
ρ(t)(1−B)− (1−B∗) −B(1−B
∗)t(1 + t) ρ(1−B)− (1−B
∗)
[ρ(t)(1−B)− (1−B∗)]2
(2.56)
and ρ(t)(1−B) > 1−B∗ from the parameter constraint in (2.31). Then, noting that ρ >,=,
< 1 establishes ρ(1−B) >,=, < 1−B∗ it is immediate that Fˆ (t) > 0 and thus F ′(t) < 0 if
ρ ≤ 1. Furthermore, accounting for limt→∞ Fˆ (t) = [1/(1−B)]2[1− ρB(1−B)/(1−B∗)],
we can safely conclude that limt→∞ Fˆ (t) = 0 defines a unique ρˆ = (1−B∗)/B(1−B) > 1,
such that limt→∞ Fˆ (t) > (<)0 if ρ < (>)ρˆ. Then, provided that ρ > ρˆ, F ′(t) > 0 holds
for sufficiently high t. Noting finally that limt→∞ F (t) = 1, we can safely conclude that
F (t) > 1 and thus Pℓ < P aℓ if ρ ≤ 1, whereas F (t) < 1 and thus Pℓ > P aℓ is guaranteed for
high levels of t if ρ > ρˆ. This completes the proof.
Formal details for the analysis in Section 2.4.1
We begin with a brief discussion of the second-order conditions for the profit-maximization
problem of firms producing luxuries. The second-order conditions for an interior maximum
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require that evaluated at the optimum the Hessian matrix
H =
 ∂
2Π
∂q2
ℓ
∂2Π
∂qℓ∂λu
∂2Π
∂λu∂qℓ
∂2Π
∂λ2u
 (2.57)
is negative semi-definite, implying that for any column vector h ≡ (h1, h2) ̸= 0, htHh ≤ 0.
From Eq. (2.13′), we have
∂2Π
∂q2ℓ
= −σ − 1
σ
1
σ
κr
q2ℓ
,
∂2Π
∂qℓ∂λu
= ∂
2Π
∂λu∂qℓ
= PnΛu
1
λu
,
∂2Π
∂λ2u
= −2PnΛu
qℓ
λ2u
− Pnφ(φ− 1)F (λu)
λ2u
.
Evaluating these second derivatives at the first-order conditions ∂Π/∂qℓ = 0, ∂Π/∂λu = 0,
we can compute
htHh = −PnΛu
1
σqℓ
[
h21 − 2h1h2
σqℓ
λu
+ h22σ(1 + φ)
(
qℓ
λu
)2]
. (2.58)
Accounting for φ > σ − 1, we obtain
htHh ≤ −PnΛu
1
σqℓ
[
h21 − 2h1h2
σqℓ
λu
+ h22
(
σqℓ
λu
)2]
= −PnΛu
1
σqℓ
(
h1 − h2σqℓ
λu
)2
, (2.59)
which confirms that the Hessian matrix is negative semi-definite.
In a next step, we derive Eqs. (2.17′) and (2.18′). For this purpose, we first acknowledge
that denoting by hℓ the share of workers finding employment in the sector of luxuries and
denoting by γh = hℓ(λˆu/λ)g the share of workers with effective labor supply λ > λˆu, we can
write total employment of workers in the sector of luxuries as Mqℓ = Hγh
∫ λ
λˆu
λdL(λ) =
HhℓΛˆu, where the second equality sign makes use of the Pareto assumption and Λˆu =
g
g−1 λˆu. From Eq. (2.13′), we then obtain σ−1σ ΛuκMr = HhℓΛˆuw, where w = Pn has been
used. Accounting for α = η−1, αˆ = αΛˆ−1u , finally establishes Eq. (2.17′).
In a final step, we derive Eq. (2.18′). For this purpose, we first compute
∫
i∈H
eidi = Hw
∫ λ
λ
λdL(λ) +Hwγh(αˆ− 1)
∫ λ
λˆu
λdL(λ). (2.60)
Making use of the Pareto assumption, we get ∫ λλ λdL(λ) = gg−1λ = Λ and ∫ λλˆu λdL(λ) =( λˆu
λ
)−g g
g−1 λˆu =
( λˆu
λ
)−gΛˆu. Accounting for γh = hℓ( λˆuλ )g, we then obtain∫
i∈H
eidi = HwΛ +Hwhℓ(αˆ− 1)Λˆu. (2.61)
We further compute
∫
i∈H
ei
(
ei
Pn
)−ε
di = Hw
∫ λ
λ
λ1−εdL(λ) +Hwγh
(
αˆ1−ε − 1
) ∫ λ
λˆu
λ1−εdL(λ), (2.62)
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where w = Pn has been used. Applying the Pareto assumption, we can determine∫ λ
λ λ
1−εdL(λ) = gg+ε−1λ
1−ε = Λ1−εψλ, with ψλ defined in the main text, and∫ λ
λˆu
λ1−εdL(λ) =
( λˆu
λ
)−gΛˆ1−εu ψλ. Substitution into Eq. (2.62), then gives
∫
i∈H
ei
(
ei
Pn
)−ε
di = HwΛ1−εψλ +Hwhℓ
(
αˆ1−ε − 1
)
Λˆ1−εu ψλ. (2.63)
Substituting Eqs. (2.61) and (2.63) into Mr = ∫i∈H ei[1 − β( eiPn )−ε]di, we obtain Eq.
(2.18′). This completes the proof.
Formal details for the analysis in Section 2.4.2
We first show the derivation details for Eq. (2.23′). For this purpose, we introduce the aux-
iliary variables Eℓ ≡ HΛw [1− βΛ−εψλ] and E∗ℓ ≡ HΛw [1− βΛ−εψλ] + h∗ℓHΛw σσ−1 1κ∗B∗
to denote economy-wide expenditures for luxury goods at home and abroad. Then, we
can determine total revenues of home and foreign firms producing luxuries according to
r = Eℓ
(
pℓ
Pℓ
)1−σ
+ E
∗
ℓ
t
(
pℓ
P ∗ℓ
)1−σ
, r∗ = E∗ℓ
(
p∗ℓ
P ∗ℓ
)1−σ
+ Eℓ
t
(
p∗ℓ
Pℓ
)1−σ
, (2.64)
where κ = σ2σ−1 > σσ+(σ−1)α∗ = κ∗ and thus pℓ = σσ−1 wκ < σσ−1 wκ∗ = p∗ℓ . Using the
zero-profit conditions κr = σPnf , κ∗r∗ = σPnf and accounting for ξ = p
∗
ℓ
pℓ
= κκ∗ , we derive
E∗ℓ
(P ∗ℓ )1−σ
= tξ
σ − 1
t− ξσ
Eℓ
P 1−σℓ
,
which, substituting for Eℓ and E∗ℓ , can be reformulated to Eq. (2.23′).
To determine the sign of dµ/dt in Eq. (2.33′), we can make use of three insights. First,
from Eq. (2.28′) it follows that µ > 0 holds if and only if t > ξσ +
√
ξ2σ − 1 ≡ t. Second,
we can show that t(1 − B∗) − ξ−σ > 0. To see this, note that t > t establishes t > ξσ
and thus t(1 − B∗) − ξ−σ > ξσ(1 − B∗) − ξ−σ ≡ g(α∗). Since both ξ = σ+(σ−1)α∗2σ−1 and
ξ(1 − B∗) = 1 + σ−12σ−1 [(α∗)1−ε − 1]βΛ−εψλ increase in α∗, we have g′(α∗) > 0, so that
g(1) = 0 gives g(α∗) > 0 and thus t(1 − B∗) − ξ−σ > 0 for all α∗ > 1. Third, defining
G(t) ≡ t−ξσt(1−B∗)−ξ−σ , we can compute G′(t) >,=, < 0 if ξσ(1−B∗)− ξ−σ >,=, < 0. Hence,
G′(t) > 0 follows from g(α∗) > 0. This establishes d2µ
dt2
∣∣
dµ
dt
=0 > 0, according to Eq. (2.33′).
We can thus conclude that if µ had an extremum in t, it would be a minimum. Evaluated
at t = t, we have 1ξ t−ξ
σ
t(1−B∗)−ξ−σ − µ = 1ξ t−ξ
σ
t(1−B∗)−ξ−σ > 0, implying dµ/dt > 0 for small
values of t higher than t. This is inconsistent with a minimum of µ and proves that
dµ/dt > 0 for all possible t.18
In a final step, we determine the welfare effects of trade and begin with the analysis of
home. Substituting zero-profit condition κr = σPnf into Eq. (2.26′) and accounting for
18To determine the effects of supply-side asymmetry on the Grubel-Lloyd index, we also need to know
the sign of dµ/dα∗. Rearranging terms in Eq. (2.28′), we can rewrite the ratio of foreign to domestic firms
as µ = t2−2tξσ+1(t2−1)ξ(1−B∗)−2tξ1−σ+2ξ . Noting dξ/dα∗ > 0 and dξ(1−B∗)/dα∗ > 0, we can safely conclude that
dµ/dα∗ < 0. This is sufficient for GLI = µξ1−σ t−ξσ
tξσ−1 to decrease in α∗.
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r∗
r =
κ
κ∗ = ξ, we can compute
κ
σ − 1
σ
HΛ (1− βΛ−εψλ)
(σ − 1)f
t− 1
t− ξσ =
t+ µξ1−σ
1 + t M. (2.65)
Differentiating the left-hand side with respect to t, we find that t+µξ1−σ1+t M decreases in
trade costs. Since (1 + t)/t also decreases in t, it follows from Pℓ = pℓ
[
M t+µξ
1−σ
1+t
1+t
t
] 1
1−σ
that home benefits from trade.19 To determine the welfare effects of trade for foreign, we
first determine two auxiliary results. Starting from the market clearing condition in Eq.
(2.26′) and accounting for rr∗ = ξ−1 and κ∗r∗ = σPnf , we can compute
HΛw
(
1− βΛ−εψλ
)
= (tξ−σ − 1)
[
t2
t2 − 1
(
1 + 1
tµξ1−σ
)
− 1
]
M∗
σPnf
κ∗
and thus
M∗ = κ∗σ − 1
σ
HΛ (1− βΛ−εψλ)
(σ − 1)f
t− 1
tξ−σ − 1
(t+ 1)µξ1−σ
µξ1−σ + t . (2.66)
Then, differentiating G0(t) ≡ t−1tξ−σ−1 (t+1)µξ
1−σ
µξ1−σ+t , we compute G′0(t) =
G0(t)
(t−1)(t+µξ1−σ)g0(t),
with
g0(t) ≡ −(1− ξ−σ) t+ µξ
1−σ
tξ−σ − 1 − (1− µξ
1−σ) t− 1
t+ 1 +
dµ
dt
t(t− 1)
µ
. (2.67)
Due to limt→∞ t+µξ
1−σ
tξ−σ−1 = ξ
σ, limt→∞ dµdt
t(t−1)
µ = 2
(1−B∗)ξσ−ξ−σ
1−B∗ , and limt→∞ µξ1−σ =
ξ−σ
1−B∗ , we can compute limt→∞ g0(t) =
(1−B∗)ξσ−ξ−σ
1−B∗ , which is zero if α∗ = 1 and is positive
if α∗ > 1.
From Eq. (2.66) we furthermore obtain
M∗
[
1 + 1
tµξ1−σ
]
= κ∗σ − 1
σ
HΛ (1− βΛ−εψλ)
(σ − 1)f
t− 1
tξ−σ − 1
t+ 1
t
tµξ1−σ + 1
t+ µξ1−σ . (2.68)
Differentiating G1(t) ≡ t−1tξ−σ−1 t+1t tµξ
1−σ+1
t+µξ1−σ gives G′1(t) =
G1(t)
(t−1)(t+µξ1−σ)g1(t), with
g1(t) ≡ −(1− ξ−σ) t+ µξ
1−σ
tξ−σ − 1 −
(t+ µξ1−σ)(t− 1)
t(t+ 1)
− t− 1
tµξ1−σ + 1
[
1− (µξ1−σ)2 − dµ
dt
(t2 − 1)ξ1−σ
]
.
Accounting for limt→∞ t+µξ
1−σ
tξ−σ−1 = ξ
σ, limt→∞ t−1tµξ1−σ+1 = ξσ(1 − B∗), limt→∞ µξ1−σ =
ξ−σ
1−B∗ , and limt→∞ dµdt (t2 − 1)ξ1−σ = 2 ξ
σ(1−B∗)−ξ−σ
1−B∗
ξ−σ
1−B∗ , we compute limt→∞ g1(t) =
B∗(1−B∗)ξσ−ξ−σ
1−B∗ ≡ g˜1(α∗). Accounting for g˜1(1) = −1, limα∗→∞ g˜1(α∗) =∞, and g˜′1(α∗) >
19Rearranging Eq. (2.65) we find that M t−ξσ
t2−1 is inversely proportional to µξ1−σ + t and therefore
decreases in t. Noting from Eq. (2.34′) that home’s total exports of luxuries can be expressed as EXℓ =
M t−ξ
σ
t2−1
tξσ−1
t−ξσ
σPnf
κ
, we can safely conclude that total (intra- plus inter-industry) trade decreases in t. Noting
from Footnote 18 that µξ1−σ decreases in α∗, we can further conclude that M t−ξσ
t2−1 increases in the foreign
wage premium and this is sufficient for total (intra- plus inter-industry trade) to increase in supply-side
dissimilarity.
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0, we can safely conclude that there exists a critical α∗ > 1, such that limt→∞ g1(t) >,=,
< 0 if α∗ >,=, < α∗. From P ∗ℓ = p∗ℓ
[
M∗ 1+tµξ
1−σ
tµξ1−σ
] 1
1−σ , it then follows that for initially
high trade costs, the foreign price index of luxuries decreases in t if α∗ and therefore ξ are
sufficiently high.
Differentiating the welfare function V (Pn, P ∗ℓ , e∗, ψˆ) from Eq. (2.21), we finally obtain
dV (·)
dt
= V (·) + (1− β)/ε(t− 1)(t+ µξ1−σ)
[
ε
σ − 1g1(t) +
Λεψˆλh∗ℓ [(α∗)ε − 1]
Λεψˆλ{1 + h∗ℓ [(α∗)ε − 1)]} − β
g0(t)
]
, (2.69)
where ( e∗Pn )εψˆ = Λεψˆλ{1 + h∗ℓ [(α∗)ε − 1]} and h∗ℓ = M∗ (σ−1)fHΛ have been considered.
Accounting for limt→∞ g0(t) > 0 and limt→∞ g1(t) = B
∗(1−B∗)ξσ−ξ−σ
1−B∗ > 0 if α∗ > α∗, we
can thus safely conclude that the foreign country loses from a small reduction of initially
high trade costs if the price distortion in the labor market is sufficiently high. In the
limiting case of α∗ = 1, we have limt→∞ g0(t) = 0 and limt→∞ g1(t) = −1, so that in this
case the foreign country unambiguously benefits from a small reduction of initially high
trade costs. This completes the proof.
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Chapter 3
PIGL Preferences, Income
Differences and International
Trade
3.1 Introduction
Empirical research in the field of international trade has shown, that relaxing the as-
sumption of useful but rather restrictive homothetic preferences and instead making use
of nonhomothetic preferences seems reasonable. Demand-side as opposed to supply-side
driven explanations for trade, have gained in importance during the last decades ever
since the introduction of the Linder (1961) hypothesis.1 Papers like Hunter and Markusen
(1988), Bergstrand (1989), Hunter (1991), Hallak (2010) and Fieler (2011) show empirical
relevance of per-capita income differences as a determinant of international trade flows.
In addition, there is also empirical research highlighting the role of income dispersion for
explaining international trade flows (cf. Francois and Kaplan, 1996; Dalgin et al., 2008;
Choi et al., 2009; Bernasconi, 2013). Egger and Habermeyer (2019) provide an extensive
overview of various theoretical contributions dealing with the role of nonhomothetic pref-
erences in international trade.2 The authors distinguish different types of preferences used
in previous work and discuss prevailing drawbacks. As per-capita income but also income
dispersion hold a relevant position in explaining the intensive margin of consumption and
thus the structure of international trade, Egger and Habermeyer (2019) introduce a new
class of preferences in the trade context, namely “price-independent generalized-linear”
(PIGL) preferences (cf. Muellbauer, 1975, 1976), which are capable of capturing both
factors of influence. These preferences have the convenient feature that aggregation of
individual demand is possible, even though households are assumed to be heterogeneous
in their income level. The authors set up a two-country framework along the lines of Help-
man and Krugman’s (1985) home-market model with two sectors of production and labor
1A prominent example for a supply-side approach is the Ricardian model and its numerous extensions.
For instance, Dornbusch et al. (1977) use the Ricardian framework to consider a continuum of goods,
whereas Eaton and Kortum (2002) extend the analysis to the case of many countries.
2Notable examples are Markusen (1986, 2013), Matsuyama (2000), Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) and Foellmi
et al. (2018).
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as the only input factor. Heterogeneous households consume homogeneous necessities pro-
duced under perfect competition and differentiated luxuries produced under monopolistic
competition. Egger and Habermeyer (2019) show that the country with a higher level
and/or dispersion of per-capita income has the larger home market for luxuries and be-
comes a net-exporter of these goods. Provided that both sectors pay the same market
clearing wage, the structure of trade is irrelevant for welfare in the open economy. In this
paper, we show that these fundamental insights extend to a more general class of PIGL
preferences.3
Starting from an indirect utility function representing parametric PIGL preferences,
Egger and Habermeyer (2019) face the fundamental problem that a closed form repre-
sentation for the direct utility function does in general not exist. This is problematic,
because it is a priori not clear that the demand functions derived from indirect utility are
in fact the solution to a well-defined utility maximization problem. In consumer theory,
this is well-known under the term “integrability problem”, whose first formal account is
usually attributed to Antonelli (1886), and which has been brought back to the surface of
economic research by Samuelson (1950). Focusing on direct utility functions, Samuelson
(1950) complements Antonelli’s (1886) conditions for mathematical integrability of de-
mand functions with a condition that ensures economic integrability (see Hurwicz, 1971).4
Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971), further elaborate on the integrability problem outlined by
Antonelli (1886) and Samuelson (1950) and provide sufficient conditions for solving this
problem. In a recent paper, Fally (2018) draws on these sufficient conditions outlined by
Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971) for solving the integrability problem to show that the con-
jecture formulated by Gorman (1995) on the permissible functional form Gorman-Pollak
demand function is correct. In fact, Fally (2018) shows that the respective demand func-
tions can only have two forms, which he summarizes under the term generalized separable
demand systems.5 Although not directly referring to the integrability problem, Boppart
(2014) shows that the conditions formulated by Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971) are fulfilled in
the case of parametric PIGL preferences with homogeneous goods.6 However, this does
not mean that the solution of the integrability problem extends to a model variant with a
continuum of differentiated luxury goods studied by Egger and Habermeyer (2019), who
avoid the integrability problem by focussing on a subclass of parametric PIGL preferences,
3Since Chapters 2 and 3 originate from autonomous manuscripts, notations might differ between those
chapters.
4As discussed in Hurwicz (1971) and Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971), demand systems can be distinguished
by local and infinitesimal properties or global and finite properties. The former contains assumptions of
substitution matrices about symmetry and negative semi-definiteness, as introduced by Antonelli (1886)
and Samuelson (1950). The latter includes, for instance, the strong axiom of revealed preferences put
forward by Houthakker (1950).
5In a subsequent contribution, Fally (2019) uses the demand system to extend the analysis of Arkolakis
et al. (2017). In their seminal paper, Arkolakis et al. (2017) depart from CES preferences and compare
the welfare gains from trade liberalization with constant and variable markups. Bertoletti and Etro (2018)
use Gorman-Pollak demand functions in a model of monopolistic competition, distinguishing homogeneous
and heterogeneous firms.
6Boppart (2014) incorporates PIGL preferences in a neoclassical growth model and shows that demand-
driven structural change can be consistent with balanced growth (and thus the Kaldor facts) if preferences
have parametric PIGL form. In his model, Boppart (2014) distinguishes a substitution and an income
effect, with non-Gorman form preferences needed to generate an income effect from changes in the level
and dispersion of per-capita income on the expenditure shares of consumers.
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for which a direct utility function can be derived. Since restricting their analysis to PIGL
preferences with a direct representation of the utility function limits the suitability of
the Egger and Habermeyer (2019) model for explaining real world trade patterns, it is the
purpose of this paper to extend their model to one that allows for more general parametric
PIGL preferences.
For this purpose, we modify the assumptions of Egger and Habermeyer (2019) and
assume, similar to Boppart (2014), homogeneous luxuries, which are nontradable and
are in turn assembled from differentiated, tradable intermediates as in Ethier (1982b).7
Associating differentiated goods with intermediates allows us to rely on insights from
Boppart (2014) to solve the integrability problem, while keeping the main ingredients of
the trade model outlined by Egger and Habermeyer (2019). Whereas the resulting model
is richer and the analysis of the open economy turns out to be more complicated than in
Egger and Habermeyer (2019), the fundamental insight from their analysis that, in the
absence of labor market imperfection, the level and dispersion of per-capita income are
crucial determinants for international trade flows, but irrelevant for welfare gains from
trade, remains intact. This suggests that the preference assumptions imposed by Egger
and Habermeyer (2019) for tractability reasons are less restrictive than they appear at a
first glance.
Krugman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) have provided the scientific foun-
dation of models, containing increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition and
trade costs, which give rise to a home-market effect. Its most general interpretation states
that “a country whose share of world demand for a good is larger than average will have –
ceteris paribus – a more than proportionally larger-than-average share of world production
of that good” (Crozet and Trionfetti, 2008, p. 309) and will export that good on aver-
age. The home-market effect has strong empirical support. Davis and Weinstein (1999)
introduce a model of economic geography to test the existence of home-market effects on
a regional level using Japanese data, whereas Davis and Weinstein (2003) focus on the
international level by employing a data set of OECD countries. Head and Ries (2001)
find support of the home-market effect by using firm-level data for U.S. and Canadian
manufacturing. However, details of home-market models, such as the assumption of a
freely traded outside good produced under constant returns to scale and sold under per-
fect competition, seem to be controversial. On the one hand, Davis (1998b) shows that the
home-market effect vanishes when trade cost of equal size are introduced for the outside
good. On the other hand, Davis (1998b) also hints on the importance of the relative size
of trade cost for the existence of a home-market effect. Crozet and Trionfetti (2008) build
on the insights of Davis (1998b) and show that, in general, the home-market effect remains
valid, however, in mitigated form. This confirms the choice of neglecting trade costs for
the outside good as a simplifying assumption for the sake of algebraic convenience.8 We
contribute to this large strand of literature as in our analysis the home-market effect orig-
7Ethier (1982b) is one of the first approaches that associates the theory of intermediate inputs with
scale economies and imperfect competition in final goods production.
8There exist numerous other topics in international trade applying a home-market model structure. For
instance, Head et al. (2002) test the role of the market structure for the robustness of the home-market
effect, whereas Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) consider a labor market imperfection within the home-market
framework.
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inates from the demand-side. We consider heterogeneous households, differing in their
income levels, who face non-Gorman preferences. This forms country-specific aggregate
demand structures, which are decisive for the respective production and trade pattern.9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the main
building blocs of our model, shows the solution to the integrability problem, derives the
market equilibrium in the closed economy and sheds light on how changes in the level
and dispersion of per-capita income affect welfare. Section 3.3 presents a two-country
trade model with countries differing only in the level and/or dispersion of per-capita
income. After having solved the open economy equilibrium, we derive the trade pattern
and resulting welfare effects of trade. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The closed economy
We introduce a static model with nonhomothetic preferences over two types of final goods.
Homogeneous necessities (n) and a homogeneous luxury good (ℓ) are both produced under
perfect competition. The luxury good is a CES aggregate of differentiated intermediate
goods (ω) which are produced under monopolistic competition. The economy is populated
by a continuous set H of single-person households with Lebesgue measure H. The inelastic
effective labor supply λ is household-specific and distributed over interval
[
λ, λ
]
according
to a continuously differentiable cdf L(λ). Thus, workers differ in their efficiency units of
labor they provide to firms, leading to heterogeneous levels of income. Labor is free to
move between the sectors of necessities and intermediate goods, whereas the final luxury
good is costlessly assembled from the available intermediates. Assuming non-Gorman
form preferences, the level and/or dispersion of per-capita income are instrumental for the
aggregate demand of the two final goods.
3.2.1 Preferences and demand
The model features “price-independent generalized-linear” (PIGL) preferences as intro-
duced by Muellbauer (1975, 1976). This is the most general class of preferences that
allows for a (positive) representative consumer and consequently avoids an aggregation
problem from individual to economy-wide demand. Egger and Habermeyer (2019) put
those non-Gorman form preferences in an international trade context considering a labor
market imperfection. The authors use a subgroup of parametric PIGL preferences that
features an explicit solution for direct utility and hence, avoids an integrability problem
and makes the computation of a price index in a model of monopolistic competition pos-
sible. Unlike Egger and Habermeyer (2019), in the underlying paper we refer to a more
general form of parametric PIGL preferences, put forward by Boppart (2014), with the
9Our analysis stands in contrast with the seminal contribution of Krugman (1980), who considers a
home-market effect arising from exogenous differences in the preferences of two economies. In this sense,
our model is for example closer related to Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), who use a home-market model to show
that richer countries export goods of higher quality.
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following functional form of the indirect utility function
v(Pn, Pℓ, ei) =
1
ε
(
ei
Pℓ
)ε
− β
γ
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ
− 1
ε
+ β
γ
. (3.1)
Households receive utility by consuming necessities and the luxury good, with Pn and Pℓ
being the respective prices. The individual expenditure level is given by ei and ε, γ and
β are preference parameters, where β ∈ (0, 1) and 0 ≤ ε < γ < 1 are assumed. Following
Boppart (2014), the ranking ε < γ restricts the analysis to the empirically relevant case of
an elasticity of substitution between necessities and the luxury good that is strictly smaller
than unity (see Ngai and Pissarides, 2007; Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008, for further
discussion).10 The limiting case of ε → 0 captures homothetic preferences and hence the
case usually considered by the trade literature. The corresponding indirect utility function,
derived from Eq. (3.1), then reads v(Pn, Pℓ, ei) = ln
(
ei/Pℓ
)
+ (β/γ) [1− (Pn/Pℓ)γ ].
By means of Roy’s identity, Marshallian demand functions for the two final goods can
be derived from the indirect utility function in Eq. (3.1):
Xin = β
ei
Pn
(
ei
Pℓ
)−ε (
Pn
Pℓ
)γ
, (3.2)
Xiℓ =
ei
Pℓ
1− β ( ei
Pℓ
)−ε (
Pn
Pℓ
)γ . (3.3)
The Engel curves for necessities and the luxury good are non-linear in the expenditure
level. On the one hand, the expenditure share of consumption devoted to necessities
decreases in the expenditure level, making the Engel curve concave. On the other hand,
convexity of the Engel curve arises because the expenditure share of consumption devoted
to the homogeneous luxury good increases in the expenditure level. Linear Engel curves
reflect homothetic preferences and thus the limiting case of ε→ 0. Aggregating Eqs. (3.2)
and (3.3) in each case over all households gives aggregate demand functions
Xn = β
He¯
Pn
(
e¯
Pℓ
)−ε (Pn
Pℓ
)γ
ψ, (3.4)
Xℓ =
He¯
Pℓ
[
1− β
(
e¯
Pℓ
)−ε (Pn
Pℓ
)γ
ψ
]
, (3.5)
where households’ average expenditure level is introduced by e¯ ≡ 1H
∫
i∈H e
idi and ψ is a
measure of economy-wide expenditure dispersion which lies between 0 and 1. Dispersion
measure ψ is a weighted mean of individual consumption expenditure divided by the
arithmetic mean of expenditures and shown below:
ψ ≡ 1
H
∫
i∈H
(
ei
e¯
)1−ε
di. (3.6)
10The limiting case of ε = γ establishes a subgroup of parametric PIGL preferences for which the direct
utility function can be solved. This case is thoroughly discussed in Egger and Habermeyer (2019) and
therefore excluded from the analysis here. In the limiting case of ε → 0 and γ → 0, preferences have
Cobb-Douglas form and in the limiting case of ε→ 1 and γ → 1, preferences are quasilinear.
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In the limiting case of homothetic preferences, Eq. (3.6) establishes ψ = 1 and thus
induces aggregate demand in Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5) to be independent of the expenditure
dispersion. For a given ε > 0, a higher (lower) ψ reflects a lower (higher) expenditure
dispersion in the economy, which in turn increases (decreases) the demand for necessities
and decreases (increases) the demand for the luxury good.
3.2.2 Economic integrability
Before turning to the production side of our model, we show that the indirect utility
function for parametric PIGL preferences in Eq. (3.1) leads to a demand system that is
integrable and thus results from utility-maximizing households. This refers to the “inte-
grability problem” discussed, for instance, by Antonelli (1886), Samuelson (1950), Hurwicz
and Uzawa (1971) and Fally (2018). In the following, we investigate three sufficient con-
ditions, established by Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971), that must be fulfilled to solve the
integrability problem. A demand system arises from utility maximization subject to a
budget constraint if (i) the whole budget is spent, (ii) the Slutsky matrix is symmetric
and (iii) the Slutsky matrix is negative semi-definite. We now check step by step that these
conditions are fulfilled, thereby relying on an online appendix of Boppart (2014) who ex-
amines these conditions but does not relate them to the integrability problem discussed
above.
Check for condition (i): Calculating the individual expenditure shares of consumption
devoted to necessities and the luxury good, respectively, we use Eqs. (3.2) and (3.3) to
obtain
ηin = β
(
ei
Pℓ
)−ε (
Pn
Pℓ
)γ
and ηiℓ = 1− β
(
ei
Pℓ
)−ε (
Pn
Pℓ
)γ
. (3.7)
Eq. (3.7) implies that the two expenditure shares add up to one, so that the whole budget
is spent and condition (i) is fulfilled.
Check for condition (ii): To derive the Slutsky matrix, we can first solve Eq. (3.1) for
the individual expenditure level. This yields the expenditure function according to
e (Pn, Pℓ, v(·)) =
{
εv(·) + εβ
γ
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ
+ 1− εβ
γ
} 1
ε
Pℓ. (3.8)
Applying Shephard’s lemma gives the respective Hicksian (or compensated) demand func-
tion for both final goods
Xi,hn = β
(
e(·)
Pℓ
)1−ε (Pℓ
Pn
)1−γ
, (3.9)
Xi,hℓ =
e(·)
Pℓ
[
1− β
(
e(·)
Pℓ
)−ε (Pn
Pℓ
)γ]
. (3.10)
Contrasting the Hicksian demand functions in Eqs. (3.9) and (3.10) with the Marshallian
demand functions in Eqs. (3.2) and (3.3) confirms correctness of our results and illustrates
the well-known difference that, by means of Eq. (3.8), the former are functions of prices
and utility, whereas the latter are functions of prices and expenditure levels.
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The Slutsky matrix captures the first partial derivatives of Eqs. (3.9) and (3.10) with
respect to prices and can be expressed as
S =
∂X
i,h
n
∂Pn
∂Xi,hn
∂Pℓ
∂Xi,h
ℓ
∂Pn
∂Xi,h
ℓ
∂Pℓ
 = Ξ
 PℓPn −1
−1 PnPℓ
 (3.11)
where Ξ ≡ β [e(·)/Pℓ]1−2ε (Pn/Pℓ)γ (1/Pn) {β(1− ε) (Pn/Pℓ)γ − (1− γ) [e(·)/Pℓ]ε}. Eq.
(3.11) proves symmetry of the Slutsky matrix and shows that condition (ii) is satisfied.
Check for condition (iii): To show that the Slutsky matrix is negative semi-definite,
we can check the Eigenvalues of S, which have to be non-positive. The Eigenvalues of S
are given by the solutions of the linear equation system,Ξ PℓPn −Ξ
−Ξ PnPℓ Ξ
(y1
y2
)
= ξ
(
y1
y2
)
. (3.12)
Ignoring trivial solutions with y1, y2 = 0, the Eigenvalues, ξ, are determined by the con-
dition that ∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
Ξ PℓPn − ξ
)
−Ξ
−Ξ
(
Pn
Pℓ
Ξ− ξ
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0 (3.13)
Solving the determinant establishes the following quadratic equation:
ξ2 − ξΞ [(Pℓ/Pn) + (Pn/Pℓ)], which has two solutions in ξ, namely ξ = 0 and
ξ = Ξ [(Pℓ/Pn) + (Pn/Pℓ)]. Negative semi-definiteness requires ξ ≤ 0 and thus Ξ ≤ 0.
This is equivalent to
e(·)ε ≥ β 1− ε1− γP
γ
nP
ε−γ
ℓ . (3.14)
If the inequality in (3.14) holds, the Slutsky matrix is negative semi-definite and integra-
bility condition (iii) is fulfilled. Below, we introduce a parameter constraint to establish
the inequality in (3.14) even for the poorest individuals.
We complete the discussion in this section by noting that positive consumption levels
of necessities and the luxury good further require that
e(·)ε > βP γnP ε−γℓ , (3.15)
according to Eqs. (3.9) and (3.10). Given that ε < γ (see above) positive demand for
both goods is guaranteed by (3.14), the negative semi-definiteness of the Slutsky matrix.
3.2.3 Technology and production
In this economy there exist two sectors producing final goods, namely homogeneous ne-
cessities (n) and a homogeneous luxury good (ℓ), and one intermediate goods sector. The
luxury good is an aggregate of differentiated intermediate goods (ω) and it is assembled
under perfect competition at zero cost. The labor market is perfectly competitive and
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there is no involuntary unemployment in the model. Labor is the only input factor for
necessities and intermediates and workers are mobile between those two sectors.
Homogeneous necessities are produced under perfect competition. The firms’ produc-
tion function is linear in the effective labor input and fixed cost do not apply. One unit of
labor input receives market clearing wage w and produces one unit of output, i.e. Pn = w.
Differentiated intermediate goods are produced with labor input via identical production
functions under monopolistic competition. Having paid fixed cost of production Pnf in
efficiency units of labor, each firm supplies a unique intermediate variety ω from the set of
available varieties Ω. Labor mobility between the sectors of necessities and intermediates
leads to wage equalization. Consequently, each labor unit receives market clearing wage
w and produces one unit of a differentiated variety. It follows that firms are indifferent
between hiring a worker with a low or high level of effective labor supply λ, because per-
unit cost of labor is the same. Intermediate goods are assembled to a homogeneous luxury
good, with all intermediates entering the production process symmetrically. To be more
precise, we follow Ethier (1982b) and assume
Xℓ =
[∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
, (3.16)
where q(ω) is the quantity of intermediate good ω which is equivalent to the efficiency
units of labor used by intermediate firm ω. The constant elasticity of substitution between
the differentiated intermediate goods is given by σ > 1. The final output of the luxury
good has constant returns to scale in the quantity of intermediates assuming a fixed
number of differentiated intermediates and has increasing returns to scale in the number
of differentiated intermediates considering a fixed total quantity of intermediates. As
formally shown in the Appendix, maximizing aggregate profits in the sector of the luxury
good, Π = PℓXℓ −
∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)q(ω)dω, gives an isoelastic demand function of the following
form: q(ω) = q(ωˆ) [p(ωˆ)/p(ω)]σ, where p(ω) and p(ωˆ) are prices for differentiated varieties
ω and ωˆ, respectively. Furthermore, in the Appendix we show that the price corresponding
to the composite Xℓ is an index of the prices of differentiated varieties and is given by
Pℓ ≡
[∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)1−σdω
] 1
1−σ , which features constant elasticity.11 In Eq. (3.17), we show
that profit maximization of a firm producing intermediates, with profit function pi(ω) =
p(ω)q(ω) − Pnq(ω) − Pnf , leads to the well-known result that firms set their prices as a
constant markup over marginal cost. The optimal price for intermediate ω and the optimal
quantity of intermediate ω are given by
p(ω) = σ
σ − 1w and q(ω) = (σ − 1)f. (3.17)
Eq. (3.17) holds for all varieties ω, which implies that all intermediates are produced
in equal amounts and are sold for the same price. According to this, firm index ω can
be suppressed in the further analysis. Firms achieve zero profits in equilibrium which
establishes the zero-profit condition r = σPnf , with firms’ revenues given by r.12
11Notice that we abstract from fixed cost for producing the homogeneous luxury good ℓ, so that total
cost of producing the luxury equal aggregate revenues of intermediate goods producers.
12In a previous version, we have considered firm heterogeneity along the lines of Melitz (2003). However,
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3.2.4 Autarkic equilibrium
Provided that there is no redistribution of income, individual expenditure levels are het-
erogeneous – due to ex ante heterogeneity of workers in their effective labor supplies – and
(acknowledging zero profits) they are equal to the workers’ respective labor incomes. To
exclude corner solutions on the consumer-side, a positive consumption demand for both
goods requires that even the poorest workers spend some of their income on the luxury
good. Referring to condition (3.14), which establishes negative semi-definiteness of the
Slutsky matrix for all consumers (see above) and noting that workers possessing the low-
est level of effective labor supply λ earn expenditure level λw, we obtain a lower bound
for effective labor supply that, at least, needs to be met:
λε ≥ β 1− ε1− γ
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ−ε
. (3.18)
Since price index Pℓ is endogenously determined, we discuss further below under which
conditions constraint (3.18) is fulfilled.
Per-capita income and the distribution of per-capita income are given by
e = Λw and ψ =
∫ λ
λ
(
λ
Λ
)1−ε
dL(λ), (3.19)
respectively, where Λ = ∫ λλ λdL(λ) is the average effective labor supply of workers. It
follows that a higher average effective labor supply induces a higher average income for a
given wage rate w. As described above, a higher dispersion measure ψ is associated either
with a more egalitarian distribution of income or with a lower impact of a given income
dispersion on consumer demand with the limiting case of no impact at all if preferences
are homothetic.
The mass of firms producing intermediate goods in general equilibrium is given by m,
then the goods market clearing condition for the luxury good reads
HΛw
[
1− βΛ−ε
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ−ε
ψ
]
= mr. (3.20)
The term HΛw denotes aggregate consumption expenditure, which equals the aggregate
income of households. The mass of firms producing intermediates cannot be explicitly
solved for, because the price index for the luxury good Pℓ also depends on m. This can
be seen by using the constant markup pricing rule, given in Eq. (3.17), in the definition
of the price index of differentiated intermediates:
Pℓ = m
1
1−σ
σ
σ − 1w. (3.21)
For a given w, the price index Pℓ decreases in the number of firms producing intermediate
goods, ∂Pℓ/∂m < 0, because of tougher competition.
Condition (3.18) contains endogenous variable Pℓ given in Eq. (3.21), which is de-
since productivity differences do not contribute to the mechanisms of our analysis, we have decided to stay
with the simpler model variant of homogeneous producers.
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termined by the market equilibrium. In the limiting case of homogeneous households,
implying λ = λ = Λ and ψ = 1, the goods market clearing condition for the luxury good
in Eq. (3.20) is given by Hλw
[
1− βλ−ε (Pn/Pℓ)γ−ε
]
= mr. Together with parameter
ranking ε < γ, the market equilibrium then establishes condition (3.18). For a sufficiently
egalitarian distribution of effective labor supply λ, we can therefore safely conclude that
condition (3.18) is fulfilled.
Furthermore, using Eq. (3.21) to rewrite the goods market clearing condition for the
luxury good in Eq. (3.20) as an implicit function of Λ, ψ and m, we obtain
Γ1(Λ, ψ,m) ≡ mσf −HΛ
[
1− βΛ−εm ε−γ1−σ
(
σ
σ − 1
)ε−γ
ψ
]
= 0, (3.22)
where the zero-profit condition r = σPnf and Pn = w have been used. As formally
shown in the Appendix, we can apply the implicit function theorem to Eq. (3.22) to show
that the number of intermediate producers increases in average effective labor supply,
dm/dΛ > 0, whereas it decreases in expenditure dispersion, dm/dψ < 0. The first result
emerges, because a higher average income level increases demand for both final goods,
and thus causes firm entry in the sector of intermediate goods. To get an intuition for the
second result we use our finding from above, that a higher dispersion index ψ decreases
the demand for the luxury good, using Eq. (3.5), resulting in firm exit in the sector of
differentiated intermediates.
Using Eqs. (3.4), (3.5) and (3.19), aggregate expenditure shares for necessities and
the luxury good can be calculated according to ηn = βΛ−ε(Pn/Pℓ)γ−εψ and ηℓ = 1 −
βΛ−ε(Pn/Pℓ)γ−εψ, respectively. As already established, a higher per-capita income and/or
a higher income dispersion increase consumption expenditures for the luxury good (direct
demand effect) which leads to firm entry in the sector of intermediate goods which in
turn lowers the price index for intermediate goods. This lower price index decreases
consumption expenditures for the luxury good and therefore has a counteracting indirect
price effect on aggregate expenditures. With respect to necessities, a higher per-capita
income and/or a higher income dispersion decrease consumption expenditures through the
direct demand effect and increase consumption expenditures through the indirect price
effect. To investigate the net effect of these two counteracting effects, we make use of Eq.
(3.22). Relying on the result that m increases in Λ, and decreases in ψ, establishes that
the direct effect always dominates and thus both, a higher Λ and a lower ψ lead to lower
consumption expenditures for necessities and higher expenditures for the luxury good.
The labor market clearing condition reads Xn + mq + mf = HΛ. Employment of
efficiency units of labor in the sector of necessities is captured by Xn, mq are the efficiency
units of labor employed as variable input in the production of intermediate goods and
aggregate fixed labor input in this sector is given by mf . Overall this has to equal
economy-wide supply of labor, HΛ. Using Eq. (3.17), the labor market clearing condition
can be rewritten as
Xn +mσf = HΛ (3.23)
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and pins down output of necessities in general equilibrium. In the Appendix we show that
both final goods are produced under autarky and thus a diversification equilibrium exists.
3.2.5 Welfare analysis
Since the representative consumer under PIGL preferences has only a positive but no
normative interpretation, we follow Egger and Habermeyer (2019) and assume a utilitarian
welfare function that gives equal weight to all households:
V (Pn, Pℓ, e, ψˆ) ≡ 1
ε
(
e
Pℓ
)ε
ψˆ − β
γ
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ
− 1
ε
+ β
γ
, (3.24)
where ψˆ ≡ ∫ λλ (λ/Λ)ε dL(λ) is yet another dispersion index defined on the unit interval,
which (except for the limiting case of ε = 1/2) is different from ψ. Dispersion index ψˆ
captures an inequality aversion of the social planner, which exists despite the assumption
of utilitarian welfare and is the higher the lower is index ψˆ.
Intuitively, from Eq. (3.19) a higher average effective labor supply Λ is associated with
higher per-capita income and therefore leads to a welfare improvement (see the Appendix
for a formal proof). This has two reasons: On the one hand, for given prices workers can
purchase more necessities and luxuries with a higher level of income. On the other hand,
the price index for the luxury good falls, due to a higher market demand, which leads to
firm entry in the sector of intermediate goods.
In contrast to the level of per-capita income, the welfare effect of a change in income
dispersion is, however, a priori not clear. The overall effect can be split into two effects
working through indices ψ and ψˆ, respectively. To determine which of the two effects
dominates, we can look at the case of ε = 1/2, for which ψˆ and ψ are of equal size. The
social welfare function for this particular parameter configuration is given by
V (Pn, Pℓ, e, ψ) = 2
(
e
Pℓ
) 1
2
ψ − β
γ
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ
− 2 + β
γ
. (3.25)
Differentiating Eq. (3.25) with respect to ψ gives
dV (Pn, Pℓ, e, ψ)
dψ
=
√
e
Pℓ(σ − 1)2
{
2(σ − 1) + 1
m
dm
dψ
[
ψ − β√
Λ
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ− 12]}
. (3.26)
A higher income dispersion causes a direct negative welfare effect because of the social
inequality aversion. However, from aggregate demand functions (3.4) and (3.5) we know
that a higher income dispersion also leads to higher consumption expenditures for the
luxury good. This attracts new firms into the sector of intermediate goods, thus lowers
the price index for the luxury good and this in turn triggers a positive effect on social
welfare. Which effect dominates is not clear even if ε = 1/2 and depends inter alia on the
level of preference parameter γ, according to Eq. (3.26). To gain further insights about
possible outcomes, we can note from Egger and Habermeyer (2019), who show that in
the case of γ = 1/2 (and thus γ = ε) a negative welfare effect due to a higher income
dispersion is more likely if either the elasticity of substitution σ is sufficiently large, leading
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to sufficiently small markups, or if β is sufficiently small.13 In the limiting case of γ → 1 a
higher income dispersion causes a negative welfare effect for all σ > 1 (see the Appendix for
a formal proof). Compared to the welfare effects for ε = γ = 1/2, the indirect price index
effect is always dominated by the direct social inequality aversion effect when ε = 1/2 and
γ → 1 is assumed.
To complete the analysis of the closed economy, we assume homothetic preferences and
consider the resulting welfare effects with regard to changes in the level and dispersion
of per-capita income. Knowing that ψˆ = 1 in the limiting case of ε → 0, we can apply
the rule of L’Hôpital to Eq. (3.24) and calculate the limiting case of ε→ 0 to obtain the
welfare function under homothetic preferences
V¯ (Pn, Pℓ, e) = ln
(
e
Pℓ
)
+ β
γ
[
1−
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ]
. (3.27)
It is straightforward that welfare increases with per-capita income, whereas a change in
the dispersion of income entails no welfare effects. This result comes as no surprise since
the dispersion of income does not affect the expenditure structure (ψ = 1) and because
welfare does not exhibit inequality aversion (ψˆ = 1) if preferences are homothetic.
As a final point, it is worth noting that firm entry is, in general, inefficient which means
that there exists a resource misallocation that is triggered due to the two final goods sectors
charging different markups – see Dhingra and Morrow (2016) for further details. In the
Appendix, we show for the limiting case of Cobb-Douglas preferences (ε→ 0 and γ → 0)
that the social planner prefers a higher mass of firms producing intermediate goods than
it is determined in the market solution (see Benassy, 1996, for a discussion). Thus, the
market outcome is not allocationally efficient in this case.
3.3 The open economy
In the open economy, we consider two countries of equal size, HΛ = H∗Λ∗, which only
differ in the level and/or dispersion of effective labor supply and thus per-capita income.
Asterisks refer to foreign variables. Trade just occurs with homogeneous necessities and
differentiated intermediate goods, whereas the luxury good is not tradable and therefore
consumed locally. Necessities can be traded at zero cost which causes domestic and foreign
firms to pay the same market clearing wage w per efficiency units of labor, provided
that a diversification equilibrium exists. Since we want to exclude corner solutions and
aim at a diversification equilibrium, a parameter constraint supporting the production of
necessities and intermediate goods in both countries is discussed below. Standard iceberg
transportation cost τ > 1 are assumed to exist for trade in intermediate goods, meaning
that more than one unit of variety ω must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive
abroad.
Total revenues in the sector of intermediate goods of home and foreign are linked
through the respective zero-profit conditions, namely r = σPnf and r∗ = σPnf which
13The model variant with β = 0 incorporates only one final goods sector as can be seen in Eq. (3.4).
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yield
1− β
(
Pn
P ∗
ℓ
)γ−ε
ϕ∗
1− β
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ−ε
ϕ
=
(
Pℓ
P ∗ℓ
)σ−1
. (3.28)
Throughout the following analysis, τ > 1 and HΛ = H∗Λ∗ are assumed. We introduce
ϕ ≡ Λ−εψ and ϕ∗ ≡ (Λ∗)−εψ∗ to simplify notation. Variables ϕ and ϕ∗ capture differences
in consumer demand due to exogenous differences in the level and/or dispersion of per-
capita income in home and foreign, respectively. For instance, if per-capita income and/or
income dispersion increase at home (higher Λ and/or lower ψ), then ϕ drops, indicating
that economy-wide demand for the luxury good increases in home and vice versa for
necessities. These links were already established in the closed economy scenario.
Provided that both countries produce necessities, the market clearing conditions for
the luxury good at home and abroad are given by
HΛw
[
1− β
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ−ε
ϕ
]
= mr 11 + τ1−σ +m
∗r∗
τ1−σ
1 + τ1−σ , (3.29)
HΛw
1− β (Pn
P ∗ℓ
)γ−ε
ϕ∗
 = m∗r∗ 11 + τ1−σ +mr τ
1−σ
1 + τ1−σ , (3.30)
respectively. The CES price indices of the luxury good for the two countries can be
calculated as
Pℓ = m
1
1−σ p
(
1 + µτ1−σ
) 1
1−σ and P ∗ℓ = m
1
1−σ p
(
µ+ τ1−σ
) 1
1−σ . (3.31)
To simplify notation, we introduce µ ≡ m∗/m as the ratio of foreign to domestic inter-
mediate producers. Again, due to the price indices for the luxury good in each country
depending on the domestic and foreign number of firms producing intermediate goods,
Eqs. (3.29) and (3.30) cannot be explicitly solved for m and m∗. To ensure a unique
interior solution with µ ∈ (0,∞) and thus production of intermediate goods in both coun-
tries, we set up two implicit relationships between the number of domestic and foreign
firms, the exogenous income variables ϕ and ϕ∗, and the transportation cost τ . Using Eq.
(3.31) in Eq. (3.28), the first implicit link is established as a condition for equal revenues
of intermediate goods producers in the two economies
Γ2(m,µ) ≡ (1− τ1−σ)(1− µ)− αF (m,µ)
ε−γ
1−σ (µ+ τ1−σ) [f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ] = 0, (3.32)
where F (m,µ) ≡ m(1+µτ1−σ) > 0 has to hold to assure a positive mass of domestic inter-
mediate goods producers, m > 0. Furthermore, f(µ) ≡ [(µ+ τ1−σ)/(1 + µτ1−σ)]σ−(1+γ−ε)1−σ
is introduced as a summary variable, which considerably simplifies the analysis of the open
economy equilibrium in the main text and the corresponding formal analysis in the Ap-
pendix, and the definitions of ϕ and ϕ∗ have been used. We define α ≡ β (Pn/p)γ−ε > 0.
Noting that p = [σ/(σ−1)]w is the price of each intermediate good as given in Eq. (3.17),
then together with Pn = w we get α = β [(σ − 1)/σ]γ−ε, which is a constant that is of no
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further interest for the subsequent analysis. The implicit solution for the equilibrium mass
of firms producing intermediate goods in home as a function of firm ratio µ is determined
by Γ2(·) = 0 and reads14
m =
(
A(µ)
α
) 1−σ
ε−γ 1
1 + µτ1−σ , (3.33)
where A(µ) ≡ [(1− τ1−σ)(1− µ)] / [(µ+ τ1−σ)(f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ)] is yet another summary
variable that substantially simplifies the open economy analysis in the main text and
the Appendix. The second link is derived by adding Eqs. (3.29) and (3.30), and using
Eq. (3.31), which establishes a goods market clearing condition for the luxury good at the
global level according to
Γ3(m,µ) ≡ mσf(1 + µ)−HΛ
{
2− αF (m,µ) ε−γ1−σ
[
µ+ τ1−σ
1 + µτ1−σ f(µ)ϕ
∗ + ϕ
]}
= 0, (3.34)
where r = r∗ = σPnf , the definitions of ϕ and ϕ∗, and F (m,µ) ≡ m(1+µτ1−σ) have been
used. Inserting Eq. (3.33) into Eq. (3.34) allows us to rewrite the goods market clearing
condition as an implicit function of just one endogenous variable µ
Γ4(µ) ≡
(
A(µ)
α
) 1−σ
ε−γ
σf
1 + µ
1 + µτ1−σ −HΛ
{
2−A(µ)
[
µ+ τ1−σ
1 + µτ1−σ f(µ)ϕ
∗ + ϕ
]}
= 0.
(3.35)
In the open economy equilibrium, the ratio of foreign to domestic intermediate producers
µ is determined by Γ4(µ) = 0 in Eq. (3.35). Under homothetic preferences with ε→ 0, the
unique solution of Eq. (3.35) is given by firm ratio µ = 1. This confirms the well-known
result that in the case of homothetic preferences, the level and dispersion of per-capita
income do not exert an effect on market outcome beyond the effect captured by country
size. Assuming identical size of the two trading partners therefore implies an equal number
of firms active in the two economies. This can be easily seen for the case of Cobb-Douglas
preferences and thus the limiting case captured by ε → 0 and γ → 0. To see this, note
that under Cobb-Douglas preferences, we have ϕ = ϕ∗, implying that Eq. (3.32) simplifies
to Γˆ2(m,µ) ≡ (1− τ1−σ)(1− µ)(1− β) = 0, with an explicit solution at µ = 1. Using this
result in Eq. (3.34) yields m = m∗ = (1− β)HΛσf . The result is less immediate for general
homothetic preferences, and we therefore delegate a formal discussion of the more general
case to the Appendix.
Turning to the case of non-Gorman preferences with 0 < ε < γ, it is formally shown in
the Appendix that Eq. (3.35) has a unique, interior solution in µ ∈ (0,∞) if trade cost are
sufficiently high. The proof for this result is tedious, because six cases can be distinguished
for ϕ > ϕ∗. Two of them can be ruled out immediately, because they violate Eq. (3.32).
Another one is excluded by Eq. (3.35). Together the Eqs. (3.32) and (3.35) rule out an
14Solving Eq. (3.32) for F (m,µ) gives F (m,µ) =
{[
(1− τ1−σ)(1− µ)
]
/
[
α(µ+ τ1−σ)(f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ)
]} 1−σ
ε−γ .
Setting this result equal to the definition of F (m,µ) ≡ m(1 + µτ1−σ) from above, we can compute the
implicitly given equilibrium mass of domestic firms producing intermediate goods as written down in Eq.
(3.33).
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outcome with µ ≤ 1 if ϕ > ϕ∗. The three final cases refer to the ranking of σ Q 1 + γ − ε
for µ > 1 and they can be discussed by making use of Figure 3.1, which illustrates Γ4(µ)
from Eq. (3.35) for the three remaining cases σ < 1 + γ − ε with τ < (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1−[σ−(1+γ−ε)] ,
σ < 1 + γ − ε with τ ≥ (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1−[σ−(1+γ−ε)] and σ ≥ 1 + γ − ε. In Figure 3.1 we see the
crucial difference between the three cases. If σ ≥ 1 + γ − ε, f(µ) decreases in µ, and in
this case f(µ) < 1, which is sufficient for f(µ)ϕ∗ < ϕ, holds for all µ > 1. In contrast, if
σ < 1+ γ − ε with τ ≥ (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1−[σ−(1+γ−ε)] , f(µ) increases in µ and in this case f(µ)ϕ∗ < ϕ
requires µ < µ1, with
µ1 ≡
(
ϕ
ϕ∗
) 1−σ
σ−(1+γ−ε) − τ1−σ
1−
(
ϕ
ϕ∗
) 1−σ
σ−(1+γ−ε) τ1−σ
> 1. (3.36)
However, for case σ < 1 + γ − ε with τ < (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1−[σ−(1+γ−ε)] , f(µ) increases in µ, but
the constraint on trade cost parameter τ ensures f(µ)ϕ∗ < ϕ for all µ > 1. Because
Γ4(1) = −2HΛ and because ϕ > ϕ∗ establishes Γ′4(µ) > 0 if µ > 1, it is immediate that
Γ4(µ) = 0 has a unique solution in µ, provided that τ ≥ (ϕ/ϕ∗)
1
γ−ε ≡ τ˜1 ensures existence
of the interior solution. Following a similar line of reasoning, ϕ < ϕ∗ establishes a unique
solution for µ < 1 if τ ≥ (ϕ∗/ϕ) 1γ−ε ≡ τ˜2. Assuming a lower bound on trade cost for both
cases ϕ > ϕ∗ and ϕ < ϕ∗, respectively, we can therefore safely conclude that the open
economy equilibrium under diversification exists and must be unique.
-
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q
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σ < 1 + γ − ε
τ ≥ (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1−[σ−(1+γ−ε)]
σ ≥ 1 + γ − ε
σ < 1 + γ − ε
τ < (ϕ/ϕ∗)
1
−[σ−(1+γ−ε)]
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium in the open economy for ϕ > ϕ∗
The equilibrium in Figure 3.1 has been derived under the caveat that a diversification
equilibrium exists in the open economy. To show that this is the case, we must ensure that
a positive amount of labor is used for the production of necessities in both economies. As
formally shown in the Appendix, using Eq. (3.33) in Eq. (3.23) and accounting for Eq.
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(3.35), we can solve for Xn and find that Xn > 0 is always fulfilled if ϕ > ϕ∗. Intuitively,
this means that the country with the smaller market for luxuries (which is home in the
case of µ > 1) always produces necessities. In contrast, if ϕ < ϕ∗ makes home the larger
market for luxuries (reflected by µ < 1), a positive local supply of necessities requires
τ >
[
µ+ τ1−σ
1 + µτ1−σ
f(µ)ϕ∗
ϕ
] 1
σ−1
. (3.37)
Of course, with µ dependent on τ (3.37) gives only an implicit condition for existence of
a diversification equilibrium. Noting that µ+τ1−σ1+µτ1−σ f(µ) increases in µ from a minimum
level of τ ε−γ at µ = 0 and noting that it reaches a maximum level of 1 at µ = 1 for
σ ≥ 1+γ−ε as well as σ < 1+γ−ε. This implies that τ > (ϕ∗/ϕ) 1σ−1 ≡ τˆ is sufficient for
a diversification equilibrium if ϕ < ϕ∗. We can therefore safely conclude that necessities
and intermediate goods are produced in both economies if τ is sufficiently large.
Since two lower bounds on trade cost, τ˜1 for ϕ > ϕ∗ and τ˜2 for ϕ < ϕ∗, were introduced
to ensure existence of an interior open economy equilibrium and since one constraint on
trade cost, τˆ for ϕ < ϕ∗, was introduced to ensure a diversification equilibrium, we analyze
which constraint is binding depending on the considered case. For ϕ > ϕ∗, a diversification
equilibrium exists for all τ > 1. Except for case σ < 1+ γ− ε with τ ≥ (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1−[σ−(1+γ−ε)] ,
where τ˜1 < (ϕ/ϕ∗)
1
−[σ−(1+γ−ε)] , for the two remaining cases, σ < 1 + γ − ε with τ <
(ϕ/ϕ∗)
1
−[σ−(1+γ−ε)] and σ ≥ 1 + γ − ε, τ˜1 is a binding lower bound for trade cost to ensure
a unique, interior equilibrium with diversification in the open economy. In contrast, two
constraints τ˜2 and τˆ apply to ϕ < ϕ∗, making the distinction in this case more complex.15
For σ < 1+γ−ε and σ = 1+γ−ε, diversification constraint τ > τˆ is binding and ensures
a unique, open economy equilibrium with diversification, whereas for σ > 1 + γ − ε,
equilibrium constraint τ ≥ τ˜2 is sufficient.16
Taking stock, the analysis in this section makes clear that under rather mild conditions
on trade cost parameter τ we achieve a unique open economy equilibrium with diversi-
fication in both economies and µ > (<)1 if ϕ > (<)ϕ∗. This result points out that the
country with the higher relative demand for the luxury good (home if ϕ < ϕ∗ and foreign
if ϕ > ϕ∗) has the larger market for differentiated intermediates, which means that a
relatively larger mass of firms producing intermediates is settled there. These results are
akin to the findings in Egger and Habermeyer (2019) and confirm that even though the
analysis of the open economy is significantly more complicated in the underlying model,
an analytically tractable solution still exists for the open economy even if the parametric
PIGL preferences have quite general form.
15Since the Appendix does not contain a detailed proof of a unique, interior equilibrium in the open
economy for ε ̸= 0 if ϕ < ϕ∗, the three final equilibrium cases for ϕ < ϕ∗ are not explicitly specified in this
paper. Therefore, details for the discussion about the constraints on trade cost parameter τ for the three
remaining cases if ϕ < ϕ∗ are available from the author upon request.
16Turning to the consumer-side, condition (3.18), which assures household consumption of necessities
and the luxury good, also needs to be fulfilled in the open economy equilibrium. As formally shown in the
Appendix, rewriting price ration Pn/Pℓ as a function of A(µ) and noting that A(µ) decreases in τ , we can
safely conclude that condition (3.18) must be fulfilled in the open economy for sufficiently high trade cost
τ , if it is fulfilled in the closed economy.
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3.3.1 Trade structure
As in Egger and Habermeyer (2019), the number of firms producing intermediate goods in
foreign relative to home, µ ≡ m∗/m, is decisive for the trade pattern in the open economy.
This can be seen by looking at the export and import functions of intermediates in home
EXω = m
τ1−σ
1 + τ1−σ σPnf, (3.38)
IMω = µm
τ1−σ
1 + τ1−σ σPnf, (3.39)
where the zero-profit condition has been used. Eqs. (3.38) and (3.39) indicate that home is
a net-exporter (net-importer) of intermediate goods if µ < (>)1. Noting the link between
exogenous variables ϕ, ϕ∗ and µ established above, we can conclude that a relatively
higher level and/or dispersion of per-capita income in home (ϕ < ϕ∗), makes this country
a net-exporter of intermediate goods (µ < 1) and the foreign country a net-exporter of
necessities. The reverse result holds for ϕ > ϕ∗.
As this model contains inter-industry trade with necessities and intermediates and
intra-industry trade only with intermediate goods, we analyze the relative importance of
intra-industry trade by using the Grubel-Lloyd index
GLI = 1−
∑
k
|EXk − IMk|∑
k(EXk + IMk)
, (3.40)
where k ∈ {n, ω} indicates the respective sector. The Grubel-Lloyd index lies in between
0 (only inter-industry trade) and 1 (only intra-industry trade). Assuming that there is no
intra-industry trade in necessities and households always buy the domestic necessity when
they are indifferent, this yields
GLI =

1
µ if ϕ > ϕ∗
1 if ϕ = ϕ∗
µ if ϕ < ϕ∗.
(3.41)
If preferences are assumed to be homothetic (ε → 0), ϕ = ϕ∗ leads to µ = 1. Identical
market sizes of the two countries then translate into all trade being driven by only intra-
industry exchange. This can be seen by looking at Eqs. (3.38) and (3.39).
Provided that a diversification equilibrium exists and preferences are nonhomothetic
(ε ̸= 0), the following effects of changes in trade cost parameter τ and market size param-
eters ϕ and ϕ∗ on the trade pattern can be derived from Eqs. (3.35) and (3.41). These
effects are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The country with the relatively higher level and/or dispersion of per-capita
income has the higher consumption expenditures for the luxury good and is a net-exporter of
intermediate goods in the open economy equilibrium. The share of intra-industry trade in
differentiated intermediates increases monotonically in trade cost and increases, moreover,
in the similarity of countries based on their level and/or dispersion of per-capita income.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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The first result in Proposition 3 replicates a home-market effect similar to Helpman and
Krugman (1985) who find that the country with the larger endowment of labor (the only
input factor) exports the differentiated good because it exhibits higher domestic demand
for it. The Helpman and Krugman (1985) two-sector model features homothetic (love-of-
variety) preferences over differentiated goods that are produced under increasing returns to
scale and a homogeneous good produced with constant returns to scale. As in our setting,
the homogeneous good is costlessly traded, whereas trade cost accrue for the differenti-
ated good, leading to the home-market effect explained above. By contrast, the underlying
model presents countries that are symmetric in their aggregate labor endowment and thus
aggregate income, but differ in their level and/or dispersion of effective labor supply (per-
capita income). This leads to differing expenditure shares devoted to necessities and the
luxury good because preferences do not have Gorman form. Therefore, the country with
the higher level and/or dispersion of per-capita income has the higher domestic demand
for the luxury good which leads to the larger domestic market for intermediate goods
and this country being a net-exporter of differentiated intermediates. The second result,
namely that higher transportation cost increase the importance of intra-industry trade is
a well-known result from Davis (1998b). The Appendix contains the derivation details
for case ϕ > ϕ∗, which makes home the net-importer of the luxury good (µ > 1). We
can show that dµ/dτ1−σ > 0 holds for all cases σ Q 1 + γ − ε, and therefore µ decreases
in trade cost τ . Thus, a rise in trade cost τ causes less specialization, the two countries
become more similar in their production structure, and hence, intra-industry trade gains
relative importance. It can be summarized that an increase in trade cost weakens the
home-market effect and consequently the Grubel-Lloyd index increases. Referring to the
Linder (1961) hypothesis serves to explain the last insight in Proposition 3. If consump-
tion expenditures of two countries become more similar, then production patterns become
more similar as well, which increases the share of intra-industry trade with intermediate
goods. As compared to Linder (1961), where only per-capita income levels are considered,
the underlying model additionally includes income dispersion as another demand-side fac-
tor in which countries can differ. Accordingly, if countries are more similar in their level
and/or dispersion of per-capita income in the underlying model framework, then the na-
ture of their trade flows is relatively more intra-industry. The results from Proposition
3 are well in line with those reported by Egger and Habermeyer (2019). However, Egger
and Habermeyer (2019) analyze a more restrictive class of parametric PIGL preferences,
where ε = γ is assumed.
Looking at overall inter- plus intra-industry trade, and its response to changes in trade
cost, ϕ and ϕ∗, the following proposition can be formulated.
Proposition 4 Overall trade decreases in trade cost and in the similarity of countries
with regard to their level and/or dispersion of per-capita income.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The first result that higher trade cost reduce overall trade is quite intuitive. We as-
sume in the following that ϕ > ϕ∗ makes home a net-importer of intermediate goods.
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Then an increase in trade cost parameter τ implies higher import cost for home with
regard to intermediate goods. As a consequence, home’s market size for differentiated in-
termediates increases to meet the demand of consumers for the luxury good by using now
relatively more domestically produced intermediate goods in the assembly of the homoge-
neous luxury. Hence, the increase in intra-industry trade caused by higher trade cost is
dominated by a decrease in inter-industry trade as in this specific example home’s exports
of necessities drop and foreign’s exports of intermediates decrease. Egger and Habermeyer
(2019) already hint at the misleading interpretation of the Linder (1961) hypothesis with
regard to overall trade. Opposing to the positive intra-industry trade effect just explained
above a counteracting negative effect on inter-industry trade has to be borne in mind
when countries converge with regard to their level and/or dispersion of per-capita income.
Accordingly, provided that home is the net-exporter of intermediate goods (ϕ < ϕ∗), a
decrease in home’s relative expenditures for the luxury good (higher ϕ) decreases produc-
tion of differentiated intermediates in home and vice versa in foreign, although foreign’s
demand for the luxury good has not changed. This implies lower exports of intermedi-
ate goods from home and lower exports of necessities from foreign. In summary, we find
that the results from this section concerning the trade structure in the open economy are
in support of the findings in Egger and Habermeyer (2019) and extend their results to
more general forms of parametric PIGL preferences. The subclass of preferences studied
by Egger and Habermeyer (2019) is included as a limiting case of the more general class
considered here.
3.3.2 Welfare effects of trade
To complete the discussion about the open economy, we now examine the welfare effects of
trade. Initially looking at the price indices of the luxury good in home and abroad, we know
from the analysis above that ϕ > (<)ϕ∗ leads to µ > (<)1, which itself induces Pℓ > (<)P ∗ℓ .
This can be seen by using Eq. (3.31). Hence, the country with the larger home market for
intermediate goods has the lower price index for the luxury good. Combining Eqs. (3.31)
and (3.33) and substituting the result into the social welfare function in Eq. (3.24) gives
V (Pn, e, ψˆ) = A(µ)
ε
γ−ε
{1
ε
(
e
α˜
)ε
ψˆ − β
γ
A(µ)
(
Pn
α˜
)γ}
− 1
ε
+ β
γ
, (3.42)
where α˜ ≡ β 1γ−εPn > 0 is introduced to simplify notation. The welfare effects of trade are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Regardless of the prevailing trade structure, welfare gains are reached in
both countries due to trade. These gains from trade increase monotonically if trade cost
fall.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As the autarky scenario can be considered as limiting case of trade cost approaching
infinity, we are able to show that moving to the open economy equilibrium, which then
translates into lower trade cost as compared to autarky, increases the number of available
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differentiated intermediates and lowers the domestic price index Pℓ. This has a positive
welfare effect in home which increase monotonically if trade cost are further reduced,
provided that the open economy equilibrium remains diversified. Since the level and dis-
persion of per-capita income are exogenous and both countries feature the same fixed cost
of production leading to the same price for necessities, welfare gains are also obtained in
foreign. These welfare effects work through adjustments in the price index of the luxury
good and therefore also exist (although in nuanced form) if preferences are homothetic
(ε→ 0). Accordingly, there are gains from trade liberalization irrespective of the specific
level of preference parameter ε. The result of overall gains from trade under homothetic
preferences is well-established in the international trade literature.17 In this paper, which
is a generalization of Egger and Habermeyer (2019) with respect to the underlying pref-
erences, we show that the result of overall gains from trade translates into a model of
parametric PIGL preferences that is inconsistent with homothetic taste.
3.4 Conclusion
We have developed a home-market model of international trade between two countries
following Egger and Habermeyer (2019) for a fairly general class of parametric PIGL pref-
erences. There are two final goods sectors that produce homogeneous necessities and a
homogeneous luxury good, respectively. Production of necessities uses labor as the only
input under constant returns to scale, and the output is sold under perfect competition
and freely tradable in the open economy. The luxury good is assembled from differen-
tiated intermediates, using a technology that features constant elasticity of substitution
between the available intermediates. The luxury good is nontradable, in contrast to the
differentiated intermediates, which are produced under increasing returns to scale, using
labor as the only input, sold under monopolistic competition and tradable subject to ice-
berg trade cost. Based on this structure, we solve the integrability problem and show that
the demand for necessities and luxuries derived from indirect utility is indeed the solution
to a constrained utility maximization problem, even though an explicit solution for the
direct utility function does not exist in general for the considered nonhomothetic PIGL
preferences.
Nonhomothetic preferences give rise to non-linear Engel curves. This affects the de-
mand structure of heterogeneous workers differing in their efficiency units of labor in the
sense that countries with a higher level and/or dispersion of per-capita income have a
higher demand for the luxury good. In the open economy, all other things equal, this
makes the country with the relatively higher demand for the luxury good and thus the
larger domestic market for differentiated intermediates a net-exporter of intermediate
goods. However, with the same market clearing wage per efficiency unit of labor paid
in the two sectors, the welfare effects of trade are positive for both trading partners al-
though their magnitude might differ. For specific parametric PIGL preferences, Egger and
Habermeyer (2019) extend the well-established result of overall gains from trade under ho-
mothetic preferences as they show that their model framework also comes up with overall
17See for instance the seminal contributions of Krugman (1979, 1980) and Eaton and Kortum (2002).
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gains from trade if labor markets are not distorted. In this paper, we go one step further
and show that this result is persistent when relying on a generalization of parametric PIGL
preferences.
We have shown that solving the integrability problem in a different manner than in
Egger and Habermeyer (2019) leads qualitatively to the same results as in their model
variant without price distortion in the labor market. In contrast to Egger and Habermeyer
(2019), who avoid an integrability problem by relying on a specific subclass of parametric
PIGL preferences giving rise to a closed form representation of the direct utility function, in
this paper the introduction of differentiated intermediate goods along the lines of Ethier
(1982b) allows us to solve the integrability problem for two homogeneous final goods
relying on insights from Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971) and Boppart (2014).
Even though the underlying analysis with more general parametric PIGL preferences
becomes quite more complicated, these preferences still provide an analytically tractable
framework to study the consequences of nonhomothetic preferences in international trade.
This framework offers a neat point of departure to address various possible extensions of
embedding PIGL preferences in a trade context. Furthermore, solving the integrability
problem under the more general form of parametric PIGL preferences for a continuum of
goods is a worthwhile task for future research.
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3.5 Appendix
Firms profit maximization problem
Using Eq. (3.16), we can express profits of the firms producing the luxury good ℓ as
Π = Pℓ
[∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1 −
∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)q(ω)dω. (3.43)
Maximizing for q(ω) and q(ωˆ), and rearranging the two first-order conditions establishes
PℓXℓ
1∫
ω∈Ω q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
q(ω)
σ−1
σ
−1 = p(ω) and PℓXℓ
1∫
ω∈Ω q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
q(ωˆ)
σ−1
σ
−1 = p(ωˆ).
(3.44)
Combining these two equations, we obtain the isoelastic demand function
q(ω) = q(ωˆ)
(
p(ωˆ)
p(ω)
)σ
. (3.45)
This completes the proof.
Derivation of price index Pℓ
Rewriting the isoelastic demand function in Eq. (3.45) and integrating over ω gives∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)p(ω)dω = q(ωˆ)p(ωˆ)σ
∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)1−σdω. (3.46)
Solving Eq. (3.44) for q(ωˆ)p(ωˆ)σ and using Eq. (3.16) establishes
XℓP
σ
ℓ = q(ωˆ)p(ωˆ)σ. (3.47)
Plugging this result into Eq. (3.46) yields∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)p(ω)dω = XℓP σℓ
∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)1−σdω. (3.48)
Applying Eq. (3.44) to solve for ∫ω∈Ω p(ω)q(ω) = PℓXℓ, then establishes
Pℓ ≡
[∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)1−σdω
] 1
1−σ as the price index for the CES composite Xℓ. This completes
the proof.
Comparative statics in the closed economy
To investigate the effect of a change in the average effective labor supply on the number of
firms producing intermediate goods in the closed economy, we apply the implicit function
theorem to Eq. (3.22) and obtain
dm
dΛ = −
∂Γ1(·)
∂Λ
∂Γ1(·)
∂m
, (3.49)
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where ∂Γ1(·)/∂Λ < 0 and Γ1(·)/∂m > 0 are immediate and establish dm/dΛ > 0. Using
the implicit function theorem on Eq. (3.22) captures the effect of a change in dispersion
index ψ on the mass of intermediate producers according to
dm
dψ
= −
∂Γ1(·)
∂ψ
∂Γ1(·)
∂m
, (3.50)
with ∂Γ1(·)/∂ψ > 0. Thus, we can safely conclude that dm/dψ < 0, which completes the
proof.
Proof of diversification under autarky
Diversification in the closed economy is fulfilled if Xn > 0 holds. Therefore, we use Eq.
(3.23) to establish
HΛ−mσf > 0. (3.51)
Accounting for Eq. (3.20) and the zero-profit condition, r = σPnf , then gives condition
HΛ1−εβ
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ−ε
ψ > 0 (3.52)
which is always fulfilled. This completes the proof.
Welfare effects of ∆Λ
To capture the welfare effects caused by a change in the average effective labor supply and
hence per-capita income of workers, we calculate the total derivative of Eq. (3.24) with
respect to Λ
dV (·)
dΛ =
∂V (·)
∂Λ +
∂V (·)
∂Pℓ
∂Pℓ
∂m
dm
dΛ , (3.53)
where the direct effect is given by ∂V (·)/∂Λ > 0. The indirect effect can be disentangled
into ∂Pℓ/∂m < 0 and dm/dΛ > 0, which are derived in the main text, and
∂V (·)
∂Pℓ
= 1
Pℓ
[
β
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ
−
(
e
Pℓ
)ε
ψˆ
]
. (3.54)
The sign of the bracket term determines the sign of ∂V (·)/∂Pℓ. Substituting the solu-
tion for e from Eq. (3.19), the definition of ψˆ, and accounting for w = Pn, we obtain
∂V (·)/∂Pℓ R 0 if
β
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ−ε
−
∫ λ
λ
λεdL(λ) R 0. (3.55)
In the main text, we show that negative semi-definiteness of the Slutsky matrix (and
thus a proper solution to the consumers’ utility maximization problem) requires λε ≥
β[(1− ε)/(1−γ)] (Pn/Pℓ)γ−ε as in condition (3.18). With the parameter ranking given by
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0 ≤ ε < γ < 1 it follows that (1− ε)/(1− γ) > 1, which in turn ensures
λε > β
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ−ε
, (3.56)
by means of conditions (3.14) and (3.15). Eq. (3.56) implies that Eq. (3.55) is strictly
smaller than zero, which then establishes ∂V (·)/∂Pℓ < 0 in Eq. (3.54). The indirect
welfare effect is therefore positive, which combined with the positive direct welfare effect
thus ensures that social welfare increases in Λ. This completes the proof.
Welfare effects of ∆ψ for γ → 1
Notice that the welfare effect caused by a change in income dispersion in Eq. (3.26)
evaluated at γ = 1 gives
dV (Pn, Pℓ, e, ψ)
dψ
=
√
e
Pℓ(σ − 1)2
{
2(σ − 1) + 1
m
dm
dψ
[
ψ − β√
Λ
(
Pn
Pℓ
) 1
2
]}
. (3.57)
Applying the implicit function theorem to goods market clearing condition in Eq. (3.22)
gives Eq. (3.50). Then, using the zero-profit condition and the derivative of the price
index with respect to the mass of firms producing intermediates yields
dm
dψ
=
−HΛ 12β
(
Pn
Pℓ
) 1
2
σf +HΛ 12β
(
Pn
Pℓ
) 1
2 1
2(σ−1)
1
mψ
< 0, (3.58)
which is as well evaluated at ε = 1/2 and γ = 1. Plugging Eq. (3.58) into Eq. (3.57) and
noting that
HΛ 12β
(
Pn
Pℓ
) 1
2 ψ
σf2(σ − 1)m+HΛ 12β
(
Pn
Pℓ
) 1
2 ψ
< 1 (3.59)
is fulfilled, we can safely conclude that a higher income dispersion, indicated by a lower
ψ, always induces negative welfare effects for all σ > 1, when evaluated at ε = 1/2 and
γ → 1. This completes the proof.
Proof of inefficient firm entry with Cobb-Douglas preferences
In a first step, we compute the market solution under Cobb-Douglas preferences. For this
purpose, we can evaluate Eq. (3.20) at ε→ 0. Then, substituting Eq. (3.21), we compute
(1− β)HΛw = mr. Using the zero-profit condition, r = σPnf , then establishes
m = (1− β)HΛ
σf
. (3.60)
We now turn to the social planner problem. Setting ε = γ and taking the limit of
ε → 0, we compute for the indirect utility function v(Pn, Pℓ, ei) = ln
[
ei/
(
P βnP
1−β
ℓ
)]
.
3.5. APPENDIX 69
Making use of Eqs. (3.2) and (3.3), we can then compute the direct utility function
u(Xin, Xiℓ) = β ln
(
Xin
β
)
+ (1− β) ln
(
Xiℓ
1− β
)
, (3.61)
for Cobb-Douglas preferences, with 0 < β < 1 being the now constant expenditure share
for necessities. A utilitarian social planner then has an objective of the form
U(Xin, Xiℓ) =
∫
i∈H
[
β ln
(
Xin
β
)
+ (1− β) ln
(
Xiℓ
1− β
)]
di. (3.62)
Of course, with risk-averse agents (due to the log structure of utility) income distribution
also matters for social welfare. However, if the social planner has access to a lump-sum tax-
transfer system for redistributing income, he cannot do better than giving all consumers
the same level of expenditures. In this case, there is no harm done by considering the
alternative (and easier accessible) welfare function
Uˆ(Xn, Xℓ) = β ln
(
Xn
β
)
+ (1− β) ln
(
Xℓ
1− β
)
, (3.63)
as objective of the social planner. The social planner maximizes Eq. (3.63) subject to a
technology constraint and a constraint for factor market clearing. Given that in optimum
all firms in the intermediate goods sector, m, produce the same quantity of intermediate
good ω from set Ω, and acknowledging Eq. (3.16), the technology constraint is given by
Xℓ = m
σ
σ−1 q. (3.64)
The labor market clearing condition from the main text, Xn +m(q + f) = HΛ, gives the
factor market clearing condition for the social planner and can be rewritten as
m = HΛ−Xn
q + f . (3.65)
Plugging Eqs. (3.64) and (3.65) into Eq. (3.63), we obtain
Uˆ(Xn, q) = β ln
(
Xn
β
)
+ (1− β) ln
[(
HΛ−Xn
q + f
) σ
σ−1 q
1− β
]
. (3.66)
Maximizing Eq. (3.66) with respect to q and Xn and rewriting the corresponding first-
order conditions gives
q = (σ − 1)f and Xn = β σ − 1
σ − βHΛ, (3.67)
respectively. Finally, using both results from Eq. (3.67) in Eq. (3.65) yields the mass of
firms producing intermediate goods in social optimum according to
m = (1− β) HΛ
f(σ − β) , (3.68)
which is larger than the market solution in Eq. (3.60). Notice that Eqs. (3.60) and
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(3.68) coincide if the model degenerates to a one-sector economy with β = 0, leading to
allocational efficiency. This completes the proof.
Proof of unique, interior equilibrium in the open economy for ε = 0
Assuming homothetic preferences, ε = 0, implies ϕ = ϕ∗ = 1. Evaluating Γ2(·) in Eq.
(3.32) at ε = 0, we obtain
Γ¯2(m,µ) ≡ (1− τ1−σ)(1− µ)− αm
γ
σ−1 (1 + µτ1−σ)
γ
σ−1 (µ+ τ1−σ)
[
f¯(µ)− 1
]
= 0, (3.69)
where f¯(µ) ≡ [(µ+ τ1−σ)/(1 + µτ1−σ)] γσ−1−1, with f¯(1) = 1 and f¯ ′(µ) R 0 iff γ R σ − 1.
According to Eq. (3.69), Γ¯2(·) = 0 holds for all m if µ = 1, due to f¯(1) = 1. Furthermore,
three cases can be distinguished. The case γ = σ − 1 establishes f¯(µ) = 1 for all µ, and
hence Γ¯2(·) = 0 in Eq. (3.69) is possible if µ = 1. The second case γ > σ − 1 leads to
f¯(µ) R 1 if µ R 1. We can therefore safely conclude that µ R 1 implies 0 R Γ¯2(·), such
that µ ̸= 1 violates Γ¯2(·) = 0 in Eq. (3.69). Considering now that µ ̸= 1 were a possible
solution for the case γ < σ − 1. Then we can solve Γ¯2(·) = 0 in Eq. (3.69) for m and
substitute the resulting expression in Γ3(·) in Eq. (3.34), evaluated at ε = 0, to arrive at
Γ¯4(µ) ≡
(
A¯(µ)
α
)σ−1
γ
σf
µ+ τ1−σ
(1 + µτ1−σ)(1 + τ1−σ) −HΛ
[
1− fˆ(µ)A¯(µ)
]
= 0, (3.70)
where A¯(µ) ≡ [(1− τ1−σ)(1− µ)] / [(µ+ τ1−σ)(f¯(µ)− 1)], fˆ(µ) ≡ µ+τ1−σ1+µτ1−σ f¯(µ) and the
reformulation 2−A¯(µ)[fˆ(µ)+1] = [1−fˆ(µ)A¯(µ)](1+τ1−σ)(1+µ)/(µ+τ1−σ) has been used.
Accounting for A¯(µ) > 0, it follows from Eq. (3.70) that Γ¯4(µ) = 0 requires 1−fˆ(µ)A¯(µ) >
0. This is equivalent to 1−
{[
f¯(µ)(1− τ1−σ)(1− µ)
]
/
[
(1 + µτ1−σ)(f¯(µ)− 1)
]}
> 0 and
ultimately to [fˆ(µ)− 1]/[f¯(µ)− 1] > 0. However, noting that fˆ(µ) R 1 if µ R 1, while in
the case of γ < σ − 1 f¯(µ) R 1 if 1 R µ, we can safely conclude that 1− fˆ(µ)A¯(µ) < 0 if
µ ̸= 1, which is in violation to Γ¯4(µ) = 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of unique, interior equilibrium in the open economy for ε ̸= 0
To investigate existence and uniqueness of the open economy equilibrium for the case of
nonhomothetic preferences (ε ̸= 0), we assume in the following that ϕ > ϕ∗ holds due to
Λ < Λ∗ and/or ψ > ψ∗. Furthermore, we focus on the case of τ > 1. The proof for ϕ < ϕ∗
due to Λ > Λ∗ and/or ψ < ψ∗ can be derived in analogy.18
Focussing on ϕ > ϕ∗, we can distinguish six different cases, where three cases assume
µ ≤ 1 and three cases assume µ > 1. In a first step, these cases are discussed in detail
to investigate whether Γ2(·) = 0 in Eq. (3.32) can be fulfilled. If this is the case, then in
a second step, we examine whether these outcomes are consistent with Γ3(·) = 0 in Eq.
(3.34). Hence, we assess whether the remaining outcomes are consistent with Γ4(·) = 0
from Eq. (3.35) and therefore characterize candidates for an open economy equilibrium.
Before we start with the analysis of the six cases, some general insights about Eq. (3.32)
can be established: From the main text we know that F (m,µ) > 0 has to hold to assure
18Derivation details for this case are available from the author upon request.
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m > 0. Furthermore, looking at f(µ) as defined in the main text, we find that f(0) =
τσ−(1+γ−ε) R 1 iff σ R 1+γ−ε, f(1) = 1, limµ→∞ f(µ) = τ−[σ−(1+γ−ε)] R 1 iff σ Q 1+γ−ε
and f ′(µ) R 0 iff σ Q 1 + γ − ε, and thus f(µ) is a monotone function.
1. σ ≤ 1 + γ − ε and µ ≤ 1:
This outcome can be excluded due to a violation of Γ2(·) = 0. This can be seen from
Eq. (3.32) since 1−µ ≥ 0, whereas bracket term f(µ)ϕ∗−ϕ < 0, due to ϕ > ϕ∗ and
f(µ) ≤ 1. Thus Γ2(·) > 0 is established.
2. σ > 1 + γ − ε, τ ≤ (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1σ−(1+γ−ε) , and µ ≤ 1:
On the one hand, we have 1 − µ ≥ 0, due to µ ≤ 1. On the other hand, we have
f(µ) > 1 , due to f(1) = 1 and f ′(µ) < 0 if σ > 1+ γ − ε, while f(µ)ϕ∗− ϕ ≤ 0 still
holds for all µ ≤ 1, because τ ≤ (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1σ−(1+γ−ε) establishes f(0) ≤ ϕ/ϕ∗. According
to Eq. (3.32), we therefore have Γ2(·) > 0, which eliminates an outcome with µ ≤ 1
in this case.
3. σ > 1 + γ − ε, τ > (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1σ−(1+γ−ε) , and µ ≤ 1:
First, 1− µ ≥ 0 is established by µ ≤ 1. Moreover, f(µ) > 1 holds, due to f(1) = 1
and f ′(µ) < 0 if σ > 1 + γ − ε (see above). However, f(0) > ϕ/ϕ∗ now implies that
there exists a critical µ0 ≡
[
(ϕ/ϕ∗)
σ−1
σ−(1+γ−ε) τ1−σ − 1
]
/
[
τ1−σ − (ϕ/ϕ∗) σ−1σ−(1+γ−ε)
]
<
1, such that f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ ≤ 0 for all µ ∈ [µ0, 1]. In this case, Γ2(·) > 0 rules out
an open economy equilibrium µ ∈ [µ0, 1]. But what about µ < µ0? In this case,
f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ > 0, so that Γ2(·) = 0 is possible and the outcome is consistent with
F (m,µ) > 0. But is the outcome also consistent with Γ3(·) = 0? To answer this
question, we can substitute m from Eq. (3.33) into Eq. (3.34), which establishes
Γ4(µ) in Eq. (3.35), with Γ4(0) > 0, Γ4(1) < 0 and
Γ′4(µ) =
(
A(µ)
α
) 1−σ
ε−γ
σf
1− τ1−σ
(1 + µτ1−σ)2 +
ε− γ
1− σHΛf(µ)A(µ)ϕ
∗ 1− (τ1−σ)2
(1 + µτ1−σ)2
+A′(µ)
1− σε− γ
(
A(µ)
α
) 1−σ
ε−γ σf
A(µ)
1 + µ
1 + µτ1−σ +HΛ
[
µ+ τ1−σ
1 + µτ1−σ f(µ)ϕ
∗ + ϕ
] .
(3.71)
Whereas we cannot pin down the sign of Γ′4(µ) in general, it is worth noting that
the bracket term in the second line of Eq. (3.71) gives the derivative of Γ4(µ) with
respect to A(µ), which is unambiguously positive. With this insight at hand, we
can make further progress by looking at the properties of A(µ) on µ-interval (0, µ0),
which can be summarized as follows: A(0) > 0, limµ→µ−0 A(µ0) =∞ and
A′(µ) =
[
1− (τ1−σ)2
] a(µ)
(µ+ τ1−σ)2 [f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ]2 , (3.72)
where a(µ) ≡ − [f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ] + σ−(1+γ−ε)σ−1 f(µ)ϕ∗ (1−τ
1−σ)(1−µ)
1+µτ1−σ with
a′(µ) = − ε−γ1−σ σ−(1+γ−ε)1−σ f(µ)ϕ∗ (1+τ
1−σ)(1−τ1−σ)2(1−µ)
(µ+τ1−σ)(1+µτ1−σ)2 > 0, due to µ ∈ (0, µ0) and
σ > 1 + γ − ε. There are two possible outcomes. Either A(µ) is monotonically
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increasing on interval (0, µ0) or it is non-monotonic and has at least one minimum.
If A(µ) is increasing, Γ′4(µ) > 0 follows from Eq. (3.71), and in this case Γ4(0) > 0 is
sufficient for Γ4(µ) > 0 to hold for all µ ∈ (0, µ0). This is in violation to Eq. (3.35).
If, however, A(µ) is non-monotonic, and A(µ) therefore has an interior extremum,
with A′(µ) = 0 and thus a(µ) = 0, it follows from a′(µ) > 0 that the extremum has
indeed to be a minimum. Evaluated at this minimum, we compute
A(µ)
∣∣∣a(µ)=0 = [f˜(µ)ϕ∗]−1 σ − 1σ − (1 + γ − ε) , (3.73)
with f˜(µ) ≡ µ+τ1−σ1+µτ1−σ f(µ) and f˜(0) = τ ε−γ < 1, f˜(1) = 1, limµ→∞ f˜(µ) = τγ−ε > 0,
f˜ ′(µ) > 0. We use these insights to determine A(µ)
∣∣∣a(µ)=0 > 0, which translates
into
Γ4(µ)
∣∣∣a(µ)=0 = {[αf˜(µ)ϕ∗]−1 σ − 1σ − (1 + γ − ε)
} 1−σ
ε−γ
σf
1 + µ
1 + µτ1−σ
−HΛ
[
2− σ − 1
σ − (1 + γ − ε) −
σ − 1
σ − (1 + γ − ε)
ϕ
f˜(µ)ϕ∗
]
, (3.74)
which is unambiguously positive due to ϕ > ϕ∗, f˜(µ) < 1 and σ > 1 + γ − ε. Since
we know from above that ∂Γ4(µ)/∂A(µ) > 0, it is then immediate that Γ4(µ) > 0
extends to all µ ∈ (0, µ0). This is again in violation to Eq. (3.35). Accordingly,
we can rule out existence of an outcome with µ ∈ (0, 1) for σ > 1 + γ − ε and
τ > (ϕ/ϕ∗)
1
σ−(1+γ−ε) by combining Eqs. (3.32) and (3.34).
4. σ < 1 + γ − ε, τ < (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1−[σ−(1+γ−ε)] and µ > 1:
From µ > 1, we know that 1−µ < 0. Due to f(1) = 1, f ′(µ) > 0 and limµ→∞ f(µ) >
1 if σ < 1 + γ − ε this implies f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ < 0 for all µ > 1, because τ <
(ϕ/ϕ∗)
1
−[σ−(1+γ−ε)] establishes limµ→∞ f(µ) < ϕ/ϕ∗. According to Eq. (3.32), Γ2(·) =
0 is possible and the outcome consistent with F (m,µ) > 0. In the following, we use
Γ4(µ) in Eq. (3.35) to investigate whether this outcome is also consistent with
Γ3(·) = 0. We acknowledge Γ4(1) < 0 and
lim
µ→∞Γ4(µ) =
[
−(1− τ1−σ)
τ−[σ−(1+γ−ε)]ϕ∗ − ϕ
] 1−σ
ε−γ
α
σ−1
ε−γ σfτσ−1 −HΛ(1 + τ
1−σ)(τγ−εϕ∗ − ϕ)
τ−[σ−(1+γ−ε)]ϕ∗ − ϕ ,
(3.75)
where the sign of limµ→∞ Γ4(µ) is not immediate, because f(µ)ϕ∗−ϕ < 0 for all µ > 1
implies the first term in Eq. (3.75) to be positive, whereas the sign of the second
term depends on bracket term τγ−εϕ∗ − ϕ. To make further progress and ensure
an interior solution, we assume that τγ−ε ≥ ϕ/ϕ∗ to establish limµ→∞ Γ4(µ) > 0.
To determine the sign of Γ′4(µ) in Eq. (3.71), we look at the properties of A(µ),
with A(1) = 0 and limµ→∞A(µ) → ∞. Eq. (3.72) together with a(µ) > 0, due to
µ > 1 and σ < 1 + γ − ε, establish A′(µ) > 0. As can be seen in Eq. (3.71), this
implies Γ′4(µ) > 0, with Γ4(1) < 0 and limµ→∞ Γ4(µ) > 0 ensured by τγ−ε ≥ ϕ/ϕ∗,
which proves existence of a unique solution for Γ4(µ) = 0 on interval (1,∞) for
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(ϕ/ϕ∗)
1
γ−ε ≤ τ < (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1−[σ−(1+γ−ε)] .
5. σ < 1 + γ − ε, τ ≥ (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1−[σ−(1+γ−ε)] and µ > 1:
Noting that 1 − µ < 0 is established by µ > 1, furthermore limµ→∞ f(µ) > 1
holds with f(1) = 1 and f ′(µ) > 0 if σ < 1 + γ − ε (see above). However,
limµ→∞ f(µ) ≥ ϕ/ϕ∗ now implies that there exists a critical
µ1 ≡
[
(ϕ/ϕ∗)
1−σ
σ−(1+γ−ε) − τ1−σ
]
/
[
1− (ϕ/ϕ∗) 1−σσ−(1+γ−ε) τ1−σ
]
> 1, such that f(µ)ϕ∗−
ϕ ≥ 0 for all µ ∈ [µ1,∞). In this case, Γ2(·) < 0 rules out an open economy equi-
librium µ ∈ [µ1,∞). By contrast, f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ < 0 holds for case µ < µ1, so that
Γ2(·) = 0 is possible and the outcome is consistent with F (m,µ) > 0. But is this
outcome also consistent with Γ4(µ) in Eq. (3.35)? First, we look at the proper-
ties of A(µ) on µ-interval (1, µ1), which can be summarized as follows: A(1) = 0,
limµ→µ−1 A(µ) → ∞ and A
′(µ) as given in Eq. (3.72). With a(µ) > 0, due to
µ ∈ (1, µ1) and σ < 1 + γ − ε, this establishes A′(µ) > 0. From Eq. (3.71), it then
follows Γ′4(µ) > 0, with Γ4(1) < 0 and limµ→µ−1 Γ4(µ) → ∞. This proves that the
solution to Γ4(µ) = 0 on interval (1, µ1) exists and is unique.
6. σ ≥ 1 + γ − ε and µ > 1:
For this case, Γ2(·) = 0 in Eq. (3.32) can hold due to 1 − µ < 0 and f(1) = 1,
with f ′(µ) ≤ 0 and limµ→∞ f(µ) ≤ 1 if σ ≥ 1 + γ − ε. This requires F (m,µ) > 0
and thus m > 0 as given in Eq. (3.33). Turning to Eq. (3.35), we can note
that Γ4(1) < 0 and τγ−ε ≥ ϕ/ϕ∗ ensures limµ→∞ Γ4(µ) > 0 (see above) and thus
existence of a solution for Γ4(µ) = 0 on interval (1,∞), which we denote by µˆ.
To prove uniqueness of this solution, we show that Γ′4(µ) < 0 is inconsistent with
Γ4(µ) ≤ 0, which is sufficient for Γ4(µ) > 0 if µ > µˆ. Therefore, to make further
progress on the sign of Γ′4(µ) in Eq. (3.71), we look at the properties of A(µ), which
are given by A(1) = 0, limµ→∞A(µ) > 0 and A′(µ) in Eq. (3.72). The sign of A′(µ)
is not immediate, because a(µ) Q 0 is possible, due to f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ < 0 for all µ > 1
and σ ≥ 1 + γ − ε. There are two possible outcomes. Either A(µ) is monotonically
increasing on interval (1,∞) or it is non-monotonic. If A(µ) is increasing, Γ′4(µ) > 0
follows from Eq. (3.71) and in this case Γ4(1) < 0 and limµ→∞ Γ4(µ) > 0 are
sufficient to show uniqueness of this solution. If, however, A(µ) is non-monotonic,
and A(µ) therefore has an interior extremum, with A′(µ) = 0 and thus a(µ) = 0, it
follows from a′(µ) ≤ 0 (due to σ ≥ 1 + γ − ε and µ > 1) that the extremum has
to be a maximum. To simplify the further analysis, rewrite Eq. (3.35) by using the
reformulation of 2−A(µ)[f˜(µ)ϕ∗+ϕ] = [1− f˜(µ)A(µ)ϕ∗](1+τ1−σ)(1+µ)/(µ+τ1−σ)
which gives
Γ˜4(µ) ≡
(
A(µ)
α
) 1−σ
ε−γ
σf
µ+ τ1−σ
(1 + µτ1−σ)(1 + τ1−σ) −HΛ
[
1− f˜(µ)A(µ)ϕ∗
]
= 0.
(3.76)
Since the first term in Eq. (3.76) is unambiguously positive, the second term, more
precisely 1− f˜(µ)A(µ)ϕ∗, determines the outcome of Γ˜4(µ). Furthermore, rewriting
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Eq. (3.72), we obtain
A′(µ) = − 1− (τ
1−σ)2
(µ+ τ1−σ)2 [f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ]
{
1− σ − (1 + γ − ε)
σ − 1 f˜(µ)A(µ)ϕ
∗
}
, (3.77)
with f(µ)ϕ∗−ϕ < 0 and [σ− (1+γ−ε)]/(σ−1) < 1. Consequently, since A′(µ) < 0
is a prerequisite for Γ′4(µ) < 0, according to Eq. (3.71), and since A′(µ) < 0 requires
Γ˜4(µ) > 0, we can safely conclude that Γ′4(µ) < 0 would be in violation of Γ4(µ) = 0.
This proves that the solution to Γ4(µ) = 0 on interval (1,∞) – whose existence
follows from the assumption that τγ−ε ≥ (ϕ/ϕ∗) – is unique.
Putting together, under the mild parameter constraint on trade cost τγ−ε ≥ ϕ/ϕ∗, we
have shown for ϕ > ϕ∗ that Γ4(µ) = 0 from Eq. (3.35) has a unique solution on interval
(1,∞). Following the line of reasoning outlined above, we can further conclude that for
ϕ < ϕ∗ Γ4(µ) = 0 has a unique solution on interval (0, 1) if τγ−ε ≥ ϕ∗/ϕ. This completes
the proof.
Derivation of the parameter constraint in (3.37)
Consider first case ϕ > ϕ∗, which implies µ > 1. Solving the labor market clearing
condition in Eq. (3.23) for Xn, using the equilibrium mass of domestic firms m from Eq.
(3.33) and substituting Eq. (3.35) yields
Xn = HΛ
{
1− 11 + µ
[
2−A(µ)
[
f˜(µ)ϕ∗ + ϕ
]]}
. (3.78)
Diversification is confirmed if Xn > 0 holds, which is equivalent to
µ− 1 +A(µ)
[
f˜(µ)ϕ∗ + ϕ
]
> 0. (3.79)
Acknowledging µ > 1, this verifies that Eq. (3.79) is always fulfilled for home if ϕ > ϕ∗.
For case ϕ < ϕ∗, which leads to µ < 1, we again use Eqs. (3.23) and (3.33) to show
that Xn > 0 requires
HΛ−
(
A(µ)
α
) 1−σ
ε−γ σf
1 + µτ1−σ > 0. (3.80)
Looking at Eq. (3.76) and using the insight that dΓ˜4(µ)/d(HΛ) < 0 if 1− f˜(µ)A(µ)ϕ∗ > 0,
we can conclude that Xn > 0 is guaranteed in the open economy equilibrium if Γ˜4(µ)
evaluated at HΛ = [A(µ)/α]
1−σ
ε−γ σf/(1 + µτ1−σ) is larger than zero. This finally gives
(3.37) as a constraint on trade cost parameter τ . This completes the proof.
Proof of positive consumption levels of final goods in the open economy
This proof outlines detailed derivation steps for ϕ > ϕ∗, leading to µ > 1. The analysis
for ϕ < ϕ∗ is achieved in analogy.
Combining Eqs. (3.31) and (3.33) gives Pℓ = [A(µ)/β]
1
ε−γPn, which then can be used
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to rewrite constraint (3.18) as
λε ≥ 1− ε1− γA(µ). (3.81)
Furthermore, we can determine
dA(µ)
dτ1−σ
Q 0 ⇔ ∂A(µ)
∂τ1−σ
+A′(µ) dµ
dτ1−σ
Q 0
⇔ dµ
dτ1−σ
Q − 1− µ
2
1− (τ1−σ)2 , (3.82)
where Eq. (3.77) and
∂A(µ)
∂τ1−σ
= − 1− µ
2
(µ+ τ1−σ)2 [f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ]
{
1− σ − (1 + γ − ε)
σ − 1 f˜(µ)A(µ)ϕ
∗
}
< 0 (3.83)
have been used. Applying the implicit function theorem to Eq. (3.35) establishes
0 = ∂Γ4(µ)
∂τ1−σ
+ ∂Γ4(µ)
∂µ
dµ
dτ1−σ
+ ∂Γ4(µ)
∂A(µ)
dA(µ)
dτ1−σ
. (3.84)
Combining Eqs. (3.82) and (3.84) then gives
dA(µ)
dτ1−σ
Q 0 ⇔ 0 Q ∂Γ4(µ)
∂τ1−σ
+ ∂Γ4(µ)
∂µ
[
− 1− µ
2
1− (τ1−σ)2
]
+ ∂Γ4(µ)
∂A(µ)
dA(µ)
dτ1−σ
.
Plugging in the results for the three partial derivatives ∂Γ4(µ)/∂τ1−σ, ∂Γ4(µ)/∂µ and
∂Γ4(µ)/∂A(µ), then rearranging gives
dA(µ)
dτ1−σ
Q 0 ⇔ 0 Q −
(
A(µ)
α
) 1−σ
ε−γ
σf
1 + µ
(1 + µτ1−σ)(1 + τ1−σ) +
∂Γ4(µ)
∂A(µ)
dA(µ)
dτ1−σ
. (3.85)
Using ∂Γ4(µ)/∂A(µ) > 0, this shows that assuming dA(µ)/dτ1−σ ≤ 0, the right-hand side
of Eq. (3.85) is violated. We can safely conclude that Eq. (3.85) to be fulfilled requires
dA(µ)/dτ1−σ > 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
We consider in the subsequent analysis the case ϕ > ϕ∗ leading to µ > 1. The proof for
ϕ < ϕ∗ implying µ < 1 can be derived in analogy.
First, we compute the partial derivative of Eq. (3.35) with respect to τ1−σ and get(
∂Γ4(µ)
∂τ1−σ
)
total
= ∂Γ4(µ)
∂τ1−σ
+ ∂Γ4(µ)
∂A(µ)
∂A(µ)
∂τ1−σ
< 0, (3.86)
where ∂Γ4(µ)/∂τ1−σ < 0, ∂Γ4(µ)/∂A(µ) > 0 and ∂A(µ)/∂τ1−σ < 0 as given in Eq. (3.83).
Applying the implicit function theorem to Eq. (3.35) and acknowledging Γ′4(µ) > 0 then
establishes dµ/dτ1−σ > 0. With the insight at hand that higher trade cost τ lead to a
decrease in τ1−σ, we can conclude that the relative number of firms producing intermediate
goods in foreign falls in trade cost. The total derivative of the corresponding Grubel-Lloyd
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index in Eq. (3.41) reads
dGLI
dτ1−σ
= − 1
µ2
dµ
dτ1−σ
< 0, (3.87)
and hence it follows that the Grubel-Lloyd index increases in trade cost. Partially differ-
entiating Eq. (3.35) with respect to ϕ gives
(
∂Γ4(µ)
∂ϕ
)
total
= HΛ
f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ
{
f˜(µ)A(µ)ϕ∗ (1 + τ
1−σ)(1 + µ)
µ+ τ1−σ
+1− σ
ε− γ
[
2−A(µ)
(
f˜(µ)ϕ∗ + ϕ
)]}
< 0. (3.88)
Applying the implicit function theorem to Eq. (3.35) and noting Γ′4(µ) > 0, delivers
dµ/dϕ > 0. If ϕ drops, the two countries get more similar in their consumption expen-
ditures and hence the relative number of foreign firms µ shrinks, implying that it moves
closer to 1. We compute the total derivative of the Grubel-Lloyd index from Eq. (3.41)
with respect to ϕ according to
dGLI
dϕ
= − 1
µ2
dµ
dϕ
< 0, (3.89)
which indicates that this index increases in the similarity of both countries with regard to
their consumption expenditures. Finally, we derive from Eq. (3.35)(
∂Γ4(µ)
∂ϕ∗
)
total
= ∂Γ4(µ)
∂ϕ∗
+ ∂Γ4(µ)
∂A(µ)
∂A(µ)
∂ϕ∗
> 0, (3.90)
where ∂Γ4(µ)/∂ϕ∗ > 0 and ∂A(µ)/∂ϕ∗ > 0 have been computed. Applying the implicit
function theorem to Eq. (3.35) and accounting for Γ′4(µ) > 0, this implies dµ/dϕ∗ < 0.
Using Eq. (3.41) gives
dGLI
dϕ∗
= − 1
µ2
dµ
dϕ∗
> 0, (3.91)
and repeats the finding from above, that the Grubel-Lloyd index increases in the similarity
of home and foreign based on their level and/or dispersion of per-capita income, here
triggered by a higher ϕ∗. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
To show Proposition 4, we notice first that the export and import functions of intermediate
goods in home, Eqs. (3.38) and (3.39), can be rewritten by using the equilibrium mass of
domestic firms producing intermediate goods in Eq. (3.33) according to
EXω =
(
A(µ)
α
) 1−σ
ε−γ
σPnf
τ1−σ
(1 + τ1−σ)(1 + µτ1−σ) , (3.92)
IMω =
(
A(µ)
α
) 1−σ
ε−γ
σPnf
µτ1−σ
(1 + τ1−σ)(1 + µτ1−σ) , (3.93)
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respectively, where A(µ) is defined as in the main text. Due to the balanced trade as-
sumption, we can compute that overall trade (inter- plus intra-industry) in home is given
by 2IMω if ϕ > ϕ∗ and by 2EXω if ϕ < ϕ∗. We focus in the subsequent analysis on case
ϕ > ϕ∗, and hence, we investigate how the import function of differentiated intermediates
in Eq. (3.93) responds to changes in trade cost parameter τ , and variables ϕ and ϕ∗. The
results for case ϕ < ϕ∗ can be derived in analogy, using Eq. (3.92).
In a first step, we compute the total derivative of Eq. (3.93) with respect to τ1−σ as
dIMω
dτ1−σ
= ∂IMω
∂τ1−σ
+ ∂IMω
∂µ
dµ
dτ1−σ
+ ∂IMω
∂A(µ)
dA(µ)
dτ1−σ
, (3.94)
where ∂IMω/∂µ > 0, dµ/dτ1−σ > 0 and ∂IMω/∂A(µ) > 0 are immediate. From above, we
furthermore know dA(µ)/dτ1−σ > 0. Nevertheless, the sign of Eq. (3.94) is not immediate
since ∂IMω/∂τ1−σ Q 0 has not been determined yet . Making use of the insight from Eq.
(3.82), that dA(µ)/dτ1−σ > 0 leads to dµ/dτ1−σ > −(1− µ2)/[1− (τ1−σ)2] in Eq. (3.94),
we can compute
dIMω
dτ1−σ
>
∂IMω
∂τ1−σ
+ ∂IMω
∂µ
[
− 1− µ
2
1− (τ1−σ)2
]
+ ∂IMω
∂A(µ)
dA(µ)
dτ1−σ
. (3.95)
Using the derivatives ∂IMω/∂τ1−σ, ∂IMω/∂µ, ∂IMω/∂A(µ) and noting that
dA(µ)/dτ1−σ > 0 shows that the right-hand side of Eq. (3.95) is greater than zero which
gives rise to dIMω/dτ1−σ > 0.
In a second step, we investigate the total derivative of Eq. (3.93) with respect to ϕ,
which reads
dIMω
dϕ
= ∂IMω
∂ϕ
+ ∂IMω
∂µ
dµ
dϕ
+ ∂IMω
∂A(µ)
dA(µ)
dϕ
, (3.96)
where ∂IMω/∂ϕ = 0, ∂IMω/∂µ > 0, dµ/dϕ > 0 and ∂IMω/∂A(µ) > 0. Applying the
implicit function theorem to Eq. (3.35) yields
0 = ∂Γ4(µ)
∂ϕ
+ ∂Γ4(µ)
∂µ
dµ
dϕ
+ ∂Γ4(µ)
∂A(µ)
dA(µ)
dϕ
, (3.97)
with ∂Γ4(µ)/∂ϕ > 0, ∂Γ4(µ)/∂µ > 0, ∂Γ4(µ)/∂A(µ) > 0, implying that dA(µ)/dϕ < 0
is needed for Eq. (3.97) to be fulfilled. Still, the sign of Eq. (3.96) is not clear, be-
cause there exist two counteracting effects, more precisely [∂IMω/∂µ][dµ/dϕ] > 0 and
[∂IMω/∂A(µ)][dA(µ)/dϕ] < 0. For this reason, we use Eq. (3.76), which is just a refor-
mulation of Eq. (3.35), and partially differentiate with respect to µ to obtain
Γ˜′4(µ) = HΛ
{1− σ
ε− γ
[
1− f˜(µ)A(µ)ϕ∗
]
+ f˜(µ)A(µ)ϕ∗
}
{
A′(µ)
A(µ) +
ε− γ
1− σ
1− (τ1−σ)2
(1 + µτ1−σ)(µ+ τ1−σ)
}
. (3.98)
Using the insight of 2−A(µ)[f˜(µ)ϕ∗+ϕ] = [1− f˜(µ)A(µ)ϕ∗](1+ τ1−σ)(1+µ)/(µ+ τ1−σ),
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introduced above, in Eq. (3.88) to get(
∂Γ4(µ)
∂ϕ
)
total
= HΛ
f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ
{1− σ
ε− γ
[
1− f˜(µ)A(µ)ϕ∗
]
+ f˜(µ)A(µ)ϕ∗
}
< 0. (3.99)
Again applying the implicit function theorem to Eq. (3.76), a new expression for dµ/dϕ
is found by incorporating Eqs. (3.98) and (3.99)
dµ
dϕ
= − 1
f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ
[
A′(µ)
A(µ) +
ε− γ
1− σ
1− (τ1−σ)
(1 + µτ1−σ)(µ+ τ1−σ)
]−1
. (3.100)
Looking back at Eq. (3.96), substituting dA(µ)/dϕ = ∂A(µ)/∂ϕ + A′(µ)(dµ/dϕ), and
plugging in the results for the partial derivatives and Eq. (3.100), we obtain
dIMω
dϕ
= −IMω τ
1−σ
µ(µ+ τ1−σ) [f(µ)ϕ∗ − ϕ]
[
A′(µ)
A(µ) +
ε− γ
1− σ
1− (τ1−σ)
(1 + µτ1−σ)(µ+ τ1−σ)
]−1
.
(3.101)
This proves that dIMω/dϕ > 0 holds. In a last step, we focus on the total derivative of
Eq. (3.93) with respect to ϕ∗. Substituting Eq. (3.93) into Eq. (3.35) shows that both
equations are linked to each other according to
Γ4(µ) ≡ IMω (1 + τ
1−σ)(1 + µ)
µτ1−σ
− 2HΛw +HΛwA(µ)
[
f˜(µ)ϕ∗ + ϕ
]
= 0. (3.102)
Defining T1(µ, ϕ∗) ≡ IMω(1+ τ1−σ)(1+µ)/(µτ1−σ) and T2(µ, ϕ∗) ≡ A(µ)[f˜(µ)ϕ∗+ϕ], we
can infer from applying the implicit function theorem that dT1(µ, ϕ∗)/dϕ∗+dT2(µ, ϕ∗)/dϕ∗
= 0. By substituting the respective results into
dT2(µ, ϕ∗)
dϕ∗
=
{
A′(µ)
[
f˜(µ)ϕ∗ + ϕ
]
+A(µ)f˜ ′(µ)ϕ∗
} dµ
dϕ∗
+
∂A(µ)
∂ϕ∗
[
f˜(µ)ϕ∗ + ϕ
]
+A(µ)f˜(µ), (3.103)
we can compute dT2(µ, ϕ∗)/dϕ∗ > 0. This implies dT1(µ, ϕ∗)/dϕ∗ < 0, which is given by
dT1(µ, ϕ∗)
dϕ∗
= 1 + τ
1−σ
µτ1−σ
[
(1 + µ)dIMω
dϕ∗
− IMω 1
µ
dµ
dϕ∗
]
. (3.104)
Hence, dµ/dϕ∗ < 0 from above, yields dIMω/dϕ∗ < 0. These formal results establish
Proposition 4, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5
In the following proof, detailed derivation steps for the case ϕ > ϕ∗, which leads to µ > 1,
are discussed. The analysis of the social welfare function for ϕ < ϕ∗ is achieved in analogy.
To obtain the welfare effects in the open economy for ϕ > ϕ∗, we compute the total
derivative of the social welfare function in Eq. (3.42) with respect to trade cost parameter
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τ1−σ and get
dV (Pn, e, ψˆ)
dτ1−σ
= ∂V (·)
∂A(µ)
dA(µ)
dτ1−σ
, (3.105)
where the second term dA(µ)/dτ1−σ > 0 is know from above. The first term reads
∂V (·)
∂A(µ) =
1
γ − ε
(
A(µ)
β
) ε
γ−ε

[
βΛ−ε
(
Pn
Pℓ
)γ−ε]−1
ψˆ − 1
 , (3.106)
where α˜ ≡ β 1γ−εPn as introduced in the main text and Pℓ = [A(µ)/β]
1
ε−γPn, combining
Eqs. (3.31) and (3.33), were used. The sign of the bracket term in Eq. (3.106) is decisive
for the sign of ∂V (·)/∂A(µ). Noting from conditions (3.14), (3.15) and (3.18) that λε >
β (Pn/Pℓ)γ−ε must hold to make the demand system a solution to a proper utility maxi-
mization problem, we can safely conclude that ψˆ > (λ/Λ)ε is sufficient for ∂V (·)/∂A(µ) >
0. Using the definition of ψˆ, the respective condition reduces to ∫ λλ λεdL(λ) > λε, which
is always fulfilled. Thus, from Eq. (3.105) we can safely conclude that dV (·)/dτ1−σ > 0,
which reveals that gains from trade exist, social welfare monotonically increases with
trade liberalization and that the welfare result is independent of the trade pattern. This
completes the proof.
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Chapter 4
How Preferences Shape the
Welfare and Employment Effects
of Trade
4.1 Introduction
The question of how labor market imperfection shapes the welfare and employment effects
of trade has played a prominent role in economic research since Brecher’s (1974) seminal
work on the role of minimum wages in a Heckscher-Ohlin model. Due to strong public
discontent about the negative consequences of globalization for domestic workers, this
question has gained momentum over the last 15 years. Building on various forms of labor
market imperfection, recent theoretical work has been successful in identifying new, so far
unexplored channels through which trade can affect economy-wide unemployment and the
distribution of income with important consequences for the expected welfare effects. In this
paper, we take a different perspective and show that the effects of trade not only depend on
the form of labor market imperfection but also on the type of consumer preferences. That
preferences matter and can give a demand-side explanation for international trade flows is
well-known from Krugman’s (1979; 1980) foundation of a new trade theory. However, the
role of preferences for the existence of gains or losses from trade in the presence of labor
market distortion has so far not been in the focus of economic research.
To fill this gap, we set up a prototype model of trade featuring a home-market ef-
fect, with two countries, two sectors of production, and labor as the only input factor.
Similar to Helpman and Krugman (1985), we assume that one sector produces differ-
entiated goods under monopolistic competition, which are subject to trade costs in the
open economy. The other sector produces a homogeneous good under perfect competi-
tion that can be shipped to the foreign country at zero costs. Our home-market model
differs from previous ones in two important respects. On the one hand, we consider price-
independent generalized-linear (so-called PIGL) preferences, which have been put forward
by Muellbauer (1975, 1976) and refer to the most general class of preferences admitting a
representative consumer and thereby avoiding complications from aggregating consumer
demand over heterogeneous households. The subclass of parametric PIGL preferences
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considered here has the advantage of delivering an explicit solution for the direct utility
function (see Boppart, 2014), which is particularly useful to avoid an otherwise potentially
complicated integrability problem.1 Whereas the preferences do not have Gorman form in
general, they cover homothetic and quasilinear preferences – and thus two widely used ex-
amples of Gorman-form preferences – as limiting cases (see Egger and Habermeyer, 2019).
On the other hand, we consider search frictions in the sector of differentiated goods and
assume that wages in this sector are set by bargaining between the firm and a continuum
of workers (cf. Stole and Zwiebel, 1996; and the correction in Bruegemann et al., 2018).
The assumption that the labor markets differ in the two sectors implies that higher wages
bring along a higher risk of unemployment. This feature of our model is akin to the dis-
tinction of good and bad jobs in Acemoglu (2001) and gives the preferences a particular
role, since they shape the risk attitude of households and thus the wage compensation
demanded by them to accept the possibility of an unfavorable outcome of unemployment
when seeking employment in the production of differentiated goods.
We use our framework to study the role of preferences for the effects of trade on
unemployment and welfare. As a result of the labor market distortion, wages are higher in
the sector of differentiated than in the sector of homogeneous goods. The probability to
find employment in the sector of differentiated goods is directly linked to the wage premium
paid in this industry by an indifference condition that makes applying for jobs in the two
sectors equally attractive for workers prior to the revelation of who is successfully matched
with a firm. The exact link between the wage premium and the employment probability
established by this indifference condition depends on household preferences. If households
have quasilinear preferences, they are risk-neutral and hence for a given wage premium the
employment probability in the sector of differentiated goods can be fairly small. Things are
different if households have homothetic (log-transformed Cobb-Douglas) preferences which
make them risk-averse. In the case of risk-averse households the employment probability
must be fairly high for a given wage premium in order to make applying for jobs in
the sector of differentiated goods attractive for them. Differentiating quasilinear and
homothetic preferences by the risk attitudes of households is not an ad hoc assumption
but follows from looking at two limiting cases of the class of parametric PIGL preferences
put forward by our analysis. Due to differences in the risk attitudes, a given change in the
fraction of workers applying for jobs in the sector of differentiated goods can have quite
different effects on nominal income for the two types of preferences. With the employment
probability unchanged, a higher fraction of workers seeking employment in the sector of
differentiated goods will reduce income if preferences are quasilinear, whereas it increases
income under homothetic preferences, provided that the unemployment compensation for
those who do not find a job is not too generous.2
1It is well understood from Samuelson (1950) and Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971) that associating consumer
demand derived from indirect utility with the solution of a maximization problem of rational households
requires integrability of demand functions. Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971) have worked out sufficient conditions
to solve the integrability problem, relying on properties of the Slutsky matrix. In the context of parametric
PIGL preferences, Boppart (2014) has shown that these conditions are fulfilled for homogeneous goods,
whereas a proof for a continuum of differentiated goods is so far missing. Here, we circumvent the problem
by focussing on a subclass of PIGL preferences, which delivers an explicit solution for the direct utility
function.
2Focussing on the two limiting cases of our parametric PIGL preferences in the main part of our analysis
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With this fundamental insight at hand, we then turn to the open economy and consider
trade between two countries that are fully symmetric except for their population sizes. In
line with the literature on home-market effects, we show that the sector of differentiated
goods expands in the larger country and contracts in the smaller country, with the op-
posite being true for the sector producing the homogeneous good. As a consequence, the
larger country will net-export the differentiated good and net-import the homogeneous
good in the open economy. With a larger fraction of workers seeking employment in the
sector of differentiated goods, the larger country experiences an increase in economy-wide
unemployment. This is, because the risk of unemployment for an individual worker seek-
ing employment in the sector of differentiated goods is the same in the closed and the
open economy, whereas the fraction of workers prone to this risk has increased in the
larger country when trade induces specialization and thus a change in the production pat-
tern. However, the increase in unemployment does not necessarily imply a welfare loss.
We can distinguish three effects: First, households in both economies benefit from lower
import prices (which in the case of a movement from the closed to the open economy fall
from infinity to a finite positive value). Second, provided that an increase in the fraction
of workers seeking employment in the sector producing differentiated goods is associated
with an increase in nominal income, trade generates an income gain in the larger and an
income loss in the smaller country. This is the case if preferences are homothetic and un-
employment compensation is not too generous, whereas the opposite is true if preferences
are quasilinear. Third, welfare is influenced by a variety effect, which can be decomposed
into two partial effects, namely an increase in the fraction of firms producing differenti-
ated goods in the larger country and an increase or decrease in the global mass of firms
producing differentiated goods. The combined variety effect is positively linked to the
effect of trade on nominal income and can therefore also be positive or negative for either
economy.
Taking stock, our model produces the well-known result that lower trade costs exhibit
a direct positive welfare effect in both countries by lowering the costs of imports. In
contrast, the income and variety effects differ in the two economies and can only be positive
for one of them. If preferences are quasilinear, the income and variety effects are to the
detriment of the larger economy and it is possible that these negative effects dominate
the gains associated with a fall in the costs of imports so that the larger country loses
from trade. In this case, the larger country experiences double losses, because, as outlined
above, its economy-wide rate of employment decreases as well. Things are different in
the smaller country, which due to its specialization on the production of the homogeneous
good will experience double gains from trade if preferences are quasilinear. However, if
preferences are homothetic and unemployment compensation is not too generous, welfare
gains are guaranteed in the larger country, despite an increase in the economy-wide rate
of unemployment. At the same time, the smaller country can be worse off in the open
economy, despite a decrease in the economy-wide rate of unemployment. This points to
an important role of preferences (and more specifically the risk attitudes implied by these
is attractive to separate the role of risk attitudes for the link between production structure and the level of
income from additional effects due to changes in the second moment of income distribution, which becomes
relevant for the structure of consumer demand and welfare if preferences do not have Gorman form.
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preferences) for determining the welfare effects of trade in settings featuring labor market
imperfection.
We consider two extensions of our model. In a first one, we analyze the case of
non-Gorman preferences, implying that the distribution of income matters for consumer
demand and welfare. With differentiated goods being luxuries and the homogeneous good
being a necessity from the households’ point of view, a larger income dispersion increases
demand for differentiated goods and lowers demand for the homogeneous good. Of course,
if preferences do not have Gorman form, the representative consumer in our model does
not have a normative interpretation, so that the choice of a proper welfare function is a
priori not clear. Choosing a utilitarian perspective, we show that welfare exhibits social
inequality aversion, implying that an increase in income dispersion lowers social welfare.
This effect is counteracted, however, by new entry of firms in the now larger market for
differentiated goods, which increases welfare due to the households’ love of variety. In the
open economy, changes in the dispersion of income imply that a higher level of income is
no longer sufficient for gains from trade to materialize in the larger country. This confirms
our insight from the benchmark model that the form of preferences is crucial for the welfare
consequences of trade.
In a second extension, we account for differences of countries in their per-capita income
levels. We generate a priori differences in per-capita income by considering differences
of the two countries in the labor endowments of households – while abstracting from
differences in the total effective labor supply of the two economies. With this modification
at hand, we show that trade does not change the labor allocation in the two economies if
preferences are homothetic, leaving the economy-wide rate of unemployment at its autarky
level and establishing gains from trade due to a fall in the costs of imported goods. Things
are different if preferences are quasilinear. In this case, the richer country net-exports the
differentiated good and net-imports the homogeneous good. This leads to an increase in
economy-wide unemployment and can lead to an overall welfare loss, because the negative
income and variety effects counteract the welfare stimulus from lower costs of imports.
Assessing the effects of trade in a setting that features search frictions in the sector
producing differentiated goods, our model contributes to a sizable literature dealing with
labor market distortions in open economies. Starting with Brecher (1974), this literature
has aimed at improving our understanding about the role of labor market institutions as a
determinant of international trade flows and as an important factor influencing the effects
of trade on employment and welfare (cf. Davidson et al., 1988; Davis, 1998a; Kreickemeier
and Nelson, 2006). Whereas the focus in recent years has shifted towards models featuring
heterogeneous firms and only a single sector of production (cf. Egger and Kreickemeier,
2009, 2012; Helpman et al., 2010; Amiti and Davis, 2012), advancements have also been
made in trade models with multiple sectors and differences of these sectors in their labor
market institutions (cf. Bastos and Kreickemeier, 2009; Egger et al., 2015). Most closely
related to our model in this respect is Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) who consider, as we
do, a two-sector trade model featuring a home-market effect. However, similar to other
existing work, they do not look at the role of preferences for the employment and welfare
effects of trade.
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Pointing to potential welfare loss from trade, the analysis in this paper adds to an old
and well established debate about the conditions, under which such losses can materialize
(see Graham, 1923, for an early example and Helpman, 1984, for a thorough literature
review). In multi-sector models disadvantageous specialization in the open economy is
usually put forward as a key explanation of why trade can be to the detriment of an
economy. Whereas the results from our model are well in line with this argument, we
deviate from the widespread view that disadvantageous specialization requires external
economies of scale in at least one industry. Excluding external economies of scale, we show
that losses from trade can also be the result of a labor market distortion and may exist
even if a country expands the sector offering ‘good jobs’ (in the terminology of Acemoglu,
2001). Provided that specialization in the open economy leads to an expansion of a sector
prone to unemployment, increasing the number of good jobs can come at the cost of a
higher fraction of workers not finding a job at all. This can generate welfare loss, with
preferences playing a crucial role for such disadvantageous specialization to materialize in
our model.
Postulating that households have PIGL preferences, this paper also contributes to a
strand of literature, which points out that important new insights on the motives for trade,
its structure, and consequences can be obtained when deviating from the widespread as-
sumption of homothetic utility. Building on the insight of Linder (1961) that demand-side
factors are important determinants of international trade flows, Krugman (1979, 1980),
Markusen (1986), and Flam and Helpman (1987) have provided first theoretical accounts
of the role of preferences for international trade flows. The main insight from this early
research is that a substantial fraction of trade remains unexplained when only considering
supply-side motives for its existence (see Markusen, 2013). Matsuyama (2000), Fajgel-
baum et al. (2011), and Foellmi et al. (2018) have further contributed to the analysis by
distinguishing high- and low-quality goods and by adding a discrete choice element to allow
for an aggregation of consumer demand over heterogeneous households even if preferences
do not have Gorman form.3 Fieler (2011) and Caron et al. (2014) consider generalized
CES preferences, whereas Bertoletti and Etro (2017) and Matsuyama (2015, 2018) con-
sider a class of preferences that establish a “generalized separable” demand system (see
Pollak, 1972). These preferences have the particular advantage to allow for aggregation
of demand over various industries with differing price elasticities and are therefore well
equipped for studying quantitative general equilibrium trade models. Lacking a repre-
sentative consumer, the preferences are, however, less suited for aggregating consumer
demand over households with differing income levels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we discuss the
building blocks of our model and in Section 4.3, we analyze the main mechanisms in the
closed economy. In Section 4.4, we investigate trade between two countries that differ
in their population size and study the effects of trade on production structure, economy-
wide employment, and welfare. In Section 4.5, we consider non-Gorman preferences and
3Tarasov (2012) considers a model with ‘0-1’ preferences over a continuum of goods to study how price
changes in the process of globalization affect welfare of different income groups. He shows that welfare
consequences of price adjustments exert asymmetric effects if, due to nonhomothetic preferences, income
groups differ in their expenditure shares.
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investigate the effects of trade in rich and poor countries. Section 4.6 concludes with a
summary of our results.
4.2 The model: basics
4.2.1 Endowment and preferences
We consider a static economy that is populated by a continuum of households with mass
H, which in their role as workers inelastically supply λ > 1 units of labor input for the
production of goods. We can interpret λ as worker productivity which is the same for
all households. Households have price-independent generalized-linear (so-called PIGL)
preferences over two goods, which are represented by a direct utility function of the form
U(Xi, Yi) = 1
ε
(Xi)ε
[(
Yi
β
) ε
1−ε − β
] [(
Yi
β
) 1
1−ε − Yi
]−ε
− 1− β
ε
, (4.1)
where ε, β ∈ (0, 1) are two constants, Yi is a homogeneous good, and Xi is a CES aggregate
over a continuum of differentiated goods:
Xi =
[∫
ω∈Ω
xi(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
, (4.2)
with xi(ω) being the consumption level of variety ω and σ > 1 being the constant elasticity
of substitution between the varieties from set Ω. The utility function in Eq. (4.1) is well-
defined only if Xi > 0. As pointed out by Muellbauer (1975, 1976), PIGL preferences are
the most general class of preferences that deliver a representative consumer and therefore
avoid an aggregation problem over households with differing levels of income. Whereas
PIGL preferences are usually represented by an indirect utility function, Boppart (2014)
shows that for a subclass of these preferences an explicit solution for the direct utility func-
tion exists. Egger and Habermeyer (2019) discuss the parameter assumptions needed to
arrive at the utility function in Eq. (4.1) and explain that this utility function has the par-
ticularly nice feature of covering homothetic (log-transformed Cobb-Douglas) preferences
and quasilinear preferences by the limiting cases of ε→ 0 and ε→ 1, respectively.
Solving the standard protocol of utility maximization delivers individual demand func-
tions
Yi = β
(
ei
PY
)1−ε
and xi(ω) =
ei
PX
(
p(ω)
PX
)−σ [
1− β
(
ei
PY
)−ε]
, (4.3)
respectively, where ei is the expenditure level of individual i, PY is the price of the ho-
mogeneous good, p(ω) is the price of variety ω of the differentiated good, and PX ≡[∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)1−σdω
] 1
1−σ is a CES index over the prices of all these varieties. From Eq. (4.3),
we see that the Engel curve of homogeneous good Yi is concave, making this good a neces-
sity with its value share of consumption decreasing in the expenditure level. In contrast,
the Engel curves of differentiated goods xi(ω) are convex making these goods luxuries.
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Aggregating over households, gives market demand functions
Y =
∫
i∈H
Yidi = β
He¯
PY
(
e¯
PY
)−ε
ψ, (4.4)
x(ω) =
∫
i∈H
xi(ω)di =
He¯
PX
(
p(ω)
PX
)−σ [
1− β
(
e¯
PY
)−ε
ψ
]
, (4.5)
where e¯ ≡ H−1 ∫i∈H eidi is the average expenditure level of households and
ψ ≡ H−1 ∫i∈H (ei/e¯)1−ε di is a dispersion index that is defined on the unit interval and
captures how the distribution of household expenditures affects the value shares of con-
sumption. The dispersion index reaches a maximum level of one if the distribution of
expenditures is egalitarian or if the distribution of household expenditure is irrelevant for
aggregate demand because Engel curves are linear, which happens in the two limiting
cases of homothetic and quasilinear preferences.
4.2.2 Technology and the firms’ problem
Firms in the sector of the homogeneous good enter the market at zero cost and hire
workers at a common wage rate w per unit of labor input. Workers need one unit of
their labor input to produce one unit of the homogeneous good, which is sold under
perfect competition. This establishes w = PY . Firms producing differentiated goods
have to develop a blueprint, which comes at the cost of f units of the homogeneous
good and gives them access to a unique variety that can be sold under monopolistic
competition. To produce their output firms hire workers, who manufacture one unit of
the differentiated good with each unit of their labor input. Hiring and wage setting in
the sector of differentiated goods is a two-stage problem. At stage one, firms install
vacancies at the cost of one unit of the homogeneous good and search for workers filling
these vacancies. There are search frictions and the assignment of workers to jobs is solved
through random matching (cf. Pissarides, 2000; Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010; Felbermayr
and Prat, 2011). For those vacancies successfully filled, firms and workers form a bilateral
monopoly at stage two and distribute the production surplus generated in the workplace
through Stole and Zwiebel (1996) bargaining.4 We solve the firm’s hiring and wage setting
problem through backward induction and begin with stage two.
The bargaining problem at stage two is reminiscent of the multilateral problem in
Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), with the difference that we allow for asymmetric bargaining
power of workers and firms. The asymmetric bargaining protocol is already discussed by
Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and it has been applied to a model similar as ours by Egger and
Habermeyer (2019). Our problem is simpler though, because we assume that all workers
employed by a firm provide the same level of labor input λ. Following Stole and Zwiebel
(1996), we can characterize the solution of the bargaining problem by a splitting rule,
which determines how the production surplus achieved by an agreement is distributed
between the bargaining parties; and an aggregation rule, describing how infra-marginal
4Bruegemann et al. (2018) show that, in contrast to common belief, the Stole and Zwiebel (1996)
bargaining protocol does not give wage and profit profiles that coincide with the Shapley values. They
suggest using a Rolodex Game instead of the non-cooperative game put forward by Stole and Zwiebel to
achieve equivalence of the bargaining outcome with the Shapley values.
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production surpluses add up to the firm’s total surplus from multilateral bargaining with
all of its workers. Bargaining with a mass l(ω) of workers, firm ω’s total bargaining surplus
is given by
pi(ω) =
∫ l(ω)
0
κ[ℓ|l(ω)]rˆ(ℓ)dℓ, (4.6)
where rˆ(ℓ) = D 1σ (λℓ)1− 1σ are revenues achieved with employment level ℓ, D is a common
demand shifter, and
κ[ℓ|l(ω)] ≡ 1
αℓ
(
ℓ
l(ω)
) 1
α (4.7)
is a probability measure that determines the fraction of infra-marginal production surplus
the firm can acquire in its wage negotiation with workers. This probability measure
declines in the workers’ relative bargaining power α > 0. Solving the integral in Eq. (4.6)
gives
pi(ω) = σ
σ + α(σ − 1)D
1
σ [λl(ω)]1−
1
σ = σ
σ + α(σ − 1)r(ω), (4.8)
where the second equality sign uses the definition r(ω) ≡ rˆ[l(ω)].
If an agreement in the wage negotiation between the firm and a worker is not achieved,
the worker becomes unemployed and receives an unemployment compensation of γλw,
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is a common replacement rate. Higher unemployment compensation
improves the disagreement income of workers in their wage negotiations and thus the
rent accrued by workers in the bargaining with the firm. The influence of unemployment
compensation on wages is reflected in the splitting rule determining how to distribute the
production surplus between the firm and its workers. This splitting rule is given by
∂pi(ω)
∂l(ω) = λ
wκ(ω)− γw
α
, (4.9)
where wκ(ω) is the wage rate for each unit of labor input paid by firm ω. Eqs. (4.8)
and (4.9) jointly determine the solution for the firm’s bargaining problem at stage two.
Thereby, firms accrue a constant fraction ρ ≡ σ/[σ+α(σ−1)] < 1 of revenues in the wage
bargaining with workers, which is decreasing in the relative bargaining power of workers,
α.
Equipped with the solution for the bargaining problem, we can now determine the
outcome of the firm’s hiring problem. Recollecting from above that firms have to invest
f units of the homogeneous good to start production and one unit of the homogeneous
good for each vacancy installed, this solution is found by maximizing profits Π(ω) ≡
ρr(ω)−q−1PY l(ω)−PY f with respect to l(ω), where q < 1 is the probability that a vacancy
can be filled, which in the case of random matching is exogenous to the individual firm
and the same for all producers. The first-order condition for the firm’s profit-maximizing
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choice of l(ω) is given by
dΠ(ω)
dl(ω) =
σ − 1
σ
ρr(ω)
l(ω) −
PY
q
= 0. (4.10)
Accounting for Eqs. (4.8) and (4.9) then gives the outcome of hiring and wage-setting for
firms producing differentiated goods:
wκ(ω) =
α+ γλq
λq
PY , Π(ω) =
ρr(ω)
σ
− PY f. (4.11)
Since all firms producing differentiated goods employ the same technology and pay the
same wage, they are symmetric producers. This allows us to drop firm index ω from now
on.
4.2.3 Industry-wide outcome in the sector of differentiated goods
Eq. (4.11) has been derived under the assumption that firms producing differentiated
goods can attract the intended mass of applicants at a wage rate wκ. To see under
which condition this is the case, we have to determine the labor market outcome in the
sector of differentiated goods. For this purpose, we note that the supply of workers in
the sector of differentiated goods is given by the product of the mass of households, H,
and the fraction of these households seeking employment in the sector of differentiated
goods, h. The ratio between the mass of workers seeking employment, hH, and the total
mass of vacancies installed, Q, is pinned down by a Cobb-Douglas matching function and
given by hH/Q = m(1 − u)−1, where m is a positive constant that measures matching
efficiency, and 1 − u is the share of workers successfully matched to a firm and thus the
employment rate in the sector of differentiated goods. In the Appendix, we provide a
microfoundation of this outcome and show that the matching technology considered here
can be interpreted as a special case of the matching technology in Helpman and Itskhoki
(2010). The probability of filling a vacancy is given by q = hH(1 − u)/Q = m and thus
independent of the employment rate in our model. Setting m = λ−1 proves particularly
useful for our purposes, because it allows us to get rid of uninteresting constants. This
additional simplification generates a negative relationship between matching efficiency and
labor productivity, which can be justified by assuming that workers with higher and more
specialized abilities are more difficult to place in the labor market.5
With this matching technology at hand, we can solve for the employment rate in the
sector of differentiated goods, using the indifference condition for production workers, who
can either enter the sector of the homogeneous good, which promises an income of w per
unit of labor input, or enter the sector of differentiated goods, which promises for each
unit of labor input an income wκ = (α+γ)w with probability 1−u and an unemployment
compensation of γw with probability u. Assuming that unemployment compensation is
financed by a proportional tax on all types of income, including the transfer payment
to the unemployed (see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2012), taxation does not influence the
5As briefly discussed in the Appendix, the results from our analysis extend to more general matching
technologies, with further derivation details available from the authors upon request.
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sector, workers choose for offering their labor input. Considering the utility function in
Eq. (4.1) and individual demand functions in Eq. (4.3), we can solve the indifference
condition of workers for
1− u = 1− γ
ε
(α+ γ)ε − γε , (4.12)
where wκ = (α+γ)w and q = m = λ−1 have been used. Eq. (4.12) reveals that an interior
solution with 0 < u < 1 requires α > 1 − γ, and hence that the sector of differentiated
goods offers a wage premium α˜ ≡ α + γ > 1. Provided that such an outcome exists, a
higher relative bargaining power of workers, α, increases the wage premium, and therefore
the employment rate has to fall in order to restore indifference of workers to enter the
two sectors. We can complete the characterization of the industry equilibrium by noting
that free entry of firms into the sector of differentiated goods establishes the zero-profit
condition ρr = σPY f .
4.2.4 Production structure and disposable labor income
We complete the discussion of the main building blocks of our model by elaborating on how
changes in the production structure affect the average level and dispersion of disposable
labor income with a particular focus on the role of preferences for this outcome. Due
to our assumption that all types of income are subject to the same income tax, average
disposable labor income and thus the average household consumption expenditure is given
by
e = wλ {1 + h[(1− u)α˜− 1]} . (4.13)
Eq. (4.13) points to a trade-off an increase in the fraction of workers producing differ-
entiated goods has on average disposable income. On the one hand, a higher h leads
to an increase in the fraction of workers receiving the wage premium offered by luxury
producers. On the other hand, it increases the economy-wide rate of unemployment,
U ≡ uh, and thus the share of labor input not productively used in the economy. In
general, (1 − u)α˜ >,=, < 1 is possible, so that allocating more workers to the sector of
differentiated goods can have a positive or negative effect on average disposable house-
hold income, depending on whether the first or the second effect dominates. Since the
effect that changes in the fraction of workers seeking employment in the production of
differentiated goods have on average disposable labor income is essential for the welfare
effects of trade, it is useful to shed light on the role of preferences for the ranking of
(1− u)α˜ >,=, < 1. The following lemma summarizes this role.
Lemma 1 If preferences are quasilinear (and thus ε = 1), we have (1 − u)α˜ < 1. In all
other cases (1− u)α˜ >,=, < 1 is possible, with (1− u)α˜ > 1 achieved for sufficiently high
levels of α. In the limiting case of homothetic preferences (and thus ε = 0), (1− u)α˜ > 1
extends to all possible α > 1− γ if γ < exp[−1].
Proof. Formal proof in the Appendix
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Whereas production of differentiated goods promises a wage premium if households are
successfully matched with firms, applying for jobs in the sector producing differentiated
goods comes at the risk of being not successfully matched and experiencing an income loss.
The households’ risk attitudes and hence the evaluation of the risk of job loss depend on
their preferences (or, more specifically, on preference parameter ε). If ε = 1 preferences
are quasilinear and households are risk-neutral. In this case, the constraint in Eq. (4.12),
which makes workers indifferent between the two sectors, reduces to a condition equalizing
the expected disposable income from job search in the two sectors: (1−u)α˜w+uγw = w.
Because of their risk neutrality, households accept a relatively low probability of a suc-
cessful match and thus a relatively high rate of unemployment, when seeking employment
in the sector of differentiated goods, leading to (1 − u)α˜ < 1. Things are different if
households are risk-averse due to ε < 1, with the degree of risk aversion maximized in our
model if ε = 0 makes preferences homothetic. In this case, households applying for jobs
in the sector producing differentiated goods must be compensated for accepting the risk
of unemployment. With the wage premium α˜ > 1 fixed, risk aversion leads to a fall in the
unemployment rate, thereby increasing (1 − u)α˜. In the case of homothetic preferences
(1−u)α˜ > 1 is achieved for all α˜ > 1 and thus for all α > 1−γ, if unemployment compen-
sation is not too generous, i.e if γ < exp[−1].6 This is the parameter domain we focus on
in the subsequent analysis in order to emphasize the important role played by the degree
of risk aversion when contrasting the two limiting cases of quasilinear and homothetic
preferences.
With the insights regarding the relationship of production structure and average dis-
posable household income (expenditures) at hand, we now turn to the dispersion index of
disposable household income, which can be computed according to
ψ =
[(1− τ)wλ
e
]1−ε {
1 + h
[
(1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − 1
]}
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is the common income tax rate that is determined by the condition of a
balanced budget of the government:
τ ≡ huγ1 + h [(1− u)α˜+ uγ − 1] . (4.14)
Tax rate τ increases in the fraction of workers seeking employment in the production of
differentiated goods, h. This is because a higher h is associated with higher economy-wide
unemployment, U , implying that the now fewer employed production workers have to
finance the compensation for a larger mass of unemployed. Substituting tax rate τ and e
into ψ establishes
ψ = 1 + h
[
(1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − 1]
{1 + h [(1− u)α˜+ uγ − 1]}1−ε , (4.15)
6For a given wage premium α˜, a higher replacement rate γ increases household income in the event of
unemployment, and hence unemployment rate u has to increase in order to restore indifference condition
(4.12). This provides an intuition for an upper limit of γ needed to ensure (1 − u)α˜ > 1 for all possible
levels of α˜ if preferences are homothetic.
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where ψ = 1 holds in the case of Gorman form preferences, which are associated with the
limiting cases of ε→ 0 and ε→ 1. This points to the important result that higher degrees
of risk aversion do not exert a monotonic effect on dispersion index ψ. This is, because
the dispersion index does not capture the second moment of income distribution but the
impact of income distribution on the structure of consumer demand. With quasilinear or
homothetic preferences, aggregate consumer demand does not depend on the distribution
of disposable household income – provided that even the households with the lowest income
consume both goods. To ensure that this is the case, condition (1 − τ)γλ > β1/ε must
be fulfilled. This condition depends on the endogenous, yet to be determined, fraction of
workers seeking employment in the production of differentiated goods, h, which is different
for the closed and the open economy.7
4.3 The closed economy
To determine the fraction of workers seeking employment in the sector of differentiated
goods, h, we can make use of two important insights from our analysis. The first one is that
combining Eqs. (4.8) and (4.9), we can compute [(σ−1)/σ]ρr(ω)/l(ω) = λ[wκ(ω)−γw]/α
and can thus express the wage bill of firms as λlwκ = λlγw+ρrα(σ− 1)/σ. This captures
the outcome of wage bargaining (plus constant markup pricing) and, noting that M firms
enter and hH(1−u) workers find a job, allows us to determine a positive link between the
share of workers seeking employment in the sector of differentiated goods and the mass of
firms producing them according to
hHλw(1− u) = σ − 1
σ
ρMr, (4.16)
where wκ = (α+γ)w has been considered. A second relationship between h andM follows
from the market clearing condition for differentiated goods, can be derived from Eq. (4.5),
and is given by
Hλw
(
1− βλ−ε)+HλwB(h) =Mr, (4.17)
where B(h) ≡ h[(1 − u)α˜ − 1] + βλ−ε[1 − T (h)] is derived in the Appendix and cap-
tures the additional effect on consumer demand from the labor market distortion and the
tax-transfer scheme implemented to compensate the unemployed. Rent-sharing increases
market income of an endogenous fraction of h(1 − u) workers, who find employment in
the sector of differentiated goods and therefore benefit from a wage premium α˜ > 1. This
gives term h[(1− u)α˜− 1] as a first component of B(h). The second component captures
the demand effect through endogenous changes in the dispersion of disposable household
income, because workers seeking employment in the sector of differentiated goods can
experience an income increase or decrease, depending on their employment status, and
because the tax-transfer system makes disposable income more egalitarian. The combined
7To derive a sufficient parameter constraint for this condition to hold, we can note from above that τ
reaches a maximum at h = 1, which we denote by τ . Making use of Eqs. (4.12) and (4.14) we compute
τ ≡ {1+ α˜(1−γε)/[γ(α˜ϵ−1)]}−1 < 1, and hence (1−τ)γλ > β1/ε gives a sufficient condition in exogenous
model parameters for the intended result that all households purchase both types of goods.
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dispersion effect is captured by βλ−ε[1− T (h)], with
T (h) ≡
{
1 + h
[
(1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − 1
]}( 1 + h[(1− u)α˜− 1]
1 + h[(1− u)α˜+ uγ − 1]
)1−ε
. (4.18)
In the limiting case of homothetic preferences, we have limε→0 T (h) = 1+h[(1−u)α˜−1] > 0
and thus limε→0B(h) = h[(1− u)α˜− 1](1− β), whereas in the limiting case of quasilinear
preferences, we have limε→1 T (h) = 1 and thus limε→1B(h) = h[(1 − u)α˜ − 1]. In both
scenarios, B(h) captures a pure efficiency effect due to changes in the level of average
disposable household income, while changes in the dispersion of income do not exert an
additional effect in the case of Gorman form preferences. However, this efficiency effect
is not the same for homothetic and quasilinear preferences. As pointed out by Lemma
1, in the case of quasilinear preferences (1 − u)α˜ < 1 holds for all possible parameter
configurations, and hence the demand for differentiated goods is reduced by the labor
market distortion, because the negative employment effect dominates the positive wage
effect of those successfully matched to firms. In contrast, with homothetic preferences,
(1 − u)α˜ > 1 is achieved for all possible α > 1 − γ if unemployment compensation is not
too generous, establishing T (h) > 1. If preferences do not have Gorman form, demand for
differentiated goods is furthermore influenced by the dispersion of disposable household
income. Whereas this complicates the analysis considerably, the model remains nicely
tractable for ε = 1/2. In this case, we have T (h) < 1 (using the indifference condition in
Eq. (4.12)), so that the combined dispersion effect on demand for differentiated goods is
positive. This suggests that the increase in the dispersion of market income dominates the
decrease in the dispersion of disposable income due to the tax-transfer system and implies
that demand for differentiated goods is further increased by the labor market distortion.
Combining Eqs. (4.16) and (4.17) allows us to solve for the equilibrium fraction of
workers seeking employment in the sector of differentiated goods. The respective solution
is given by the condition Γ(h) = 0, with
Γ(h) ≡ 1− h
[
1 + σ
σ − 1(1− u)− γ(1− u)
]
− βλ−εT (h). (4.19)
We show in the Appendix that Γ(h) = 0 has a unique solution in h. Combining this
solution with Eq. (4.16) and the zero-profit condition ρr = σPY f determines the equilib-
rium mass of firms producing differentiated goods, M . For Gorman form preferences, we
get explicit solutions for h and M . For the limiting case of homothetic preferences, we
compute
h =
1−β
1−u
σ
σ−1
1
ρ − 1−β1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
, M =
(1−β)Hλ
(σ−1)f
σ
σ−1
1
ρ − 1−β1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
, (4.20)
whereas in the case of quasilinear preferences, we obtain
h =
λ−β
λ(1−u)
σ
σ−1
1
ρ − 11−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
, M =
(λ−β)H
(σ−1)f
σ
σ−1
1
ρ − 11−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
. (4.21)
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Higher levels of per-capita labor endowment λ make for a given allocation of workers
all households richer and increase the expenditures for differentiated goods. In the case
of homothetic preferences the expenditure shares of differentiated goods are independent
of λ, so that the now higher demand for differentiated goods is offset by the now higher
supply of labor producing them, leaving the fraction of workers seeking employment in the
sector of differentiated goods, h, unaffected. Things are different in the case of quasilinear
preferences. With expenditure shares for differentiated goods increasing in λ, more workers
are needed in the sector of differentiated goods to fulfill the now higher consumer demand
for these goods. As a consequence, h has to increase to restore market clearing. Irrespective
of the preferences, more firms will enter the now larger market for differentiated goods.
A higher relative bargaining power of workers α can increase or decrease the fraction of
workers seeking employment in the sector of differentiated goods. A higher α must lower
employment rate 1−u to restore indifference of workers between the two sectors. All other
things equal, a higher fraction of workers must therefore seek employment in the sector
of differentiated goods to fulfill a given demand. This effect can be counteracted if an
increase in average disposable household income, due to an increase in (1 − u)α˜, induces
households to increase their demand for the homogeneous good, causing a reallocation
of labor away from the sector of differentiated goods. This second effect needs not to
work against the first one, because average disposable household income can fall in α and
because with quasilinear preferences income changes leave demand for the homogeneous
good unaffected. However, in general it is a priori not clear, which of the two effects
dominates, so that dh/dα can be positive or negative. Whereas we cannot rule out positive
effects of a stronger labor market distortion on the fraction of workers seeking employment
in the sector of differentiated goods, the mass of firms producing them, M , unambiguously
decreases in α in the two limiting cases captured by Eqs. (4.20) and (4.21). This is, because
a higher wage premium increases the costs of production, and therefore makes entry less
attractive for firms. Whereas an increase in average disposable household income would
counteract this effect, it does not dominate because the respective demand stimulus is
mitigated by an income loss of those workers becoming newly unemployed in the sector of
differentiated goods.
Changes in the fraction of workers seeking employment in the sector of differentiated
goods and changes in the mass of firms producing them are important determinants of
welfare effects. In the two limiting cases of ε → 0 and ε → 1 preferences have Gorman
form, giving the representative consumer a normative interpretation. This allows us to
consider utility of the representative consumer as a proper welfare function, establishing8
VCD (e, PY , PX) ≡ ln
(
e
P βY P
1−β
X
)
, VQL (e, PY , PX) ≡ e
PX
− β PY
PX
− 1 + β (4.22)
in the case of homothetic (log-transformed Cobb-Douglas) and quasilinear preferences,
8The (price-invariant) representative level of expenditures is defined by Muellbauer (1975) as the ex-
penditure level that gives the same expenditure shares for the homogeneous good and differentiated goods
as observed for the whole economy. It is given by er = eψ− 1ε , and the household with this income level
is therefore called representative consumer. With Gorman form preferences, we have er = e, and we can
compute the welfare functions in Eq. (4.22) by determining indirect utility of the representative household,
using Eqs. (4.1)-(4.3).
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respectively. Substituting Eqs. (4.13), (4.20), and (4.21), and accounting for PX =
σ
σ−1
w
ρM
1
1−σ , we can express welfare as a function of λ and α. Intuitively, welfare increases
with per-capita labor endowment λ for two reasons: On the one hand, an increase in
per-capita labor endowment makes all households richer. In the case of quasilinear pref-
erences this direct effect is counteracted by an indirect effect, because the reallocation of
labor towards the production of differentiated goods leads to an aggregate income loss.
However, differentiating e, it is easily verified that the indirect effect cannot dominate. On
the other hand, a higher λ induces more firms to enter the sector of differentiated goods,
which leads to a fall in the CES price index PX . Regarding the effect of a higher wage
premium, we show in the Appendix that welfare unambiguously decreases in α if prefer-
ences are quasilinear. This is, because a stronger labor market distortion decreases average
disposable household income, lowers the mass of firms producing differentiated goods, and
increases the prices charged by the remaining firms. All three effects are detrimental for
social welfare. If preferences are homothetic, average disposable household income can
increase in α, thereby counteracting negative effects from a lower mass of firms and higher
prices for differentiated goods. In this case, a stronger labor market distortion can be a
stimulus for social welfare.
Whereas specifying a welfare function in the case of Gorman preferences is straightfor-
ward, choosing a proper welfare function is less obvious if preferences do not have Gorman
form, because the representative consumer does not bear a normative interpretation in this
case (see Muellbauer, 1975, 1976). One possibility put forward by Egger and Habermeyer
(2019) is to take a utilitarian perspective and we follow this approach in Section 4.5, where
we discuss how the results from our analysis change when ε ∈ (0, 1). This completes the
discussion of the closed economy.
4.4 The open economy
In the open economy, we consider trade between two countries that are symmetric in all
respects, except for their population size: H ̸= H∗, where an asterisk is used to indicate
foreign variables and to distinguish them from home variables. Trade in the homogeneous
good is free of costs, and hence wage w is the same in the two economies, provided that
production is diversified in either of the two economies. We discuss the parameter domain
supporting diversification below. Trade in differentiated goods is subject to iceberg trade
costs, implying that t 1σ−1 > 1 units of the good must be shipped in order for one unit to
arrive in the foreign country.
4.4.1 Characterization of the open economy equilibrium
Under diversification, the open economy equilibrium can be characterized by combining
the outcome of wage bargaining with the zero-profit conditions and goods market clearing
for differentiated goods in the two economies. Following the steps of the closed economy,
we find that wage bargaining (plus constant markup pricing) establishes a proportional
link between the fraction of workers seeking employment in the sector of differentiated
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goods, h, and the mass of firms producing them, M . We obtain
hHλw(1− u) = σ − 1
σ
ρMr, h∗H∗λw(1− u) = σ − 1
σ
ρM∗r∗ (4.23)
for home and foreign, respectively. Contrasting Eqs. (4.16) and (4.23), we see that trade
leaves the link between h and M established by wage bargaining unaffected. This result
is intuitive because Eqs. (4.8) and (4.9) are the same in the closed and the open economy.
Furthermore, firm-level revenues in home and foreign, r and r∗, respectively, are linked
by the zero-profit conditions ρr = σPY f , ρr∗ = σPY f . Accordingly, firm-level revenues
are the same in the two economies, provided that production is diversified and that trade
of the homogeneous good is costless. Market clearing in the sector of differentiated goods
gives for home and foreign
Hλw
(
1− βλ−ε)+HλwB(h) = Mrt1 + t + M
∗r∗
1 + t ,
H∗λw
(
1− βλ−ε)+H∗λwB(h∗) = M∗r∗t1 + t + Mr1 + t ,
(4.24)
respectively.
Combining Eqs. (4.23) and (4.24) and accounting for the zero-profit conditions, we
can solve for the equilibrium values of h and h∗ in the open economy. These values are
determined by a system of two equations
h∗ = 1
η
Φ(h), h = ηΦ(h∗), (4.25)
with η ≡ H∗/H,
Φ(x) ≡ x+ σ − 1
σ
ρ(1 + t)
1− u Γ(x), x = h, h
∗, (4.26)
and Γ(·) being defined in Eq. (4.19). The first expression in (4.25) makes use of market
clearing for differentiated goods at home and therefore gives the response of h to changes
in h∗ that is necessary to restore market clearing in home. The second expression in
(4.25) makes use of market clearing for differentiated goods abroad and therefore gives the
response of h∗ to changes in h that is necessary to restore market clearing in foreign.
We illustrate the open economy equilibrium for the case of symmetric countries (η = 1)
in Figure 4.1. There, we depict the two equations in (4.25) in (h, h∗)-space by the two
curves Φ(h) and Φ(h∗), respectively. The negative slope of the two curves is assumed
for now and further discussed below. Φ(h) has an intercept with the vertical axis at
Φ(0) = σ−1σ
ρ(1+t)
1−u (1 − βλ−ε) and this intercept is denoted by f1(t), with f ′1(t) > 0. Due
to symmetry of the two trading partners, the intercept of Φ(h∗) with the horizontal axis
is also given by f1(t). Furthermore, Φ(h) has an intercept with the horizontal axis if
h + σ−1σ
ρ(1+t)
1−u Γ(h) = 0 has a solution in h. For −1−u1+t
[
t
(
σ
σ−1 − γ
)− α˜] − βλ−εT (1) < 0
a solution exists and it lies on the unit interval.9 We denote this solution by f2(t), with
9To see this, we can substitute Eq. (4.19) for Γ(·) and evaluate Φ(x) at x = 0 and x = 1. This
gives Φ(0) = σ−1
σ
ρ(1+t)
1−u (1 − βλ−ε) > 0 and Φ(1) = σ−1σ ρ(1+t)1−u
{
− 1−u1+t
[
t
(
σ
σ−1 − γ
)
− α˜
]
− βλ−εT (1)
}
,
respectively.
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f ′2(t) < 0, and it is unique due to our assumption that Φ(h) has a negative slope.
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium in the open economy with symmetric countries
We can now make use of Figure 4.1 to discuss existence, uniqueness, and stability
of the open economy equilibrium. Showing existence of the open economy equilibrium is
simple for the case of symmetric countries, because we see in Figure 4.1 that the two curves
Φ(h) and Φ(h∗) intersect in point A at the 45◦-line, where the fractions of workers seeking
employment in the sector of differentiated goods are the same in the two economies and
are given by their autarky levels. This establishes h = h∗ = ha, with subscript a used to
indicate an autarky variable. To show uniqueness of the intersection point, we can define
a critical
t(x) ≡ − 2σ
σ − 1
1− u
ρ
Γ′(x)−1 − 1, x = h, h∗ (4.27)
such that Φ′(h) < −1 holds if t > t(h), whereas Φ′(h∗) < −1 holds if t > t(h∗). Noting
that t > max {t(0), t(1)} is sufficient for Φ′(h) < −1 to extend to all h ∈ (0, 1) and for
Φ′(h∗) < −1 to extend to all h∗ ∈ (0, 1)10, it follows from t > max {t(0), t(1)} that curve
Φ(h) is steeper than curve Φ(h∗), proving uniqueness of intersection point A on the unit
interval. Finally, stability of the open economy equilibrium in point A follows from its
uniqueness and is illustrated by the grey arrows in Figure 4.1. Of course, the analysis so
far has been confined to diversification equilibria, and one may suspect that an equilibrium
with full specialization of production in one of the two economies also exists, as indicated,
for instance, by a point like B. However, this is not true, because the requirement of
market clearing rules out such an outcome provided that f2(t) < 1. This follows from the
direction of the grey arrows in Figure 4.1.
The open economy equilibrium is no longer symmetric, however, if the two countries
10To see this, it is worth noting that the second derivative of Φ(h) adopts the properties of the second
derivative of Γ(h): Φ′′(h) = σ−1
σ
ρ(1+t)
1−u Γ
′′(h). In the Appendix we discuss the properties of Γ(h) and show
in particular that only two cases are possible, namely either Γ′′(h) > 0 or Γ′′(h) < 0 for all h, ruling out
that Γ(h) has an extremum at the unit interval. In both cases, we can conclude that Φ′(h) < −1 must
hold for all possible h ∈ (0, 1) if Φ′(0) < −1 and Φ′(1) < −1.
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differ in their population size. For instance, if the foreign country is larger than the
domestic one, we have η > 1, and in this case the foreign country features a larger market
for differentiated goods. This case is illustrated in Figure 4.2. In the closed economy,
the additional demand for labor from a larger population size is offset by a larger labor
supply, leaving the fraction of workers seeking employment in the sector of differentiated
goods unaffected. Accordingly, the autarky equilibrium remains to be given by point A,
irrespective of the prevailing differences in population size. Things are different in the open
economy. From previous work on home-market effects (cf. Helpman and Krugman, 1985),
we know that in a setting as ours “a country whose share of demand for a good is larger
than average will have – ceteris paribus – a more than proportionally larger-than average
share of world production of that good” (Crozet and Trionfetti, 2008, p.309). Therefore,
in the open economy the fraction of workers seeking employment in the production of
differentiated goods increases in foreign and decreases in home if η > 1. In Figure 4.2 the
relative increase in foreign market size leads to a counter-clockwise rotation of locus Φ(h)
and locus Φ(h∗) in their respective intercepts f2(t). These intercepts are unaffected because
they capture the local market clearing conditions in the respective countries if worldwide
production of differentiated goods is concentrated there. Accordingly, relative country
size differences are irrelevant for the positions of these intercepts. Things are different
for intercepts f1(t), which reflect the local market clearing conditions in the respective
countries if no local production is left. In this case, relative country size differences exhibit
the largest effect. Figure 4.2 shows a new open economy equilibrium in point A˜ and
illustrates that access to trade leads to an expansion of the production of differentiated
goods in the country with the initially larger market for these goods and to a contraction
of the production of differentiated goods in the other economy.
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium in the open economy with asymmetric countries
For a better understanding of how trade affects the allocation of labor, we can de-
termine the effects of marginal changes in trade cost parameter t on h and h∗. These
effects are illustrated in Figure 4.3. Starting point is the open economy equilibrium for
asymmetric countries depicted by point A˜. Due to our assumption that foreign is larger
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than home, this equilibrium corresponds to a production pattern with h˜∗ > h˜. The au-
tarky equilibrium is depicted by point A and leads to a symmetric outcome in the two
economies regarding the fraction of workers seeking employment in the sector of differen-
tiated goods: h = h∗ = ha. An increase in the trade cost parameter from t to t′ rotates
locus 1ηΦ(h) clockwise in point C. To understand this effect, it is worth noting that a
clockwise rotation of 1ηΦ(h) captures that higher trade costs make the home market more
relevant for firms and guard domestic producers in their home market from competition
with foreign ones. As a consequence, for higher levels of t an increase in foreign production
(reflected by an increase in h∗) induces a smaller production decrease at home (reflected by
a less pronounced decline in h) to restore market clearing there. This makes locus 1ηΦ(h)
steeper. Locus 1ηΦ(h) rotates in point C, because in this point the fraction of workers
seeking employment in the sector of differentiated goods at home is at its autarky level:
h = ha. This establishes Γ(h) = 0, and we can conclude from Eq. (4.25) that in this case
changes in t do not affect h∗ for a given level of h. Using the same reasoning, it follows
that ηΦ(h∗) rotates counter-clockwise in point C∗, implying that higher trade costs bring
the fraction of workers seeking employment in the sector of differentiated goods closer to
the autarky levels of the two economies. To put it differently, higher trade costs lower the
scope for specialization in the open economy.
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Figure 4.3: Increase in trade cost parameter from t to t′
With the solution for h and h∗ at hand, we can make use of the outcome of wage
bargaining in (4.23) and the zero-profit conditions ρr = ρr∗ = σPY f to solve for the
equilibrium masses of domestic and foreign producers of differentiated goods, M and M∗,
respectively. As pointed out above, h = h∗ holds under autarky, irrespective of prevailing
size differences of the two economies. Whereas the fraction of workers seeking employment
in the sector of differentiated goods is the same, the two countries differ in the mass of firms
producing differentiated goods in the closed economy. Since the market for differentiated
goods is larger in foreign than in home if η > 1, we have M∗ > M . Since wage bargaining
(plus constant markup pricing) establishes for either country a positive link between the
fraction of workers seeking employment in the sector of differentiated goods and the mass
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of firms producing them, we can conclude from the graphical analysis in Figure 4.2 that
trade leads to firm entry in the larger country and to firm exit in the smaller one, thereby
augmenting pre-existing differences in the mass of local firms producing differentiated
goods. From Figure 4.3, we can further conclude that higher trade costs bring the masses
of firms closer to their respective autarky levels, reducing the differences in the local mass
of firms producing differentiated goods. This completes the characterization of the open
economy equilibrium.
4.4.2 Trade pattern, unemployment and welfare
With the mass of firms determined in the previous section, we can now make use of the
zero-profit conditions and compute home’s total exports and imports of differentiated
goods according to
EXX =M
1
1 + t
σPY f
ρ
, IMX =M∗
1
1 + t
σPY f
ρ
, (4.28)
respectively. This implies that home is a net-importer of differentiated goods, EXX <
IMX , if the foreign to domestic firm ratio µ ≡M∗/M is larger than one. This is the case,
if foreign is the larger economy, η > 1, and therefore offers the larger home market for
differentiated goods. The opposite is true if home is the larger economy. In this case, η < 1
establishes µ < 1 and thus EXX > IMX . This trade structure is well in line with other
models featuring a home-market effect (see Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Assuming that
households in the case of indifference purchase the domestic product, we have IMY = 0 and
EXY = IMX −EXX if η > 1 and therefore ∑j(EXj + IMj) = 2IMX , where j ∈ {X,Y }
is an industry index. In contrast, η < 1 gives EXY = 0 and IMY = EXX − IMX and
thus ∑j(EXj + IMj) = 2EXX . Also, higher trade costs lower the mass of firms that are
active in the larger economy, thereby reducing the volume of trade.
The trade structure in our model is directly linked to the employment effects of trade.
From the analysis in the closed economy, we know that only a fraction 1 − u of workers
seeking employment in the sector of differentiated goods is successfully matched with a
firm. Since 1 − u is pinned down by the condition that under diversification workers
must be indifferent between employment in the production of the homogeneous good or
employment in the production of differentiated goods and since this indifference condition
is given by Eq. (4.12) and thus the same in the closed and the open economy, the economy-
wide rate of unemployment, U ≡ hu, can be affected by trade only through adjustments in
the fraction of workers seeking employment in the sector producing differentiated goods,
h. This establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 6 In the open economy, the larger country is net-exporter of differentiated
goods and suffers from a higher rate of unemployment. An increase in trade costs lowers
the export of differentiated goods in the larger and the import of differentiated goods in the
smaller economy. The economy-wide rate of unemployment decreases in the larger and
increases in the smaller economy.
Proof. The proposition follows from the analysis above.
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The link between trade structure and unemployment established in Proposition 6 is a
direct consequence of associating employment in the sector of differentiated goods with a
higher risk of unemployment. This property of our model is akin to the distinction put
forward by Acemoglu (2001) between good jobs offering high wages at the cost of a longer
duration of unemployment to wait for the respective offer and bad jobs associated with
low wages and a shorter duration of unemployment. The link between unemployment and
wages is also well in line with the observation from the US that manufacturing, while
offering higher hourly earnings than the average workplace according to data from Bureau
of Labor Statistics, is prone to longer durations of unemployment (see Chien and Morris,
2016).
Since the large country is net-exporter of differentiated goods, it experiences an increase
in the rate of unemployment in the open economy. However, this does not mean that
trade is to the detriment of the larger economy. To see this, we can determine the welfare
effects of trade. As pointed out in the analysis of the closed economy, the representative
consumer in the case of PIGL preferences does not have a normative interpretation in
general, implying that the choice of a proper welfare function is a priori not clear. This is
different if preferences have Gorman form, and we therefore focus on the two limiting cases
of homothetic and quasilinear preferences for now, while discussing the case of ε ∈ (0, 1)
in Section 4.5.
If households have Gorman form preferences, we can combine Eqs. (4.23) and (4.24)
to compute an explicit solution for the ratio of foreign to domestic firms µ as a function of
the relative foreign population size η and trade cost parameter t. This gives for homothetic
and quasilinear preferences
µ = ηδ(t)− 1
δ(t)− η , µ =
ηδˆ(t)− 1
δˆ(t)− η , (4.29)
respectively, with
δ(t) ≡ t− σ − 1
σ
ρ(1 + t)
1− u [(1− u)α˜− 1] (1− β), δˆ(t) ≡ t−
σ − 1
σ
ρ(1 + t)
1− u [(1− u)α˜− 1] .
(4.30)
Furthermore, using the definition of µ in Eq. (4.24) and accounting for the markup pricing
rule in Eq. (4.23) and zero-profit condition ρr = σPY f , we can determine the fraction of
workers seeking employment in the sector of differentiated goods and the mass of firms
producing them in home. For the case of homothetic preferences, we compute
h =
1−β
1−u
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t − 1−β1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
, M =
(1−β)Hλ
(σ−1)f
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t − 1−β1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
, (4.31)
whereas for the case of quasilinear preferences, we obtain
h =
λ−β
λ(1−u)
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t − 11−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
, M =
(λ−β)H
(σ−1)f
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t − 11−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
. (4.32)
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With Eqs. (4.31) and (4.32) at hand, we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Let us assume that preferences have Gorman form and let us consider an
open economy equilibrium with diversified production in both economies. Then, a decline
in the trade cost parameter increases welfare in the larger economy, while it can increase
or decrease welfare in the smaller economy if (1 − u)α˜ > 1. Things are different if
(1 − u)α˜ < 1. In this case, a decline in the trade cost parameter increases welfare in the
smaller economy, whereas it can increase or decrease welfare in the larger economy.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To provide an intuition for the welfare effects described in Proposition 7, we can distinguish
three channels through which a decline in trade costs impacts welfare in our model. The
first one is a fall in the price of differentiated goods imported from the foreign economy.
This effect is captured by an increase in (1+t)/t in price index PX = σσ−1 wρ
(
M µ+t1+t
1+t
t
) 1
1−σ ,
and it also exists if countries are symmetric and hence in cases in which η = 1 and the
fraction of workers seeking employment in the sector of differentiated goods as well as
the mass of firms producing them remain at their autarky levels. If countries differ in
their population size, there are two additional effects. The first one is a disposable in-
come effect, which materializes through changes in e = wλ{1 + h[(1 − u)α˜ − 1]} and can
be positive or negative. It is positive for the larger country net-exporting differentiated
goods if (1 − u)α˜ > 1, because in this case the wage premium received by workers newly
employed by firms producing differentiated goods dominates the income loss of the newly
unemployed. The opposite is true if (1 − u)α˜ < 1. Disposable income effects in the two
countries go into opposite directions, because the fraction of workers seeking employment
in the sector of differentiated goods increases in the larger and decreases in the smaller
economy.
Finally, there exists a variety effect, because existing firms change the location of
production (captured by changes in µ for a given total mass of producers, M + M∗)
and because firms enter or exit the market (captured by changes in the total mass of
producers, M +M∗, for a given µ). This variety effect materializes through changes in
price index PX = σσ−1 wρ
(
M µ+t1+t
1+t
t
) 1
1−σ due to changes in the composite termM µ+t1+t and it
can be positive or negative. In the larger country, which net-exports differentiated goods,
the mass of domestic producers increases. However, the mass of foreign firms decreases
and the former dominates the latter only if trade increases average disposable household
income, i.e. if (1 − u)α˜ > 1. In this case, the larger country net-exporting differentiated
goods unambiguously benefits from a fall in the trade cost parameter. Things are different
if (1 − u)α˜ < 1. In this case, a negative disposable income effect and a negative variety
effect counteract the positive effect of cheaper access to foreign imports, and we show in
the Appendix that they can dominate if σ is sufficiently large, because for high levels of σ
both the positive price effect for imported goods as well as the negative variety effect are
relatively small compared to the negative income effect.
While Proposition 7 is valid for both types of Gorman form preferences, there is a
difference regarding the expected trade effects for homothetic and quasilinear preferences.
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As pointed out by Lemma 1, quasilinear preferences establish (1−u)α˜ < 1 for all possible
α > 1 − γ. This is because in the limiting case of ε → 1 households are risk-neutral
and hence they find it attractive to seek employment in the sector of differentiated goods
and accept a lower probability of finding a job whenever this causes an increase in their
expected income. This leads to a relatively low employment rate in the sector of dif-
ferentiated goods, implying that the impact of trade on economy-wide unemployment is
fairly strong. As a consequence, average disposable labor income falls in the country ex-
panding production of differentiated goods, so that the larger country is at risk of double
losses from trade due to an increase in the economy-wide unemployment and a decrease
in the representative consumer’s welfare level if preferences are quasilinear. Things are
different in the case of homothetic (log-transformed Cobb-Douglas) preferences, because
households are risk-averse and thus expect a compensation for the possibility of ending
up in an unfavorable state of unemployment when applying for jobs in the sector of dif-
ferentiated goods. For a given wage premium offered by firms producing differentiated
goods, this results in a higher employment rate 1 − u, and thus in a moderate increase
in unemployment when exporting in the open economy increases the fraction of workers
seeking employment in the sector of differentiated goods, h. As put forward by Lemma
1, (1 − u)α˜ > 1 is guaranteed for all α > 1 − γ if γ < exp[−1]. This implies that if
preferences are homothetic and unemployment compensation is not too generous, trade is
to the benefit of the larger economy, but may be detrimental for the smaller country.11
Double losses from trade are not possible in this case.
4.5 Extensions
To complete the analysis in this paper, we discuss two extensions of our model. In the
first one, we consider the case of ε ∈ (0, 1) and analyze to what extent the insight from
the two limiting cases of homothetic and quasilinear preferences are informative about
the trade effects if preferences do not have Gorman form. In the second extension, we
consider differences of countries in the per-capita labor endowment of households and
study whether rich or poor countries are more likely to benefit from trade liberalization.
4.5.1 Trade effects if preferences do not have Gorman form
As pointed out above, the representative consumer in our model does not have a normative
interpretation if ε ∈ (0, 1). This makes the choice of a social welfare function somewhat
arbitrary. Egger and Habermeyer (2019) suggest to take a utilitarian perspective and to
use average household utility as a social welfare function. This establishes
V (e, PY , PX , ψˆ) ≡ 1
ε
(
PY
PX
)ε [( e
PY
)ε
ψˆ − β
]
− 1− β
ε
, (4.33)
11In many applications to international trade, economists set unemployment compensation equal to 0
(see, e.g., Helpman et al., 2010; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2012). Due to the risk aversion of households
with homothetic preferences in our model, the employment probability in the sector of differentiated goods
increases to one in the limiting case γ → 0, so that trade would not affect economy-wide unemployment
and would therefore increase average disposable household income unambiguously.
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where ψˆ ≡ H−1 ∫i∈H (ei/e¯)ε di is a dispersion index, which is equal to ψ only if ε = 1/2. Eq.
(4.33) is a natural candidate for our welfare analysis and it converges to VCD(e, PY , PX)
and VQL(e, PY , PX) in the limiting cases of ε→ 0 and ε→ 1, respectively. As extensively
discussed in Egger and Habermeyer (2019), the welfare function in Eq. (4.33) features
social inequality aversion (through ψˆ < 1), which, however, is not the consequence of a
prioritarian social planner but is rooted in the risk aversion of households imposed by the
preferences in Eq. (4.1). Thus, the welfare function in Eq. (4.33) would associate a market
outcome with the same level but a higher dispersion of disposable household income with
a lower level of welfare, providing scope for achieving a welfare gain through redistribution
of income from richer to poorer households.
In comparison to the limiting cases of homothetic and quasilinear preferences studied in
the previous section, the assumption of non-Gorman form preferences opens an additional
channel through which trade affects welfare in the open economy, namely through changes
in the dispersion of disposable household income. Thereby, changes in the dispersion of
disposable household income influence welfare through a direct and an indirect effect. The
direct effect works through the social income inequality aversion and implies that welfare
decreases if trade lowers ψˆ. The indirect effect works through changes in firm entry.
Because the Engel curves for luxuries are convex, while the Engel curve for necessities is
concave, an increase in the dispersion of disposable household income increases consumer
demand for differentiated goods and therefore leads to additional firm entry through a
decline in ψ. This firm entry lowers price index PX relative to price PY with positive
welfare implications, according to Eq. (4.33). To keep things simple, we look at the case
of ε = 1/2, implying that the two dispersion measures are equal: ψ = ψˆ. In this case, we
have (1− u)√α˜+ u√γ = 1 from Eq. (4.12) and thus
√
e
PY
ψ =
√
λT (h) =
√
λ
1 + h[(1− u)α˜− 1]
1 + h[(1− u)α˜+ uγ − 1] , (4.34)
with T ′(h) < 0. Furthermore, the constraint that even unemployed households consume
the differentiated good, (1− τ)λγ > β2, establishes √e/PY ψ = √λT (h) > β. Combining
the market clearing condition in Eq. (4.24) with the zero-profit condition ρr = σPY f , we
further compute
M
µ+ t
1 + t =
Hλρ
σf
{
1 + h [(1− u)α˜− 1]− β
(√
λ
)−1
T (h)
}
. (4.35)
Substituting into the price index for differentiated goods, we then obtain the welfare
function
V (·) = 2
(√
σ
σ − 1
1
ρ
)−1 (
Hλρ
σf
) 1
2(σ−1)
Vˆ (h)− 2(1− β), (4.36)
with
Vˆ (h) ≡
{[
1 + h[(1− u)α˜− 1]− β
(√
λ
)−1
T (h)
]1 + t
t
} 1
2(σ−1) [√
λT (h)− β
]
. (4.37)
4.5. EXTENSIONS 105
Noting from Figure 4.3 that dh/dt < 0 if home is a net-exporter of differentiated goods,
we can conclude that (1 − u)α˜ > 1 is no longer sufficient for gains from trade in the
larger economy. If σ is sufficiently large, the detrimental impact of trade on the level and
dispersion of disposable household income (captured by a lower
√
λT (h)−β) may dominate
the gains from a lower import price and a positive variety effect. This strengthens our
insights from the main text that the specific form of preferences plays a crucial role for
the welfare effects of trade in our model.
4.5.2 Trade effects in the case of rich and poor countries
We now consider trade between two countries that differ in the labor endowments of
households but feature the same total effective labor supply, Hλ = H∗λ∗. Households
with a richer labor endowment receive higher disposable income and their country is thus
associated with the richer economy. With differences in the households’ labor endowments,
the outcome of wage bargaining (plus constant markup pricing) and the market clearing
conditions for differentiated goods change to
hHλw(1− u) = σ − 1
σ
ρMr, h∗H∗λ∗w(1− u) = σ − 1
σ
ρM∗r∗ (4.23′)
and
Hλw(1− βλ−ε) +HλwB(h) = Mrt1 + t +
M∗r∗
1 + t ,
H∗λ∗w(1− β(λ∗)−ε) +H∗λ∗wB∗(h∗) = M
∗r∗t
1 + t +
Mr
1 + t ,
(4.24′)
respectively, where B∗(h∗) is defined in analogy to B(h) with λ∗ replacing λ. Combining
Eqs. (4.23′) and (4.24′), we compute
h∗ = Φ(h), h = Φ∗(h∗), (4.25′)
with Φ(h) given by Eq. (4.26), Φ∗(h∗) ≡ h∗ + σ−1σ ρ(1+t)1−u Γ∗(h∗), and Γ∗(h∗) defined in
analogy to Γ(h), with λ∗ replacing λ.
System (4.25′) gives two equations in two unknowns, which can be combined to solve
for the equilibrium values of h and h∗ in the open economy. For this purpose, we make use
of Figure 4.4, where the open economy equilibrium for the case of two symmetric countries
is given by point A (similar to Figure 4.1). A richer labor endowment of households in the
foreign country (λ∗ > λ) increases the home market for differentiated goods there, pro-
vided that higher average disposable household income increases demand for differentiated
goods, which is the case if ε > 0. Then, the fraction of workers producing differentiated
goods is already under autarky higher in foreign than at home, which can be seen from
contrasting h∗a in point A′ with ha in point A. In the open economy equilibrium (point
A˜), the difference between h and h∗ is further increased, because foreign specializes on
the production of differentiated goods in line with the idea of a home-market effect put
forward by Helpman and Krugman (1985).12
12The equilibrium is derived for the case of diversification of production in both economies. With a
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Figure 4.4: Open economy equilibrium if foreign is richer than home (λ∗ > λ)
With the equilibrium labor allocation at hand, we can derive the mass of firms pro-
ducing differentiated goods from the outcome of wage bargaining in Eq. (4.23′) and the
zero-profit conditions ρr = ρr∗ = σPY f . Provided that ε > 0, the richer country hosts
a larger mass of firms producing differentiated goods, and hence becomes net-exporter of
these goods in the open economy. Similar to the baseline scenario with country asym-
metries rooted in different population sizes, net-exporting differentiated goods comes at
the cost of a higher economy-wide unemployment rate. To determine the welfare effects
of trade, we proceed as in the main text and focus on the two limiting cases representing
Gorman form preferences. From Eq. (4.31), we see that for symmetry of the two coun-
tries in aggregate labor supply Hλ = H∗λ∗, h and M are the same in the two economies
and do not differ from their autarky levels (due to µ = 1) if preferences are homothetic
(ε = 0). In this case, trade leaves unemployment unaffected and increases welfare in
both economies. With quasilinear preferences (ε = 1), differences in the households’ labor
endowments generate differences of the two economies in their demand for differentiated
goods. This establishes h∗ > h and M∗ > M if λ∗ > λ, implying that the richer country
net-exporting differentiated goods not only suffers from an increase in the economy-wide
rate of unemployment but may also experience welfare losses from trade if σ is sufficiently
large (see the Appendix).
4.6 Conclusion
We have developed a two-country model of trade with differentiated and homogeneous
goods using labor as the only production input. The model features a home-market effect
due to trade costs of differentiated goods. Whereas the labor market in the homogeneous
goods sector is perfectly competitive, there are search frictions and firm-level wage bar-
gaining in the sector of differentiated goods. This generates involuntary unemployment,
reasoning similar to the one in the main text, one can show that such an outcome is guaranteed for
sufficiently high trade costs.
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whose extent is linked to the fraction of workers seeking employment in the sector of dif-
ferentiated goods. The exact form of this link depends on consumer preferences, which
are assumed to be from the PIGL class and cover homothetic and quasilinear preferences
as two limiting cases.
In the open economy, the larger of the two countries specializes on the production of
differentiated goods and net-exports these goods. Since seeking employment in the sector
of differentiated goods is prone to the risk of unemployment, trade increases the economy-
wide rate of unemployment in the larger economy. In the case of quasilinear preferences,
trade lowers average disposable household income and exerts a negative variety effect in
the larger country, so that social welfare can be reduced there, although the prices of
imported goods are reduced. Things are different in the smaller country, which benefits
from trade. If preferences are homothetic, trade induces an increase of average disposable
household income and generates a positive variety effect in the larger economy, provided
that unemployment compensation is not too generous. This adds to the gains from lower
import prices, implying that the larger country benefits from trade, despite an increase in
the economy-wide rate of unemployment. At the same time, the smaller country can lose
from trade, because the negative income and variety effects work against the gains from
lower import prices.
In an extension of our analysis, we study non-Gorman preferences and show that in
this case changes in the dispersion of income exert an additional impact on welfare, which
is missing under homothetic and quasilinear preferences. The impact of changes in the
dispersion of income is twofold. On the one hand, a higher income dispersion increases
demand for differentiated goods, which are luxuries in our model. This implies that higher
income dispersion leads to firm entry and therefore induces indirect welfare gains due to
a love-of-variety effect. On the other hand, from a utilitarian perspective welfare exhibits
social inequality aversion, so that higher income dispersion reduces welfare through a
direct effect. In the open economy, the assumption of non-Gorman preferences implies
that an increase in the level of income is no longer sufficient for welfare gains from trade.
In a second extension, we consider differences of the two countries in their per-capita labor
endowments and show that such differences may lead to welfare loss in the richer economy
if preferences are quasilinear. In contrast, welfare gains are guaranteed for both countries
if preferences are homothetic, because with homothetic utility per-capita income levels
do not matter for aggregate consumer demand, implying that trade does not change the
production structure in the open economy.
To improve the exposition of our analysis, we have imposed several simplifying assump-
tions, which are not crucial for our results. For instance, allowing for differentiated goods
in only one sector and associating output of the other sector with a homogeneous good is
useful for the analysis of asymmetric countries. However, as long as the wage premium as
well as the risk of unemployment are larger in the sector associated with the production
of luxuries and as long as the elasticity of substitution between necessities is sufficiently
high, the main mechanisms of our model remain valid in a modified setting, in which the
differences of the two sectors are less pronounced. Also, allowing for heterogeneous firms
in the production of differentiated goods would not alter our results in a qualitative way.
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Whereas extensions in these directions are straightforward, we leave a detailed analysis of
them to the interested reader.
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4.7 Appendix
Microfoundation for the search and matching model
Starting point is the static search and matching model proposed by Helpman and Itskhoki
(2010),13 where the number of matches of workers with firms, L, is determined as a Cobb-
Douglas function of the mass of vacancies generated by firms, Q, and the mass of workers
seeking employment in the sector of differentiated goods, hH (see Pissarides, 2000, for an
extensive discussion of the Cobb-Douglas matching function):
L = mˆQχ (hH)1−χ , 0 < χ < 1. (4.38)
Thereby, parameter mˆ is a positive constant that measures the efficiency of the matching
process. Establishing a vacancy comes at the cost of one unit of the homogeneous good.
Assuming that not all vacancies can be successfully filled, hiring costs per worker can be
expressed by q−1w, where q ≡ L/Q < 1 is the probability to fill a vacancy. Denoting
the probability of finding a job by 1 − u < 1 the number of successful matches can be
expressed as L = hH(1− u). Substituting into Eq. (4.38), we can write
Q
hH
= m−1(1− u) 1χ , (4.39)
where m ≡ mˆ 1χ . In the main text, we consider the limiting case of χ → 1 and m = λ−1,
which then establishes Eq. (4.12) from the indifference condition of workers. To see that
looking at the limiting case does not change the main insights from our analysis, we can
determine employment rate 1 − u for the more general case of m < 1 (needed for q < 1)
and χ < 1. In this case, the employment rate 1− u is implicitly determined by
1− u = 1− γ
ε[
α
mλ(1− u)1/χ−1 + γ
]ε − γε , (4.40)
which delivers d(1 − u)/dα < 0 and d(1 − u)/dγ < 0 as in the baseline specification.
Furthermore, the insight from the main text regarding the ranking of (1 − u)α˜ >,=, < 1
also extends to the more general case. This completes our discussion of the matching
technology.
Proof of Lemma 1
Multiplying Eq. (4.12) by α˜ gives (1−u)α˜ = α˜(1− γε)/(α˜ε− γε) and thus (1−u)α˜− 1 =
α˜[(1− γε)/(α˜ε − γε)]− 1 ≡ Ψ(α˜). We compute Ψ(1) = 0, limα˜→∞Ψ(α˜) =∞, and
Ψ′(α˜) = Ψ(α˜) + 1
α˜
[
1− εα˜
ε
α˜ε − γε
]
, Ψ′′(α˜) = − εα˜
ε
α˜(α˜ε − γε)Ψ
′(α˜) + ε
2α˜εγε[Ψ(α˜) + 1]
α˜2(α˜ε − γε)2
(4.41)
13Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) also discuss an extension of their model to a dynamic setting, and we
therefore refer readers interested in such dynamic effects to their paper.
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From the derivatives of Ψ(α˜), we can safely conclude that if Ψ(α˜) has an extremum at
α˜ > 1, this extremum must be unique and a minimum, implying that Ψ(α˜) > 0 holds
for sufficiently high levels of α (with α = α˜ − γ). Furthermore Ψ′(1) ≥ 0 follows if
γ ≤ (1 − ε) 1ε ≡ γ(ε) and, in this case, Ψ′(α˜) > 0 and thus Ψ(α˜) > 0 holds for all α˜ > 1
or, equivalently, for all α > 1 − γ. Accounting for γ′(ε) < 0, limε→0 γ(ε) = exp[−1], and
limε→1 γ(ε) = 0 then establishes Lemma 1.
Derivations details for B(h) and Eqs. (4.17) and (4.18)
From Eq. (4.5) it follows that total expenditures for differentiated goods are equal to
∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)x(ω)dω = He
[
1− β
(
e
PY
)−ε
ψ
]
. (4.42)
Substituting Eq. (4.13) for e and Eq. (4.15) for ψ, we can express economy-wide demand
for differentiated goods as∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)x(ω)dω = Hλw {1 + h[(1− u)α˜− 1]} − βHλ1−εwT (h)
= Hwλ(1− βλ−ε) +HwλB(h), (4.43)
where the first equality sign uses the definition of T (h) in Eq. (4.18), while the second
equality sign uses the definition of B(h) in the main text. Setting ∫ω∈Ω p(ω)x(ω)dω =Mr
finally establishes the market clearing condition in Eq. (4.17). This completes the proof.
Determination of h and M in the closed economy
In the main text, we argue that Γ(h) = 0 has a unique solution on the unit interval. To
see this, we can first note that Γ(0) = 1 − βλ−ε > 0 and that Γ(1) = −( σσ−1 − γ)(1 −
u) − βλ−εT (1) < 0. Making use of the Intermediate Value Theorem, we can thus safely
conclude that Γ(h) = 0 has a solution in h ∈ (0, 1). As put forward in the main text,
in the two limiting cases of ε → 0 and ε → 1, we have T (h) = 1 + h [(1− u)α˜− 1] and
T (h) = 1, implying that Γ(h) = 0 has an explicit and unique solution in h ∈ (0, 1). Things
are less obvious if ε ∈ (0, 1). Twice differentiating Γ(h), we obtain
Γ′(h) = −
[
1 +
(
σ
σ − 1 − γ
)
(1− u)
]
− βλ−εT (h) (1− u)α˜
1−ε + uγ1−ε − 1
1 + h
[
(1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − 1]
+ βλ−εT (h) (1− ε)uγ{
1 + h
[
(1− u)α˜− 1]} {1 + h[(1− u)α˜+ uγ − 1]}
and
Γ′′(h) = βλ−εT (h) (1− ε)uγ{
1 + h
[
(1− u)α˜− 1]} {1 + h[(1− u)α˜+ uγ − 1]}×[
2
[
(1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − 1]
1 + h
[
(1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − 1] − (2− ε)uγ + 2[(1− u)α˜− 1]
{
1 + h[(1− u)α˜+ uγ − 1]}{
1 + h
[
(1− u)α˜− 1]} {1 + h[(1− u)α˜+ uγ − 1]}
]
.
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We next show that Γ′(0) < 0 and Γ′(1) < 0. For this purpose, we can first note that
Γ′(0) = −1 − ( σσ−1 − γ)(1 − u) − βλ−ε[(1 − u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − 1 − (1 − ε)uγ] and thus
Γ′(0) < −(1 − βλ−ε) − βλ−ε[(1 − u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − (1 − ε)uγ]. Positive expenditures of
differentiated goods require γλ(1 − τ) > β1/ε. Noting that τ = 0 if h = 0, we have β <
(γλ)ε and thus 1−βλ−ε > 1−γε > 0. This implies that (1−u)α˜1−ε+uγ1−ε−(1−ε)uγ > 0
is sufficient for Γ′(0) < 0. Second, we can note that
Γ′(1) = −[1 + σ
σ − 1(1− u)− γ(1− u)
]− βλ−ε ( (1− u)α˜(1− u)α˜+ uγ
)1−ε
Z(α˜), (4.44)
with
Z(α˜) ≡ (1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − 1− (1− ε)uγ
[
(1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε]
(1− u)α˜ [(1− u)α˜+ uγ] . (4.45)
If Z(α˜) ≥ 0, then Γ′(1) < 0 is immediate. If Z(α˜) < 0, we can note that h = 1 gives
τ = uγ/[(1− u)α˜+ uγ] and that λγ(1− τ) > β1/ε establishes
βλ−ε
( (1− u)α˜
(1− u)α˜+ uγ
)1−ε
< γε
(1− u)α˜
(1− u)α˜+ uγ
and thus
βλ−ε
( (1− u)α˜
(1− u)α˜+ uγ
)1−ε
Z(α˜) > γε
{
−1 + (1− u)α˜(1− u)α˜
1−ε + uγ1−ε
(1− u)α˜+ uγ
+ uγ(1− u)α˜+ uγ
[
1− (1− ε)(1− u)α˜
1−ε + uγ1−ε
(1− u)α˜+ uγ
]}
.
Using Eq. (4.12), we can note that [(1 − u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε]/[(1 − u)α˜ + uγ] >,=, < 1
if f(α˜) ≡ (1 − γε)α˜1−ε + (α˜ε − 1)γ1−ε − (1 − γε)α˜ − (α˜ε − 1)γ >,=, < 0. Thereby,
we have f(1) = 0 and f ′(α˜) = −(1 − γε)[1 − (1 − ε)α˜−ε] + εα˜ε−1[γ1−ε − γ], f ′′(α˜) =
−ε(1−ε)[α˜−ε−1(1−γε)+ α˜ε−2(γ1−ε−γ)] < 0. Hence, if f(α˜) has an extremum, it must be
a maximum. Noting further that f ′(1) = −ε(1−γε−γ1−ε+γ) < 0 holds for all permissible
levels of γ,14 it follows that f(α˜) < 0 and thus [(1− u)α˜1−ε+ uγ1−ε]/[(1− u)α˜+ uγ] < 1
hold for all α > 1− γ (and thus α˜ > 1). Putting together, we can therefore conclude that
βλ−ε
( (1− u)α˜
(1− u)α˜+ uγ
)1−ε
Z(α˜) > −γε
and this is sufficient for Γ′(1) < 0.
Let us now turn to the second derivative of Γ(h), for which we can note that
Γ′′(h) >,=, < 0 is equivalent to F (h) >,=, < 0, with
F (h) ≡ 2
[
(1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − (1− u)α˜
]
{1 + h [(1− u)α˜+ uγ − 1]}
− (2− ε)uγ
{
1 + h
[
(1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − 1
]}
.
(4.46)
14To see this, one can note that f ′(1) is increasing in γ and takes a value of zero if γ = 1.
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Then, F (h) < 0 and thus Γ′′(h) < 0 holds if (1 − u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − (1 − u)α˜ ≤ 0, and in
this case Γ′(0) < 0 is sufficient for Γ′(h) < 0 to hold for all h > 0. To see whether this can
be the case, we can note that (1 − u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − (1 − u)α˜ >,=, < 0 is equivalent to
ζ(α˜) ≡ (1− γε)α˜1−ε + (α˜ε − 1)γ1−ε − (1− γε)α˜ >,=, < 0. Then, accounting for ζ(1) = 0,
ζ ′(α˜) = −(1 − γε)[1 − (1 − ε)α˜−ε] + εα˜ε−1γ1−ε, ζ ′′(α˜) = −ε(1 − ε)[(1 − γε)α˜−ε−1 +
α˜ε−2γ1−ε
]
< 0, and limα˜→∞ ζ(α˜) = −∞, we can conclude that if ζ(α˜) has an extremum,
it must be a maximum and establish ζ(α˜) > 0. Such a maximum can only exist if ζ ′(1) > 0.
We have ζ ′(1) = −ε(1− γε− γ1−ε) >,=, < 0 if 0 >,=, < 1− γε− γ1−ε. This determines a
unique γ ∈ (0, 1), which is implicitly given by 1 − γε = γ1−ε, such that ζ ′(1) >,=, < 0 if
γ >,=, < γ. This implies that γ ≤ γ is sufficient for (1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − (1− u)α˜ ≤ 0
to hold for all α˜ > 1. In contrast, if γ > γ, there exists a unique α˜0 > 0, such that
(1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − (1− u)α˜ >,=, < 0 if α˜0 >,=, < α˜.
Let us now consider a parameter configuration (1 − u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − (1 − u)α˜ > 0.
This requires 1 − γε < γ1−ε. Then, differentiating Eq. (4.46), we see that F (h) is a
monotonic function. Furthermore, evaluating F (h) at h = 0 and h = 1, we obtain F (0) =
2
[
(1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − (1− u)α˜− uγ]+ εuγ and F (1) = {2[(1− u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − (1−
u)α˜ − uγ] + εuγ}(1 − u)α˜ + εuγ[(1 − u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − (1 − u)α˜], so that F (0) ≥ 0 is
sufficient for F (1) > 0. Substituting (1−u) and u from Eq. (4.12), we furthermore obtain
(α˜ε − γε)F (0) = 2
[
(1− γε)
(
α˜1−ε − α˜
)
+ (α˜ε − 1)
(
γ1−ε − γ
)]
+ ε(α˜ε − 1)γ ≡ G(α˜).
(4.47)
Differentiation ofG(α˜) givesG′(α˜) = 2{(1−γε)[(1−ε)α˜−ε−1]+εα˜ε−1(γ1−ε−γ)}+ε2α˜ε−1γ,
G′(1) = −2ε(1 + γ − γ1−ε − γε)+ ε2γ, limα˜→∞G′(α˜) = −2(1− γε), and G′′(α˜) = −ε(1−
ε)
{
2
[
(1−γε)α˜−ε−1+(γ1−ε−γ)α˜ε−2]+ εα˜ε−2γ} < 0. Two cases can be distinguished.15 If
2
(
1+γ−γ1−ε−γε) ≥ εγ, which is the case for sufficiently low values of γ, then G′(1) ≤ 0,
and hence G′(α˜) < 0 holds for all possible α˜ > 1. In this case, G(1) = 0 is sufficient for
G(α˜) < 0 and thus F (0) < 0 hold for all α˜ > 1. We can therefore conclude that either
F (h) < 0 for all h or there exists a critical h0, such that F (h) >,=, < 0 if h >,=, < h0.
With these considerations, we cannot rule out that Γ(h) has multiple extrema. However,
Γ(h) cannot have more than two interior extrema and if two extrema existed, the first
one would have to be a maximum, while the second one would have to be a minimum.
This is inconsistent with Γ′(0) < 0, Γ′(1) < 0, which requires in the case of two extrema
that the first one must be a minimum and the second one must be a maximum. For the
same reason, there cannot be a unique extremum, so that it must be true that Γ′(h) < 0
holds for all h ∈ (0, 1). This is sufficient for a unique interior solution of Γ(h) = 0. If
2
(
1 + γ − γ1−ε − γε) < εγ, which is the case for high levels of γ, then G′(1) > 0 implies
that G(α˜) is positive for low levels of α˜ > 1 and negative for high levels of α˜. From
limα˜→∞G(α˜) = −∞ and the derivation properties of G(α˜), it follows that there exists a
unique α˜1 > 1, such that G(α˜) >,=, < 0 if α˜1 >,=, < α˜. The analysis above extends to
the case 2(1+γ−γ1−ε−γε) < εγ if α˜ ≥ α˜1, which ensures that the solution of Γ(h) = 0 on
the unit interval is unique. Things are different, however, if α˜ < α˜1 establishes G(α˜) > 0
15From above, we know that 1− γε < γ1−ε. However, this does not rule out one of these cases.
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and thus F (0) > 0. However, using the monotonicity of F (h) it follows from F (1) > 0
– due to our assumption of (1 − u)α˜1−ε + uγ1−ε − (1 − u)α˜ > 0 – that Γ′′(h) > 0 must
hold. This implies that Γ(h) has at most one extremum, which would have to be a unique
minimum. However, a minimum is in contradiction to Γ′(1) < 0, so that we can safely
conclude that Γ′(h) < 0 again holds for all h ∈ (0, 1), which is sufficient for the solution
of Γ(h) = 0 to be unique. This completes the proof.
Welfare effects of an increase in α in the closed economy
We first consider the case of homothetic (log-transformed Cobb-Douglas) preferences, so
that welfare is given by VCD(e, PY , PX) in Eq. (4.22). Substituting PX = σσ−1 wρM
1
1−σ and
e = wλ
{
1 + h[(1 − u)α˜ − 1]}, and accounting for h and M from Eq. (4.20), we compute
VCD(·) = lnλ+ 1−βσ−1 ln
(
(1−β)Hλ
(σ−1)f
)
+ ln [V0(α)], with
V0(α) =
(
σ
σ − 1
1
ρ
)β { σ
σ − 1
1
ρ
− 1− β1− u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
}−σ−β
σ−1
.
dVCD(·)/dλ > 0 is immediate. Furthermore, acknowledging ρ = σσ+α(σ−1) , α˜ = α+ γ and
1− u = − ln γln α˜−ln γ , the derivative of V0(α) can be computed according to
V ′0(α) = V0(α)
 βσ
σ−1
1
ρ
− σ − β
σ − 1
β − (1− β) 1α˜ ln γ
σ
σ−1
1
ρ − 1−β1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
 . (4.48)
Evaluated at α = 1− γ (and thus α˜ = 1), we compute V ′0(1− γ) < 0. For higher levels of
α, the marginal effect is however not clear. For instance, setting parameter values σ = 2,
β = 0.8, and γ = 0.98, V0(α) has a local minimum at α = 6.46.
Let us now turn to the limiting case of ε → 1. Accounting for h and M from Eq.
(4.21), we can express welfare by VQL(·) = (λ− β)
σ
σ−1
[
H
(σ−1)f
] 1
σ−1 Vˆ0(α)
σ
σ−1 − 1 + β, with
Vˆ0(α) =
{
σ
σ − 1
1
ρ
− 11− u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
}−1
=
(
σ
σ − 1 − γ +
α
1− γ
)−1
. (4.49)
Thereby, the second equality sign makes use of the definition of ρ and 1 − u = 1−γα from
Eq. (4.12). From these computations, we can conclude that VQL(·) increases in λ and
decreases in α. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7
Let us first consider the limiting case of homothetic (log-transformed Cobb-Douglas) pref-
erences, with welfare given by VCD(e, PY , PX) in Eq. (4.22). Substituting h and M from
Eq. (4.31) into e = wλ{1 + h[(1 − u)α˜ − 1]} and PX = σσ−1 wρ
(
M µ+t1+t
1+t
t
) 1
1−σ , we can
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compute
e = wλ
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t − 1−β1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
, (4.50)
PX =
σ
σ − 1
w
ρ
((1− β)Hλρ
σf
) 1
1−σ
 σσ−1 1ρ µ+t1+t
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t − 1−β1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
1 + t
t
 11−σ . (4.51)
Substituting into VCD(e, PY , PX), then gives VCD(·) = −(1 − β) ln
(
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
)
+ lnλ +
1−β
σ−1 ln
(
(1−β)Hλρ
σf
)
+ ln [V1(t)],
V1(t) =
 σσ−1 1ρ µ+t1+t
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t − 1−β1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]

σ−β
σ−1 (1 + t
t
) 1−β
σ−1
, (4.52)
where µ is given by Eq. (4.29). Differentiating f(t) ≡ µ+t1+t establishes
f ′(t) = 1− µ(1 + t)2 +
dµ
dt
1
1 + t =
1
1 + t
[
1− µ
1 + t +
1− η2
[δ(t)− η]2 δ
′(t)
]
. (4.53)
Noting that µ >,=, < 1 if η >,=, < 1 from Eq. (4.29) and that δ′(t) > 0 from Eq. (4.30),
we can safely conclude that f ′(t) >,=, < 0 if 1 >,=, < η. Furthermore, differentiating
V1(t) gives
V ′1(t) = V1(t)
−σ − β
σ − 1
1−β
1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1] 1+tµ+tf ′(t)
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t − 1−β1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
− 1− β
σ − 1
1
t(1 + t)
 . (4.54)
This derivative is unambiguously negative if either 1 > η (home net-exporting differen-
tiated goods) and (1 − u)α˜ > 1 or 1 < η (home net-importing differentiated goods) and
(1− u)α˜ < 1. In contrast,
lim
σ→∞V
′
1(t) = −
(1 + α)1−β1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]f ′(t){
(1 + α)µ+t1+t − 1−β1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
}2 (4.55)
is positive if 1 > η (home net-exporting differentiated goods) and (1− u)α˜ < 1 or if 1 < η
(home net-importing differentiated goods) and (1− u)α˜ > 1. This completes the proof of
Proposition 7 for the limiting case of ε→ 0.
If preferences are quasilinear, welfare is given by VQL(e, PY , PX) in Eq. (4.22). Sub-
stituting h and M from Eq. (4.32) into e = wλ{1 + h[(1 − u)α˜ − 1]} and PX =
σ
σ−1
w
ρ
(
M µ+t1+t
1+t
t
) 1
1−σ , we can compute
e
PY
− β = (λ− β)
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t − 11−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
, (4.56)
PX =
σ
σ − 1
w
ρ
(
Hρ
σf
) 1
1−σ
(
(λ− β) σσ−1 1ρ µ+t1+t
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t − 11−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
1 + t
t
) 1
1−σ
. (4.57)
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This allows us to determine VQL(·) =
(
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
)−1 (Hρ
σf
) 1
σ−1 Vˆ1(t)− 1 + β, with
Vˆ1(t) =
(
(λ− β) σσ−1 1ρ µ+t1+t
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t − 11−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
) σ
σ−1 (1 + t
t
) 1
σ−1
. (4.58)
Differentiation with respect to t gives
Vˆ ′1(t) = Vˆ1(t)
− σ
σ − 1
1
1−u [(1− u)α˜− 1] 1+tµ+t fˆ ′(t)
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
µ+t
1+t − 11−u [(1− u)α˜− 1]
− 1
σ − 1
1
t(1 + t)
 , (4.59)
where fˆ(t) ≡ µ+t1+t and µ = ηδˆ(t)−1δˆ(t)−η have been considered. In analogy to the case of
homothetic preferences, we find that this derivative is unambiguously negative if 1 < η
(home net-importing differentiated goods) and (1 − u)α˜ < 1. In contrast, we find that
limσ→∞ Vˆ ′1(t) is positive if 1 > η (home net-exporting differentiated goods) and (1−u)α˜ <
1. This completes the proof of Proposition 7 for the limiting case of ε→ 1.
Formal details for the analysis in Section 4.5.2
Let us consider the limiting case of ε → 1 and focus on an interior solution with h, h∗ ∈
(0, 1). Then, accounting for the definition of δˆ(t) in Eq. (4.30), we can follow the steps
from the main text to compute
µ = ηˆδˆ(t)− 1
δˆ(t)− ηˆ , ηˆ ≡
λ∗ − β
λ∗
λ
λ− β . (4.60)
Thereby, µ >,=, < 1 if λ∗ >,=, < λ and thus ηˆ >,=, < 1. Noting that h and M are
given by (4.32) and following derivation details from above, we can compute VQL(·) =(
σ
σ−1
1
ρ
)−1 (Hρ
σf
) 1
σ−1 Vˆ1(t) − 1 + β, with Vˆ1(t) given by Eq. (4.58). The welfare effects of
trade discussed in Section 4.5.2 then follow from the proof of Proposition 7.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The purpose of this thesis has been to analyze the role of preferences in international trade
theory by means of three different modeling approaches. In all three articles, we have
concentrated on the class of “price-independent generalized-linear” (PIGL) preferences
and have focused on how these preferences determine the production structure, shape the
trade pattern and influence the welfare effects of trade in open economies, with the three
models differing, however, in their respective focus.
Different from previous research on the home-market effect, Chapter 2 has considered
a subclass of parametric PIGL preferences and rent sharing at the firm level. Relying
on a subclass of parametric PIGL preferences for which a closed form representation of
direct utility exists, we have avoided an integrability problem. Rent sharing has generated
sector-specific wages, which are important to generate a two-way linkage between income
differences and trade. Assuming that households differ in their effective labor supply,
which has established differences in their ex ante level of labor income, demand for the
differentiated good has been larger in the country that features a higher level and/or higher
dispersion of per-capita income. We have then shown that, in line with the home-market
effect, countries have a trade surplus in the good for which they have relatively higher
domestic demand. Furthermore, due to the labor market imperfection, the trade pattern
has been decisive for the welfare outcome in the open economy, such that there might be
losers from globalization.
Chapter 3 has put forward a generalization of parametric PIGL preferences in a home-
market model along the lines of Chapter 2. This generalization has come at the cost that
a closed form representation of the direct utility function does not exist, giving rise to
an integrability problem, which needs to be solved in order to ensure that the demand
functions derived from indirect utility are indeed the result of utility maximization of
rational households. We have solved this problem by introducing an intermediate goods
sector, which produces differentiated goods that are costlessly assembled to a homogeneous
final good. Workers have been ex ante heterogeneous in their effective labor supplies, which
has led to heterogeneous labor incomes. Due to the non-linearity of Engel curves, demand
for the homogeneous luxury good has been larger in the country that features a higher
level and/or higher dispersion of per-capita income, translating into a larger home-market
for differentiated intermediates. Associating trade with the exchange of the outside good
and differentiated intermediate goods, the level and/or dispersion of per-capita income
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have shaped the production and trade structure in accordance with the well-established
model of the home-market effect. In the absence of a price distortion on the labor market,
the existence of welfare gains from trade for both trading partners has been independent
of the trade structure, however, their magnitude may vary.
Chapter 4 has presented a home-market model with a homogeneous goods sector, pro-
ducing under perfect competition, and search frictions and firm-level wage bargaining in
the monopolistically competitive sector of differentiated goods, while featuring a specific
form of parametric PIGL preferences. With a particular emphasis on the limiting cases of
homothetic and quasilinear preferences, we have elaborated on how the specific nature of
preferences affects the employment and welfare effects of trade. With differences of coun-
tries only due to differences in their population size, the findings in the open economy have
been in line with the home-market effect discussed in Helpman and Krugman (1985). In
our setting, the larger country has featured a higher economy-wide rate of unemployment
in the open economy, irrespective of the considered preferences. However, the preference
structure has been decisive for the welfare effects of trade. If preferences were homothetic,
the large country would likely benefit from trade, whereas the smaller country might lose
from trade. Considering quasilinear preferences, the opposite has been true.
Relaxing the assumption of useful but rather restrictive homothetic preferences makes
the analysis in this thesis formally demanding. For that reason, we have made use of
several other simplifying assumptions – standardized in the trade literature – to keep the
different model frameworks tractable and to focus on the main questions of interest. There
exist numerous possibilities how to model nonhomotheticity in a theoretical trade context,
once relying, for instance, on different demand-side factors and preference structures. Of
course, this thesis cannot provide all possible channels through which preferences affect
outcomes of models in international trade theory. Nevertheless, this thesis contributes
to this large strand of literature by incorporating parametric PIGL preferences, which
feature a well-defined representative consumer, to existing trade models. This has the
convenient advantage, that an aggregation problem with heterogeneous households does
not exist and thus provides a model framework, which can tackle per-capita income and
the distribution of per-capita income. Since income inequality and redistribution of income
are topics of particular importance in the theoretical and empirical trade literature, our
modeling approaches pave the way for further research about the role of PIGL preferences
in international trade theory.
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